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From Definition to Exploration: Social
Groups and Political Asylum Eligibilityt

MAUREEN GRAVES*

INTRODUCTION

Despite this country's self-image as a haven for the persecuted,

political asylum claims may receive less careful consideration, given
the stakes, than claims in any other proceedings in American law.
This lack of care creates undue obstacles for applicants even when
criteria for decision-such as religious or racial persecution-are relatively straightforward. When the reasons for persecution are less
familiar, not only the petitioner's claims, but also the purpose and
intent of this country's asylum law can be completely lost. The right
to claim asylum based on persecution due to "membership in a particular social group"1 is in danger of suffering this fate. Such grants
have always been rare, partly because of institutional inadequacies;
recent decisions restrict this basis for asylum even more. This Article
will criticize recent judicial and administrative attempts to define
and apply the concept of "persecution" on account of "membership
in a particular social group," and will analyze how these attempts
relate to broader questions concerning the availability of asylum.
Both petitions for protection based on "social group" membership
and attempts to bring group-level evidence to bear in adjudications
have fared badly in administrative proceedings and sometimes in
courts. Recent attempts to define "social group" have produced narrowing constructions which are not only inconsistent with the language and legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), but mutually inconsistent and internally confused as well.
t I am grateful for the helpful suggestions and criticisms of Alex Aleinikoff, Ricky
Blum, Steve Cohen, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Lewis Kornhauser, Anne Pilsbury, and Ken
Pomeranz. I am also grateful to Carolyn Patty Blum for providing briefs from the
Sanchez-Trujillo case as well as for her critical comments.

* The author is teaching at Loyola Law School and in the Politics & Society de-

partment at the University of California, Irvineo As a law student at NYU, she assisted
in representing Salvadoran refugees in individual asylum hearings and appeals and in
class actions challenging INS policies, including Campos v. Nail, infra note 127.
1. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(42) (1982).
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The flexibility intended by Congress-and demonstrated by decisions
applying the "social group" concept without elaborate discussion-has been undermined. Two major cases which have produced
important, incorrect,
and
mutually inconsistent
definitions--Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS2 and In re Acosta4--will be analyzed in detail.
In Sanchez-Trujillo, the Ninth Circuit, claiming to rely on word
meaning, interpreted "social group" as limited generally to voluntary, cohesive, and homogeneous groups in which people know one
another; it preferred small and "readily identifiable" groups. 4 Many
of Pol Pot's victims would be excluded. 5 The court offered the family
as the paradigm group,6 suggesting that it is more important that the
group be small than that it be voluntary. The Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) took an almost opposite tack in In re Acosta, limiting
eligibility to members of groups sharing characteristics which are
"immutable" or so "fundamental" that people ought not to have to
change them.' The linguistic peculiarity of these restrictive definitions suggests-as do references by both the Ninth Circuit and BIA
to "policy" concerns-that something other than an attempt to discover congressional intent is going on here. Both the BIA and Ninth
Circuit appear concerned that, without some restriction of the kind
they offer, the "social group" provision is dangerously expansive. I
will argue that courts should neither pioneer nor acquiesce in attempts to reduce asylum eligibility to a level more "realistic" than
that mandated by Congress.
These decisions violate the doctrine of separation of powers and
defy logic. Part I of this Article will examine congressional intent
and the separation of powers doctrine with respect to immigration
law and will show that neither the courts nor the executive may
properly narrow asylum standards. Part I then turns to the logic of
both restrictive definitions of "social group," and shows that the de-

cisions are historically and linguistically indefensible. Both fail to do
what useful definitions should: clarify issues so that individual adjudications will be simpler yet remain fair.
Part II argues that a proper understanding of "social group" could
2.
3.
4.
5.
groups,
6.
7.

801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
Interim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985).
See infra text accompanying notes 208-75.
The Khmer Rouge, who ruled Cambodia from 1975 until 1979, persecuted large
such as educated people and urban dwellers.
Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
See infra text accompanying notes 171-93.

help confine the executive's role in asylum adjudications to that assigned it by Congress. A proper understanding of "social group"
would also clarify the basic, yet currently unclear, concept of "persecution." Such an understanding would cast more light on the evidentiary burdens properly placed on asylum seekers than the abstract
analyses of probability of persecution thus far preoccupying courts
and commentators. It would draw attention to the right questions:
whether particular groups of people are subject to persecution; and
whether group membership combined with whatever individual evidence an asylum seeker can offer justifies or requires protection.
Part III of the Article goes beyond the question of how to interpret "social group" as a basis for eligibility to examine a broader
problem in asylum hearings. The broader problem predates Acosta
and Sanchez-Trujillo and has roots which are more bureaucratic
than doctrinal: evidence on "social groups" to which petitioners
claim to belong tends to be excluded or discounted. This rejection
sometimes is based on an explicit narrowing of the statute, and
sometimes on an amorphous insistence on "individualized" asylum
cases. Greater openness to group-level evidence would improve adjudications, which now rely on an unsatisfactory combination of: (1)
highly subjective evaluations of individual credibility; and (2) generalized country-wide evidence. The latter is often dismissed as overly
"general" when offered by applicants, but accepted uncritically when
it comes from the Department of State. Like a literal, consistent
reading of "social group," increased openness toward group-level evidence would bring asylum adjudications closer to what Congress intended-careful assessment and resolution of individual claims of
persecution in accordance with our international obligations.
PART I: "SOCIAL GROUP"-CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND
INTERPRETIVE DISTORTION

A.

The Asylum Framework and Social Group Membership

The Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted after experience with refugees from Southeast Asia, Africa, Haiti, and elsewhere made tragically obvious the inadequacy of the then existing global and domestic
framework for providing havens. 8 Burdens fell mainly on poor countries close to crises, which received inadequate financial and resettlement assistance.' Several important subscribing states, including the
8. See generally G. LOESCHER & J. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES
AND AMERICA's HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945-PRESENT (1986).

9. For a discussion of Southeast Asia, see infra note 101. For a discussion of
Latin America, see infra notes 144-46. Many African countries have been extremely
generous as countries of first asylum. See, e.g., Fuchs, Immigration and Fear, Wash.
Post, Aug. 6, 1982, at A17, col. 3 ("Tiny Somalia, with a miserable per capita gross
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United States, had not fully implemented international covenants requiring protection of refugees. 10
By passing the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress not only responded
to the immediate crisis, but established a framework for fulfilling
international obligations. The Act was the result of years of committee and other deliberations on refugee policy." As the Supreme
Court put it:
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of
"refugee," and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance
with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,

to which the United States acceded in 1968.1"

Congress established procedures for admitting refugees from
abroad,' 3 and created two remedies for foreigners already within the
United States who fear persecution from their governments or from

forces their governments are unable or unwilling to control.' 4 "Political asylum" is available under section 208 of the INA for persons
who can demonstrate a "well-founded fear" of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership
in a particular "social group."' 5 However, this relief, which includes
eligibility for adjustment to permanent resident status, is discretionary; the power to grant or deny asylum is vested in the Attorney

General.' 6 A stricter standard-showing a "clear probability" of

national product of $130, has accepted more than 1.5 million refugees from Ethiopia-one for every 2.4 of its own population.").
10. See Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1125 (1980) (though 1967 Protocol intended to be self-executing, United States failed to
conform fully before 1980); see also In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (BIA 1973)
(Attorney General obliged to conform previously discretionary actions to international
commitments).
11. See Anker, The Refugee Act of 1980: An HistoricalPerspective, in 5 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 89 (L. Tomasi ed. 1983) (Act well considered rather than
"impulsive").
12. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (citations omitted); see
also 125 CONG. REC. 23,232 (1979) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("[Refugee Act] will
make our law conform to the UN Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees, which we signed in 1969."); H.R. REP.No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1979).
See generally Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the
Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9 (1981).
13. On overseas screening and admission, see A. LEIBOWITZ, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND REFUGEE POLICY § 4.04 (1983).
14. For convenience, "persecution" will refer to persecution by regimes except
where persecution by nongovernmental entities is specifically mentioned.
15. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982) (incorpo-

rating definition of refugee from Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8
U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1982)).
16. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 426 n.3, 427.

persecution on one of the five grounds-applies to nondiscretionary
"withholding of deportation" under section 243(h) of the INA: a
person cannot be deported to any country in which she would "more
likely than not" be persecuted. 17 Both standards have subjective as
well as objective components; the applicant must be afraid, and the
level of risk must be sufficient either to create a "clear probability"
of persecution, for withholding of deportation, or make fear "wellfounded," for purposes of section 208 asylum. 18 Both forms of relief
are popularly known as asylum, and section 208 applications raised
in the context of deportation proceedings are automatically also considered as section 243(h) petitions for withholding of deportation. 19
Persons who have persecuted others or committed serious nonpolitical crimes are excluded from any relief.20
Asylum may be sought affirmatively, by applying to an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) district director, 21 or defensively, during deportation 22 or exclusion 23 proceedings. Denials by a
district director cannot be challenged directly, but such claims can
be raised de novo in a deportation proceeding. 24 Denials in deportation hearings may be appealed to the BIA, and then to the federal
courts of appeals.2 5 Denials in, exclusion proceedings may be challenged by petitioning a federal district court for a writ of habeas
corpus.26

In passing the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress attempted to introduce standard procedures and uniform criteria for refugee decisions,
moving decisionmaking away from the older and chaotic ad hoc approach27 (which included such phenomena as executive grants of
mass "parole" followed by congressional adjustment of status).28
Congress directed the Attorney General to create standardized procedures 9 to assess the factual bases underlying petitions for relief
17. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). This distinction, developed by the Supreme Court in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca,may misread congressional intent and fail
to meet international obligations. Congress may have intended to bar deporting any person to a country where she would face a well-founded fear of persecution. See Helton,
Stevic: The Decision and its Implications, 3 IMMIGR. L. REV. 49, 54 (1984).
18. See supra notes 15-17.
19. Avila-Torres v. INS, 790 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 8 C.F.R. §
208.3(b) (1987).
20. See In re McMullen, Interim Dec. No. 2967 (BIA 1984).
21. T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 642-43
(1985).
22. Aliens who have entered the country may face deportation proceedings.
23. Aliens who have not technically "entered" are placed in exclusion proceedings.
24. T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 643.
25. Immigration and Nationality Act § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982).
26. Id. § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(b) (1982).
27. See R. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 8.1, at 264-66 (1985).

28. See Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 819, 847-54 (1982).
29. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). Proce-
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from persons already here. These procedures were to be available

regardless of manner of arrival or status; persons otherwise deportable for unlawful entry or excludable for lack of a visa 30 could inter-

pose asylum petitions as a defense.3 '
A central aim of the 1980 Refugee Act was to change the pattern
in which the United States had generously protected persons fleeing
left wing governments but had denied protection to victims of right
wing, often "friendly," governments. This intention was noted by
legislators of varying political perspectives.3 2 Congress repealed geographic restrictions which limited refugee status to persons fleeing
the Middle East and communist or communist dominated countries.3 " Congress was aware that the new definition of refugee was
much broader than the old.3 4 Legislators who wished to continue the
pattern of discriminatory, ad hoc preferences for anticommunist refugees lost.3 5

The Act mandated preferential treatment in overseas admission
dures have been codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1986).
30. For an explanation of the distinction between "deportable" and "excludable"
aliens, see infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
31. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982) (provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically
present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such
alien's status, to apply for asylum

. .

.") (emphasis added).

32. See S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) (Refugee Act "repeals the
current immigration law's discriminatory treatment of refugees by providing a new definition of a refugee that recognizes the plight of homeless people all over the world").
During the Senate debates, elimination of ideological discrimination was mentioned repeatedly by members of varying political stances. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. 23,240
(1979) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); id. at 23,239 (statement of Sen. Boschwitz).
House materials make the same point. See H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 12, at I ("the
bill amends the definition of refugee to eliminate current discrimination on the basis of
outmoded geographical and ideological considerations").
33. See Anker, supra note 11.
34. See 125 CONG. REc. 37,241 (1979) (statement of Rep. Weiss) ("There may be
those who contend that the proposed definition [from the UN Protocol] is too broad. I
believe the current definition is far too narrow and that it prevents far too many desperate people from receiving asylum in our country.").
35. A few legislators proposed that some special arrangement be made for Indochinese refugees, but opposed broader initiatives. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 4,502
(1980) (statement of Rep. McClory in debate on Conference Committee bill). Since the
National Commission on Refugee Policy has not yet reported,

all we should be doing at the present time is to provide some kind of interim

legislation which would authorize a program for the present accommodation of
refugees from Southeast Asia. To suggest that we should here and now establish a new mechanism for receiving refugees in large numbers over a relatively
long period of time seems to me to be a most unfortunate step for the Congress
to be taking at this time.
Id.

for persons of "special humanitarian concern" to the United States.

This included persons of diverse ideological positions for whom the
United States felt special concern or responsibility, whether because
of close historic connections with the individual or her country, family ties, the refugee's previous assistance to this country, or this
country's complicity with the persecuting regime.36 The term "humanitarian" was inserted for fear that a "special concern" provision
might be used by the executive to perpetuate existing ideological and
nationality biases.3 The expression was intended to make clear that
it was the plight of the refugee, not the connection with the United
States, that was crucial.38 For refugees facing a "clear probability"
of persecution, ideology became irrelevant; protection was
mandatory.3 9 Whether the executive may consider ideology in making discretionary determinations about persons who establish a
"well-founded fear" of persecution but fall short of showing a "clear
probability" is disputed. 0
The 1980 Refugee Act also introduced a new ground for protection-persecution "on account of membership in a particular social
group." Prior to 1980, political asylum had been available under section 243(h) of the INA, which authorized but did not require the
Attorney General "to withhold deportation of any alien. . .to any
country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical
persecution" on account of race, religion, or political opinion. 4 1 The
1980 Refugee Act's new definition of "refugee" for section 208 asy36. See 125 CONG. REc. 35,816 (1979) (statement of Rep. Fish) ("[Factors include] patterns of human rights violations in the refugees' country of origin, family, historical, cultural, and religious ties to this country, the likelihood of finding sanctuary
elsewhere, and previous contact with the United States government or United States
businesses abroad."). In describing provisions of the Conference Committee bill for admitting persons who had not left their home countries, Congresswoman Holtzman referred to Chile and Cuba as places "where there are political detainees or prisoners of
conscience of special humanitarian concern to the United States." 126 CONG. REc. 4,499
(1980). The Hmong (Meo) people of Laos, who were used by the CIA during the United
States war in Indochina, were among those Congress had in mind in providing that refugee slots should go to persons of "special humanitarian concern" to the United States.

Several members of Congress expressed particular concern for the Hmong during debates on the Refugee Act. See 125 CONG. REc. 35,813 (1979) (statement of Rep. Downey); see also H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 12, at 12-14; S. REP. No. 256, supra note
32, at 6.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 12, at 12-14; Anker, The Development of
U.S. Refugee Legislation, in 6 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 159, 161 (L. Tomasi ed.
1984).
38. See 125 CONG. REC. 35,816 (1979) (statement of Rep. Fish) ("The
bill. . .came to the committee. . .[with] a standard of special concern and the word humanitarian was added to emphasize that the plight of the refugees themselves is paramount as opposed to national origins, political considerations or a possible contribution
by the United States to the refugee condition.").
39. Id.
40. See infra note 341 and accompanying text.
41. See Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952).
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lum and list of types of persecution for section 243(h) mandatory
withholding of deportation were drawn from international documents
ratified by the Senate in 1968.42 In international instruments4 3 a
"refugee" is any individual "who owing to a well-founded fear of
being persecuted.

.

.[because] of race, religion, nationality, member-

ship of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." Article
33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees prohibits contracting states, with certain exceptions, from expel-

ling or returning a refugee to a territory where his or her life or
freedom would be threatened on account of one of these bases." In
1968, when the Senate ratified the International Protocol on the Sta-

tus of Refugees, which incorporated the earlier Convention, it did
not address the meaning of the new "social group" ground. 45 The
meaning of "social group" also was not addressed in 1980, when
Congress created the legal mechanisms to implement it. But, it is
clear from committee reports and from statements of members from
diverse camps that congressional intent in ratifying the Protocol and
passing the Refugee Act was to bring United States law into conformity with international law.46
The international drafting history and other states' interpreta42. T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 626-27.
43. The United States is a state party to the United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S.

267 [hereinafter Protocol]. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention], is incorporated in
pertinent part by reference into the Protocol.
44. Article 33(1) of the Convention reads that:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for 'regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
Convention, supra note 43, at art. 33(1).
45. The only language which might conceivably be taken to cast light on the meaning of "social group" is inconclusive, and comes not from Congress but from President
Johnson's letter transmitting the proposed Convention and Protocol: "The Protocol constitutes a comprehensive Bill of Rights for refugees fleeing their country because of persecution on account of their political views, race, religion, nationality, or social ties." 114
CONG. REc. 24,628 (1968).
46. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

tions-both before and after 1980-make plain that "social group"
was intended to be interpreted broadly.47 As the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees put it, a "social group" "normally
comprises persons of similar background, habits or social status. ' 48
The international drafters deliberately created a residual category
for persons not covered by any of the other grounds.49 Possible narrower constructions, such as "ethnic minority" and "cultural group,"
were not used." The Conference of Plenipotentiaries, which finalized
the draft Convention, recognized that persecutors had sometimes victimized groups other than those identifiable by race, nationality, religion, or political conviction. They sought to protect victims of persecution regardless of the persecutors' motives, and unanimously
adopted the Swedish delegation's proposal that the concept of refugee be broadened by adding the "social group" basis for eligibility.5 1
As a special consultant to the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees wrote, in an important reference work published just
before the adoption of the 1967 Protocol, "[t]he notion of 'social
group' is of broader application than the combined notions of racial,
ethnic, and religious groups, and in order to stop a possible gap, the
Conference felt that it would be as well to mention this reason for
persecution explicitly." 52 He explained that "[n]obility, capitalists,
landowners, civil servants, businessmen, professional people, farmers,
workers, members of a linguistic or other minority, even members of
certain associations, clubs, or societies, all constitute social groups of
various kinds." 53 International fora and courts in other countries
have recognized members of formerly privileged classes attacked by
47. See generally G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2930 (1983) (broad definition encompasses "a combination of matters of choice with other
matters over which members of the group have no control"); Helton, Persecution on
Account of Membership in a Social Group as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM.
Hum. RTS. L. REV. 39 (1983); Comment, Asylum for Persecuted Social Groups: A
Closed Door Left Slightly Ajar-Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir.
1986), 62 WASH. L. REV. 913, 927-28 (1987).

48. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
HANDBOOK].

REFUGEE

STATUS

subpara. 77 (1979)

[hereinafter UN

49. Helton, supra note 47, at 45; see U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3, at 14 (1951).
For a summary of the UN Convention's Travaux Preparatoires,see Comment, supra
note 47, at 923-27.
50. Helton, supra note 47, at 43.
51. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.23, at 8 (1951). The Swedish representative explained that "experience had shown that certain refugees had been persecuted because
they belonged to a particular social group." U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR3, at 14 (1951).
At an earlier stage of drafting, the Italian government had expressed concern that an
"ampler" definition of refugee should be adopted. U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/L.40, at 13

(1950).
52.

1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN,

STATUS

OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL

(1966) (citing UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.19, at 14 (1951)).
53. Id.

LAW

219
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revolutionary governments as victims of persecution on the basis of

membership in class and occupational "social groups." 54 The drafters created an open-ended formulation which could deal with "evolving," "creative" forms of persecution. 5 In the mid-1960s, during the
development of the 1967 Protocol (which broadened the concept of
refugee to include persons not victimized by events before 1951 and
extended geographic coverage), it was recognized that new kinds of
refugees would be included. 6
54. Comment, supra note 47, at 927-28. For a summary of European cases involving textile manufacturers and dealers, former large property owners, capitalists and
tradespeople, and former Chinese bureaucrats, see 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 52,
at 17.
55. Helton, supra note 47, at 45 (the term "social group" is meant to cover "all
the bases for and types of persecution which an imaginative despot might conjure up").
There appears to have been concern that more specific language might be construed as
creating "negative implications" concerning grounds for persecution which were not
mentioned. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16, at 7 (1951). The delegate of the Holy See
noted with respect to the nonrefoulement provision that:
besides the grounds already stated. . .on which the life or freedom of refugees
might be threatened, the Swedish amendment sought to add the further ground
of membership of a particular social group. Further grounds of the same kind
can be found, but their enumeration might have dangerous consequences. In
order to avoid such a contingency, he considered it would be preferable to
amend article 28 to read: "where his freedom would be threatened on account
of the reasons which had compelled him to seek refuge."
Id.
56. The Preamble to the 1967 Protocol recites:
The States Parties to the present Protocol,
Consideringthat the Convention. . .covers only those persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951,
Considering that new refugee situations have arisen since the Convention
was adopted and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the
scope of the Convention,
Considering that it is desirable that equal status should be enjoyed by all
refugees covered by the definition in the Convention irrespective of the dateline
1 January 1951,
Have agreed as follows ...
Protocol, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, at 3, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268 (1967).
The Protocol permitted states which had already subscribed to the 1951 Convention, but
limited coverage to European refugees, to "grandfather" in that limitation, but newly

acceding states no longer had the option of limiting protection to refugees from Europe.

These limitations had been viewed as crucial in 1951; many governments insisted that a
covenant without such limitations would constitute a "blank check." See U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.2/SR.19, at 28 (1951) (statement of United States delegate); U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.2/SR.9, at 11, 13 (1951) (French delegate argued that failure of many developing countries to attend convention meant that the "system of generalized protection. . .had suffered a setback," that given failure of those countries to accept obligations, "a general provision from which the words 'in Europe' were missing would be a
travesty," that "[without dateline] governments would in fact be asked to sign a blank
cheque," and that even with dateline, omission of "in Europe" language would create
blank check, because "it would be almost impossible to determine what non-European

Nothing in the ratification documents or debates on the 1980 Refugee Act suggests that congressional intent was narrower. Many of
the just admitted Indochinese suffered as members of large occupational or cultural groups;57 such persons continued to be admitted
after the Refugee Act limited overseas admission to persons who
qualified as refugees under section 101(a)(42) of the INA. The
broad definition of refugee was viewed as correcting past Eurocentric
biases. 58 Congress was fully aware both during the 1968 ratification
discussions and during the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act that it
was creating a right to nonrefoulement59-- that is, a right on the part
of a refugee not to be returned to any country where she is likely to
face persecution or danger to life or freedom. Giving individuals
such an entitlement creates a situation in which protection cannot be
restricted to members of particular types of "social groups"; rather,
which groups are protected depends on which groups are persecuted.
Attempts to limit asylum law appear to be based on a sense that
Congress could not have intended to extend asylum to large numbers
of people. In fact, Congress in 1979 and 1980 was determined to
fulfill international obligations and what it saw as this country's historic role in protecting people persecuted in their home countries.
The United States was in the process of resettling large numbers of
Indochinese refugees, 60 and while it was hoped that need would soon
subside,61 Congress refused to set firm ceilings. Provisions for overseas admissions set an annual target of 50,000, but permitted the
President to exceed that figure following consultation with Conrefugees would be entitled to claim the benefits conferred by the Convention").
57. See Van Esterik, Lao, in REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 149, 154-55 (D. Haines ed. 1985) [hereinafter REFUGEES IN THE UNITED
STATES]. There was concern in the Senate that some Indochinese, including persons evacuated from South Vietnam in 1975, would not be covered by the United Nations language, and the Senate accordingly added "displaced persons" to cover such persons. See
S. REP. No. 256, supra note 32, at 4. That language was not accepted by the Conference
Committee. See infra note 408.
58. See 125 CbNG. REC. 35,818 (1979) (statement of Rep. Mikulski) ("the outmoded definition that we now have of a refugee... limits that primarily to those from Europe, when at the same time the refugee problem is enormously present in Asia and

Africa"); 126 CONG. REC. 4,507-08 (1980) (statement of Rep. Chisholm) (too few Latin
American and African refugees have been admitted considering those regions' human
rights situations). Congresswoman Chisholm also argued that the practice of permitting
refugee applications from abroad to be made only in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, and Lebanon "discriminate[s] against refugees from
the Caribbean, Latin America, and Africa, most of whom would be people of color." 125
CONG, REC. 35,820 (1979).
59. G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 47, at 69.
60. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1984, at A12, col. 3 (United States accepted 455,000
Vietnamese refugees).
61. Congress hoped that while the Indochina crisis might require flows above
50,000 for several years, that figure would prove adequate in the long run. H.R. REP. No.
608, supra note 12, at 11.
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gress.6 2 Opponents warned that "consultation" would give the President great leeway and could open the way for "unlimited" immigration. 3 Nevertheless, a House proposal to create a House veto over
admissions above the "normal" figure was rejected by the Confer-

ence Committee.64
The Refugee Act was viewed as a matter of urgent humanitarian
concern and an international obligation, not as just another category

of immigration. The House rejected a proposal to reduce family

reunification slots if admissions exceeded predicted levels.65 Congress
rejected suggestions that action on refugees be delayed until the re62. Immigration and Nationality Act § 207, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1157(a)-(e) (West
Supp. 1988).
63. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 12, at 61, 63 (Additional and Minority Views-statement of Rep. Sawyer) ("I believe that this bill dilutes the Congressional
mandate of absolute authority over immigration matters. This bill gives the Executive
Branch and the President complete control over refugee matters whether we like it or
not.").
Further minority views voiced were:
Only pro forma consultation with Congress is required of the President, and
there is no number limit to the number of refugees he may add. We oppose this
bill, as presently written, on the grounds that we have failed to adequately
consider all the implications of unlimited increases in immigration to the
United States. In Vietnam, America learned that it cannot be the world's policeman. From the Vietnamese, we also have to learn that we cannot be the
world's refuge.
Id. at 65; see also 125 CONG. REc. 35,813 (1979) (statement of Rep. Lott) (arguing that
bill opened way to unlimited numbers, and expressing concern over how many refugees
United States could absorb); 125 CONG. REc. 37,241 (1979) (statement of Rep. Tauke)

("The proposed legislation does not address the implications of unlimited increases in
immigration, although it potentially expands immigration without limits."). Sponsor
Holtzman denied that the bill would "open the floodgates to hordes of refugees." 125
CONG. REc. 35,814 (1979) (statement of Rep. Holtzman). She argued that "[t]o say
that it creates some sort of entitlement for refugees all over the world to come to the
United States is completely erroneous and in no way characterize [sic] what this conference report does." 126 CONG. REc. 4,507 (1980) (statement of Rep. Holtzman). Representative Fish pointed out that "[tihe bill also forbids the use of parole for refugees
except in individual cases involving compelling reasons in the public interest. Therefore,
we expect very few refugees to be admitted who would come in outside the structure
established in this legislation." 126 CONG. REc. 4,507 (1980) (statement of Rep. Fish).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980). There was considerable debate in the House over whether to accept the Conference Committee proposal,
which substituted nonbinding consultation for the House veto. See, e.g., 126 CoNG. REC.
4,505 (1980) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
65. In passing the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress rejected a proposal to subtract
"excess" refugee slots from those normally available for family reunification. 125 CONG.
REC. 37,227 (1979) (negative vote on Sensenbrenner amendment to reduce other slots by
one for every two refugee openings over 50,000 "ordinary" level). Opponents of the proposed amendment argued that no such trade-off was necessary. See 125 CoNG. REC.
37,223 (1979) (comments of Rep. Holtzman) (arguing that it is not necessary to pit
entry of refugees against the reunification of families).

lease of a comprehensive report on immigration."6 In 1982, after the
relevant report came out, Congress took up comprehensive immigra-

tion reform and again rejected a proposal to tie refugee admissions
to overall immigration ceilings.6 7 Congress refused to fix firm ceilings
or force refugees to compete with persons with domestic sponsors
because it realized that America's response to refugees was often too
little, too late, and often reflected short-term political concerns
rather than urgent needs.6 "
No numerical ceiling was placed on asylum grants, even though
the United States had already begun to be a country of first asylum.
Haitians had come in large, accelerating numbers during the
1970s,619 and their asylum prospects were discussed during debates

about the Refugee Act.7 0 Setting asylum quotas is inherently problematic anyway because applicants "choose" and transport them-

selves. Though a ceiling was placed on adjustments from refugee to
permanent resident status,7 ' temporary protection was not limited.
66. Senator Huddleston feared that the Act could permit "undetermined hundreds
of thousands of refugees" and warned that legal immigration, illegal immigration, and
refugees should no longer be treated separately. 125 CONG. REc. 23,241 (1979).
67. See 128 CONG. REc. 20,871 (1982) (statement of Sen. Huddleston). But see
Turning Mean on Immigration, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1982, at A14, col. I (editorial
criticizing Sen. Huddleston's proposal to impose ceiling of 425,000 per year on immigrant admissions, which would include refugees).
68. See Fuchs, supra note 9 (describing reasons for Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy conclusion that "lumping" refugees with other immigrants is
"bad public policy").
69. P. Weiss Fagen, Applying for Political Asylum In New York: Law, Policy, and
Administrative Practice 7 (Apr. 27, 1984) (Occasional Paper No. 41, Refugee Policy
Group, New York Research Program in Inter-American Affairs) (on file with author).
70. Congresswoman Chisholm reported the conclusion of a congressional Black
Caucus study that "there can be no doubt that Haitians are in fact political refugees,"
and argued that the current practice of permitting refugee applications from abroad to

be made only in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, and
Lebanon "discriminate[s] against refugees from the Caribbean, Latin America, and Africa, most of whom would be people of color." 125 CONG. REc. 35,820 (1979). Congress
was further put on notice of the United States role as a country of first asylum by Florida representatives who successfully sought financial assistance in dealing with Haitians
who had won a slowdown of deportation proceedings through federal litigation. 125
CONG. REc. 37,239 (1979). This survived in the final Conference Committee version.
H.R. REi,. No. 781, supra note 64, at 23. Congressman Fascell informed his colleagues
that Dade County alone had 5,000 refugees, which he called the "normal" level for the
whole country. 125 CONG. REc. 37,238 (1979). In the final debates on the Conference
Committee bill, Congressman Pepper of Florida asked sponsor Holtzman whether Haitians would get asylum, and whether there were any numerical limits. She responded:
Whether any particular Haitian will qualify for asylum under the law is a matter to be determined by the Attorney General under appropriate regulations. . . . This bill does not deal with the numbers who can be granted asylum. This bill simply mandates a procedure for the consideration of asylum
claims by people who are here on our shores.
126 CONG. REc. 4,507 (1980). Congress was also reminded of the estimated 500,000
Cubans in Dade County, and appropriated funds for assisting recent Cuban immigrants.
125 CONG. REc. 23,251 (1979) (statement of Sen. Chiles).
71. Several commentators have inferred from section 208(b)'s 5,000 per year ceil-
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In sum, while Congress did not specifically address the meaning of
''social group," interpretations of "social group" are still constrained
by legislative intent. Congress intended to bring the law into conformity with United States international obligations, and to adopt a
politically neutral, geographically unrestricted, definition of "refugee." Constructions of persecution on account of membership in a

particular "social group" which undermine those objectives are in-

consistent with congressional intent.
B.

The Constitution and Immigration: "Plenary Congressional

Power" and Asylum Eligibility
1.

The Judiciary and Congress

The judiciary's historic deference to Congress in immigration matters should both bar courts from narrowing asylum eligibility and
require them to uphold a literal interpretation of eligibility against
executive efforts to narrow it. Neither the courts nor the executive
may legitimately interfere with the broad eligibility standards created by Congress. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,7 2 the Supreme
Court found the "inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign
and independent nation" to control aliens is to be exercised by the

"political" branches, and most particularly by Congress:

The Constitution has granted to Congress the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, including the... bringing of persons into the ports of
ing on adjustment from asylee to permanent resident status that Congress did not foresee
large increases in asylum seeking. See, e.g., Scanlan, supra note 28, at 855 n.157. However, given that there were approximately 60,000 potential asylum applications on file
with the INS in 1980, id. at 858-59, it seems plausible that members expected asylum to
remain a temporary state of refuge for many. The Senate Judiciary Committee suggested
that adjustment would be routine for eligible persons, but noted that "[a]djustment cannot take place until the refugee has been in this country for two years, and the refugee
must make application for adjustment. If conditions have changed in the refugee's home
country so that he would no longer be subject to persecution upon return, adjustment
would not be available." S. REP. No. 256, supra note 32, at 9, 14. Conditional status
would also apply for two years to refugees above the 50,000 "normal" overseas admission
ceiling. See 125 CONG. REc. 23,238 (1979) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). In any case,
whatever the empirical projections of Congress, the issue facing courts is what law was
passed. An increase in the adjustment quota is likely. See INS Assigns FY 1988 Asylee
Adjustment Numbers to 1986 Applicants, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1372-73 (1987)
(Congress likely to pass H.R. 2921, section 141(c) of which would scrap numerical cap
and allow INS to decide how many adjustment applications should be granted each
year).
72. 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding congressional decision to permit Chinese laborers to stay in the United States only upon procurement of certificate to be granted
upon testimony of a "credible white witness").

the United States; 3 to establish a uniform rule of naturalization;. .. and to
make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution these powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government of
the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.""

Courts have been extremely deferential to the political branches
when aliens are involved. 75 While a few cases suggest inherent executive authority, 6 courts have generally treated immigration as an
area of "plenary congressional power" subject to few if any substantive constitutional constraints." Measures which would violate equal

protection if used domestically can be applied to foreigners, even
though citizens are affected as well.78 Courts have protected procedural due process rights for "deportable" aliens-those who have already "entered" the United States7 9-but have found almost 0 no
constitutional limits8 ' on the treatment of "excludable"
aliens-persons who have not technically entered.82 American courts
have refused, with a few exceptions," to find that a treaty or inter73. This referred to slavery. See Berns, The Constitution and the Migration of
Slaves, 78 YALE L.J. 198 (1968).
74. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 712.
75. See S. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 206-08 (1987).
76. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
77. S. LEGOMSKY, supra note 75, at 143-222; Note, Developments In the
Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1286, 1296-1302
(1983); see also Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (sustaining exclusion of
homosexuals based on congressional "plenary power to make rules for the admission of
aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden"); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) ("[Olver
no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over
[admission of aliens].").
78. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (denial of immigration benefit to
nonlegitimated children of citizen fathers not violative of equal protection, despite gender
and legitimacy classifications and impact on family relationships).
79. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (Japanese Immigration Case).
80. One circuit has held that detention conditions may violate due process. See
Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1373-74 (5th Cir. 1987) (due process clause protects excludable stowaways from physical abuse); see also Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1151 (1984) (applying "flexible due process"
analysis to argue that "an initial entrant seeking asylum has higher interests than those
presented by the typical applicant for admission").
81. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (due process is whatever process Congress
defines as due). For a recent reaffirmation that "[a]liens seeking admission to the United
States therefore have no constitutional rights with regard to their applications, and must
be content to accept whatever statutory rights and privileges they are granted by Congress," see Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 968 (11 th Cir. 1984) (en banc), af'd, 472 U.S.
846 (1985). The Supreme Court held that it had been unnecessary to reach the constitutional

issue, since the statute and regulations did not permit lower level officials to dis-

criminate on the basis of national origin. Jean, 472 U.S. at 854-56.
82. See Comment, From Mezei to Jean: Toward the Exit of the Entry Doctrine,
22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1143 (1985). This distinction has largely broken down for returning long-term residents. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (recognizing
constitutional due process rights for lawful permanent residents returning from trip).
83. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (deliberate torture
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national law creates rights enforceable by the individuals ostensibly
protected.84
Courts have traditionally treated foreign policy matters generally
as involving classic "political questions"8 5 not susceptible to judicial
resolution,

6

even when they appear to involve clear separation of

powers issues. The theory that immigration inherently involves foreign policy has been invoked to prevent judicial insistence on any but
the most minimal rationality in the treatment of individuals, even
where the matters at stake have appeared vital to individuals but
politically insignificant to the United States.87 Courts have adhered
to literal statutory language, even where the results are extremely

harsh, 8 on the ground that a more flexible approach would shift

power away from Congress toward the executive, and ultimately to

the courts, a result "impermissible in our tripartite scheme of gov' Courts' nearly total
ernment."89
deference to the political branches
in this area of constitutional interpretation has been widely and
powerfully criticized, 90 but courts have persisted in this attitude.

under color of official authority violates universal human rights law, and federal jurisdiction exists when alleged torturer is found and served with process within United States).
84. See, e.g., Note, The Agony and The Exodus: DeportingSalvadorans in Violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 18 N.Y.U. J. IN'L L. & POL.703 (1986).
85. Criteria are set out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (voting malapportionment not a political question). See generally Redish, JudicialReview and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1031, 1043-55 (1984-85).
86. Efforts to challenge the constitutionality of the Vietnam War were repeatedly
rejected by courts. Note, Congressional Control of Presidential War-Making Under the
War Powers Act: The Status of a Legislative Veto After Chadha, 132 U. PA. L. REv.
1217, 1221-23 (1984). The Supreme Court had earlier refused to address the lawfulness
of the Korean "police action." C. LOFGREN, "GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND
CHOICE'-CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND FEDERALISM
206 (1986).
87. See S. LEGOMSKY, supra note 75, at 261-69; see, e.g., De Los Santos v. INS,
690 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1982) (deferring to INS insistence that only foreign procedures
which resulted in treating children born out of wedlock exactly the same as children born
to married parents sufficed to create parent-child relationship for purposes of relative
admissions).
88. One important exception was Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), in
which the Court found an afternoon trip by a permanent resident to Mexico an "innocent, casual and brief" absence which did not subject him to the consequences of "entry"
(in this case, exclusion for the "psychopathic personality" of homosexuality) upon return.
However, in INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984), the Court found that the expression "continuous physical presence" in the statute permitting suspension of deportation
for long-term de facto residents precluded such an exception. Attempts to overturn
Phinpathyaculminated in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 315(b), 8
U.S.C. § 1254(b) (1986).
89. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 196.
90. See, e.g., Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1387-96 (1953) (eloquently

Whatever the merits of greater judicial scrutiny of decisions using
suspect classifications or affecting liberty or other fundamental interests, no one argues that courts should begin to show independence by
deciding optimal levels of immigration, something they are neither
well suited nor constitutionally empowered to do. 9 '

2. The Executive and Congress
Although creative judicial initiatives to guard the borders are easily condemned, it seems more defensible in principle for the INS and
BIA to produce "administrable" interpretations of broad statutory
language. The views of the INS-the agency charged with enforcing
immigration restrictions and administering benefits-are entitled to
some weight. As the body set up by the Attorney General92 to develop certain positions on immigration issues, the BIA may be entitled to some deference. 93 However, final responsibility remains with
Congress, and excessive judicial deference to administrative interpretations undermines ultimate congressional control.
Immigration decisions stress that whichever political branch is the
immediate beneficiary of judicial deference, the ultimate power lies
criticizing refusal to subject exclusion to due process constraints); Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny,
100 HARV. L. REv. 853, 862-63 (1987).
91. See Dawood-Haio v. INS, 800 F.2d 90, 97 (6th Cir. 1986) ("how many refugees this country... is capable of absorbing" is "a policy question of the kind properly
answerable by the representatives of the electorate"); see also United States v. Elder,
601 F. Supp. 1574, 1579 (S.D. Tex. 1985). The court held the free exercise clause did
not preclude prosecution for "alien smuggling" of a defendant who felt a Christian commitment to assist those fleeing violence in El Salvador, and the court responded to the
defendant's evidence that undocumented aliens benefit the economy by finding that:
[tlhis existing controversy among experts proves first, that the economic impact
of illegal immigration remains unresolved, and second, that the court should
Congress remains entitled to examine the imminot resolve the dispute ....

gration question and to pass legislation to address the problems which Congress

Id.

discovers. Congress may direct the executive to account for each individual
who enters the country and to make appropriate decisions in the best interest of
all Americans.

92. The BIA is a "creature of regulation." See Roberts, The Board of Immigration Appeals: A CriticalAppraisal, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 29 (1977).
93. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987). The Court
decided:
There is obviously some ambiguity in a term like "well-founded fear" which
can only be given concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication. In that process of filling "any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress," the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the statutory
program. . . . We do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the
"well-founded fear" test should be applied.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted); see also INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145
(1981) (Attorney General may interpret "extreme hardship" narrowly).
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with Congress. 94 Decisions approving executive initiatives in the
treatment of aliens have stressed the compatibility of presidential ac-

tions with congressional mandates.95 Determining who can live here
and who can acquire citizenship are fundamental acts of national
self-constitution. 96 One recent commentary goes so far as to argue
that this requires rethinking the traditional, probably constitutionally
required, policy that birth here confers citizenship.97 Congress has
guarded this power: for overseas admission of refugees, Congress insists on consultations with regard to both total numbers and allocations among countries, and requires public hearings on allocations.98
Regular immigration quotas are the subject of political debates and
deals. 99
Some central rationales for deference to the President in foreign
94. See, e.g., United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387 (lth Cir. 1983); United
States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958) (president had no authority to admit Hungarians to United States without statutory authorization). See generally Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principles of Plenary CongressionalPower,
1984 Sup. CT. REV. 255; Wildes, Consular Nonreviewability-A Reexamination, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1012, 1014 (1987).
95. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 977 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (stating that "Congress has delegated remarkably broad discretion to executive officials under
the INA," and indicating in dicta that responsible executive officials have authority
under the Act to discriminate on the basis of nationality), afl'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985);
Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding regulation directing
Iranian students to report to INS, promulgated under INA section 103(a), which permits
Attorney General to "perform such other acts as he deems necessary" to administer and
enforce immigration laws), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
96. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 668 (1898) (it "is the
inherent right of every independent nation. . .to determine. . .what classes of persons
shall be entitled to its citizenship").
97. See P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL

ALIENS INTHE AMERICAN POLITY (1985) (children born in United States to undocumented or temporarily present parents not entitled to citizenship by Constitution, since
citizenship should be "consensual" rather than "ascriptive," and "responsibility for defining the boundaries of the political community" should rest "with the representative organs of the nation"). But see, e.g., Schwartz, The Amorality of Consent, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 2143 (1986).
98. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 12, at 10; 126 CONG. REc. 4,498 (1980); 125
CONG. REc. 35,814 (1979) (statement of Rep. Holtzman) ("The committee was extremely concerned about assuring that Congress has a proper and substantial role in
refugee admissions, given our plenary power over immigration."); 125 CONG. REC.
23,245 (1979) (Sen. Kennedy accepted as friendly the proposed amendment by Sen.
Huddleston providing for publication of information concerning refugee admissions). In
practice, Congress has exercised pro forma supervision, leaving crucial allocation decisions to the executive. See Anker, supra note 37, at 162-66.
99. See, e.g., Mailman, Legal Immigration: An Introduction to S. 1611, 10 IMMIGR. J. 7 (July-Sept. 1987) (describing changes which would have benefited groups "adversely affected" by 1965 immigration changes, such as the Irish, English, and
Canadians).

policy-needs for haste, confidentiality, and a "single voice" in negotiations-are comparatively weak in immigration.1 0 There are, of
course, refugee emergencies,10 1 and possibly, situations in which

aliens threaten national security, 0 2 meriting narrow exceptions to
congressional dominance; since Congress has left the executive room
to deal with such emergencies,103 the ultimate issue of constitutional
power is unlikely to arise. Not only are pragmatic justifications for
executive dominance absent, but control over refugee flows is closely
linked to powers granted Congress by the Constitution's text. 04 Except for handling enemy aliens in wartime, refugee control is remote
from commander-in-chief powers, even on the broad view of those
powers espoused and practiced by modern presidents.
Whatever the merits of judicial deference when individuals claim
constitutional rights, deference to executive attempts to limit benefits
Congress has created is inappropriate. 0 5 Extending judicial "re100. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), which
upholds a broad congressional delegation, sets forth most fully the rationales for deference to the executive in foreign policy matters. For an analysis concluding that the decision's history is "shockingly inaccurate," see C. LOFGREN, supra note 86, at 205.
101. For instance, the willingness of countries of first asylum to accept Indochinese
"boat people" was directly related to perceptions of other countries' willingness to share
financial burdens and resettle refugees. For an account of the July 1978 Geneva conference, see G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 47, at 112-14 (describing agreement by countries of first asylum to stop repelling landing attempts). Congress acted slowly, and eventually ratified what President Carter had done. See generally W. SHAWCROSS, THE
QUALITY OF MERCY (1984).
102. See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding requirement that Iranian students report to INS as legitimate exercise of authority delegated by
Congress to Attorney General), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
103. The parole power has traditionally been used for this purpose. The Refugee
Act of 1980 aimed to limit that power to individual hardship cases, and to require consultation with Congress when unforeseen circumstances require immediate action. For
Senator Kennedy's explanation of the Conference Committee's resolution of this issue,
see 126 CONG. REC. 3,757 (1980). Extended voluntary departure (EVD)-a moratorium
on deportations-is another executive option. See Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union,
Local 25 v. Attorney Gen., 804 F.2d 1256, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (calling EVD "extrastatutory" relief, and refusing to mandate EVD for Salvadorans, because "[w]here Congress has not seen fit to limit the agency's discretion to suspend enforcement of a statute
as to particular groups of aliens, we cannot review facially legitimate exercises of that
discretion"). This status has been extended at various times to nationals of Afghanistan,

Cambodia, Cuba, Chile, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Iran, Laos,

Nicaragua, Poland, Uganda, and Vietnam. See Justice Department Drafts Relaxed Asylum Procedurefor Poles, 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 300 (1986). Congress has recently
considered creating a statutory framework for safe haven. See House Subcommittee
Hears Testimony on Safe Haven Bill, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1289 (1987). See generally Note, Extended Voluntary Departure:Limiting the Attorney General's Discretion
in Immigration Matters, 85 MICH. L. REV. 152 (1986).
104. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
105. It may be unusual as well. One commentator argues that in interpreting immigration statutes American courts "have been generally liberal, assertive, and extremely
purposive," while on constitutional matters, they have "tended toward exceptional conservatism and deference. . .

."

He suggests that courts may rule on aliens' behalf on

statutory grounds to avoid constitutional difficulties. S. LEGOMSKY, supra note 75, at
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straint" to such contexts permits the executive to expand its power at

congressional expense.'

Particularly after the demise of the legisla-

107

tive veto, Congress has minimal ability to directly supervise executive adherence to the policies underlying the INA. Congress relies on
the judiciary to ensure that its aims are carried out.
The central innovations in the 1980 Refugee Act were to expand
and depoliticize the definition of "refugee," and to bar deportation in
certain cases. 108 Creating a statutory provision for asylum was intended to curtail politicized executive decisionmaking and to protect
the rights of those fleeing right wing governments.1 0 9 Judicial review

was to be a crucial tool in carrying out these reductions in executive
discretion. By 1980, even though the Attorney General had already
increased immigration judges' economic independence and administrative detachment from the INS, 110 Congress intended ample and
strong judicial review. Congress recognized that, as an agency
charged with guarding the borders, the INS often has trouble administering benefits fairly and as Congress intended.' Depoliticizing asylum decisions"" required increasing the role of the judiciary
as compared to the executive, given that courts are far better suited
to promoting consistent treatment of individuals than are executive
officials who are preoccupied with foreign policy concerns. Even as
the asylum caseload pressure has increased, proposals to curtail judicial review have gotten nowhere." 3
233-34, 325.

106. Excessive deference to agencies in interpreting the national security exception
to the Freedom of Information Act presents another example of this problem. See generally Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1985, 1986 DUKE L.J.
384, 411.
107. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (legislative veto allowing House to over-

ride

INS decision to suspend deportation is unconstitutional).

108. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
109. See Refugee Act: Hearingson H.R. 3056 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law Comm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126-30 (1977).

110.

For a discussion of the evolution, which was intended to increase efficiency as

well as respond to charges of unfairness, see T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note
21, at 87-91.

111. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 12, at 18 ("The committee intends
to monitor the Attorney General's implementation of the [asylum] section so as to insure
the rights of those it seeks to protect.").

112.

See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.

113. See G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 47, at 188-89; P. Weiss Fagen, supra note
69, at 55 (lawyers and law groups defended broad judicial review in congressional debates during 1981 and 1982). For a discussion of the provisions of the 1983 version of the
Immigration Reform & Control Act which would have narrowed judicial review, see
Refugees and Refoulement, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1983, at A22, col. 1. For a discussion

Many concepts in the Refugee Act require judicial construction.
The scope of persecution on account of "political opinion" and the
very nature of "persecution," as distinct from universal oppression
and violence, require and have often received careful judicial analysis." 4 Judicial review has become more aggressive under the 1980
Act, 1 5 as Congress directed. However, courts still frustrate congressional efforts to enlist their help in overseeing asylum to the extent
that they acquiesce in restrictive executive views of asylum eligibility

or produce their own narrowing interpretations.

3. Drawing the Line: Why the Temptation Should be
Resisted
Immigration is generally an area in which courts insist on congressional prerogatives; the reasons for that posture are particularly
strong in asylum matters. Courts which "rewrite" asylum criteria
usurp principled decisions that Congress must make. Moreover,
many asylum criteria and procedures are inevitably shaped by expedient concerns which are legitimately weighed by the political
branches but not by courts. In particular, the Ninth Circuit and the
BIA seem to have been moved by one "expedient" concern-fear
that broad eligibility would bring on excessive asylum seeking. In
what follows, I begin by considering why even principled distinctions
among asylum seekers are not properly made by courts, and then
move to the sorts of expedient considerations that should be restricted to political policymakers. I conclude that manipulating or
of the 1981 debates, see Wash. Post, Oct. 22, 1981, at A27, col. I (describing Reagan's
requests for "emergency powers" to use the military in immigration enforcement, elimination of judicial review of exclusions, and drastic restriction of review of deportation
orders). See also Note, supra note 77, at 1368-69; Carliner, Asylum Procedures: Proposed ImmigrationReform and Control Act of 1982, in 5 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 98
(L. Tomasi ed. 1983).
114. For a discussion of persecution on account of political opinion, see infra notes
347-65 and accompanying text. For a discussion of "singling out," see infra text accompanying notes 396-444.
115. Previously, denials were reversible only for abuse of discretion. Most courts
now apply a "substantial evidence" standard to withholding of deportation. See Chavarria v. Department of Justice, 722 F.2d 666 (11th Cir. 1984); McMullen v. INS, 658
F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1981). A "substantial evidence" standard also applies to
eligibility for discretionary asylum. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1321
n.9 (9th Cir. 1984); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 1984); Sarkis
v. Nelson, 585 F. Supp. 235, 237-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). One court has proposed, in dicta,
that the abuse of discretion test be retained because substantial evidence review ignores
the "necessary application of expertise" in the determination of whether fear is well
founded. Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129, 133 n.5 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984); see also Sotto v: INS, 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984) (BIA
abused discretion in failing to consider key affidavit). If an applicant has demonstrated a
"well-founded fear" but not a "clear probability" of persecution, the case is remanded
for a discretionary determination. Courts differ in their willingness to scrutinize exercises
of discretion. See infra notes 157, 341 and accompanying text.
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revising congressional language to conform to numerical targets is a
matter for Congress alone: only Congress is equipped to assess such
problems and empowered to devise solutions.
It is conceivable that political support for a generous asylum policy has eroded since 1980, as the United States has faced increasing
numbers of asylum seekers, though there are some indications to the
contrary.1 1 Whatever Congress's current attitude, it would be inappropriate for courts to narrow the Refugee Act in accordance with
public or evolving congressional opinion. Immigration has been declared an area of "plenary Congressional power," and Congress created a permanent statutory framework for asylum, in part because it
recognized that this country often failed to respond to refugee crises,
or did so in ad hoc, politicized ways." 7
The asylum framework-and possible changes in it-depend on
principled decisions about which refugees the United States is willing to protect, decisions so central to the nation's self-definition that
they necessarily belong to the majoritarian branches. These considerations often point in directions unavailable to a court committed to
116. Strong support for proposals to extend voluntary departure status to
Salvadorans and Nicaraguans, or to Salvadorans alone, suggests disapproval of restrictive
interpretations of the Act. See Array of Legal Issues Face Congress This Fall, Nat'l L.
J., Sept. 21, 1987, at 5; House Passes Bill Deferring Deportation of Salvadorans and
Nicaraguans, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 894 (1987). Failure so far to extend voluntary
departure to all Salvadorans does not, of course, imply that Congress approves of the
current pattern, in which virtually no Salvadorans receive asylum.
117. See H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 12, at 2, 5 (quoting Rep. Holtzman to
effect that "[i]n good measure, our country's humanitarian tradition of extending a welcome to the world's homeless has been accomplished in spite of, not because of, our laws
relating to refugees," and concluding that "our response to refugee emergencies has been
haphazard, incoherent and often inadequate"); 125 CONG. REC. 16,298 (1979) (statement by Sen. Boschwitz). The Senator noted the lack of systematic approach to prewar
refugees from Europe, described his family's good luck, and stated:
We respond to casualties on a case-by-case basis with no established policy or
statute that guides our actions. Our response to each crisis is subject to the
mood of the times rather than being-guided by a set procedure. . . . We want
to be able to avoid situations like we have faced in the last couple of months
with the Indochinese boat people. When people are in need of help, we must be
able to respond quickly without long delays.
Id.; see also 125 CONG. REC. 16,300 (1979) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("I am gratified
that the international community has refused to repeat history [of European Jews in
dealing with Indochinese boat people]," but noting the urgency of the situation, and
citing Secretary of State Vance's estimate that tens of thousands of boat people had
died); 125 CONG. REC. 35,813 (1979) (statement of Rep. Holtzman) ("This ad hoc response to refugee problems has not only caused inordinate delays in admissions and led
to great human suffering on the part of the refugees themselves, but has made long-range
planning by States and voluntary agencies involved in the resettlement process virtually
impossible.").

"consistent" treatment of individuals. For example, the United
States may have a special responsibility to people who were brought
by this country into social and geopolitical conflicts and then attacked for "collaboration" following a United States defeat, or for
victims of United States sponsored governments. 18 It may also be
morally legitimate (and is constitutional though incompatible with
international covenants) to prefer refugees with certain values. Some
political theorists argue that political communities naturally welcome those who share their basic values, and that a goal of ideological neutrality is neither realistic nor morally required. 119 Another
possibility would be to favor persons who act courageously to change
conditions in their countries before fleeing.
Courts should also be reluctant to set asylum criteria because such
decisions may ultimately and sometimes necessarily depend on expediency rather than principle, and expediency is rarely an acceptable
basis for judicial action.' 20 Relative generosity toward refugees from
communist countries,12 ' for instance, may have been based less on a
conviction that their plight was the worst than on expedient factors.
Accepting Eastern Europeans has been easier than offering refuge to
Central Americans because distance and strict travel restrictions ensured that very few people could take advantage of this openness.
Various political purposes were served by welcoming Eastern
Europeans-pleasing relatives and compatriots, encouraging discontent with Soviet rulers, and making Americans feel generous and su118. For a discussion of the Hmong (Meo) people in Laos, see supra note 35; for a
discussion of Chilean refugees, see infra notes 144, 146.
119. See, e.g., M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 48-51 (1983). Walzer points out that this concern for "community" is no
excuse for denying foreigners' claims to distributive justice. A resource rich country

might fulfill its moral obligations either by admitting people or by sacrificing territory or
resources, Id. at 47-48.
120. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24-28 (1962) (in
legislatures, expediency dominates principle, while court processes are suited for and
courts are charged with responsibility for decision according to principle); Dworkin, The
Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981).
121. This has continued, despite the congressional attempt to eliminate ideological
discrimination. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASYLUM: APPROVAL RATES FOR SELECTED APPLICANTS (1987); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN-FEw DENIED APPLICANTS DEPORTED (1987)

[hereinafter GAO REPORT]; Awaiting Ruling On Asylum, Haitians Ponder Going
Home, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1986, at 41, col. I (quoting Arthur Helton of Lawyers'
Committee for International Human Rights to effect that one percent of Haitians, 73 %
of Libyans, 59% of Rumanians, and 57% of Czechs are successful in asylum cases);
Anker, supra note 37, at 162 (since 1980, 393 of the 463,665 refugees admitted from
overseas were from countries which are not "communist-dominated"). As Elliott
Abrams, then Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, put it: "We are politically
biased. We don't like Russia or Czechoslovakia, so we take anyone who wants in. We like
El Salvador and Haiti, so we don't take them." Miami Herald, July 1, 1984, at 16A, col.
4. This situation is bound to change to some degree due to recently changed policies in
Eastern Europe, allowing unrestricted emigration, at least temporarily.
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perior at low "cost," since so few actually came. Further, most of

those who did come were well educated and highly skilled.' 22 That
these expedient concerns are important is suggested by recent developments. As more people began to leave communist countries, approval ceased to be nearly automatic; 123 some Polish Solidarity activ-

ists were turned down,' 24 and when United States relations with the
People's Republic of China improved, Chinese applicants received
asylum at a much lower rate than Russians:' 5
Protecting Central and South Americans who flee "friendly" re-

gimes involves serious political "liabilities"-acknowledging that client states persecute their citizens, and admitting nonwhite, poor, unschooled,

non-English

speaking

immigrants,

many

of them

"peasants," whose political activities once here, if any, are likely to

be critical of current United States foreign policy. Because it is easier to get here, 26 and because communications are still easier than

with the Eastern bloc, receptiveness to Western hemisphere applicants carries a greater risk that others will follow.' 27
122. Such people can more easily obtain permission to come temporarily both from
their government and ours. Visa applicants must generally convince a consular officer
that they have funds for return and for maintenance in the United States, and that their
"stake" at home will induce return. See P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 53.
123. See R. STEEL, supra note 27, at 277 ("[p]reviously favorable consideration of
claims for people from various communist countries is no longer the rule").
124. See Hansen, No Way to Treat Solidarity Refugees, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1,
1985, at A21, col. 1; see also U.S. Studies Plan to Ease Access to Asylum for Poles and
Others, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 4 (administration considering presumption of persecution for persons fleeing "totalitarian" regimes).
125. Note, Cardoza-Fonseca: Supreme Court Takes Initiative to End Current Inequities in Law of Asylum, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 179 (1987). The events at Tiananmen
Square during the summer of 1989 will undoubtedly increase the number of applications
for asylum, and possibly, the number granted.
126. This is relative. Financing one person's voyage over land to "el norte" often
requires all of a family's savings and involves serious physical dangers. See, e.g., 26
Aliens Found Locked in Railroad Car in Texas, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1986, at AS, col.
6. See generally T. CONOVER, COYOTES: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE SECRET WORLD OF
AMERICA'S ILLEGAL ALIENS (1987). Over water, the dangers are greater. One court
observed:
For the most part, the plaintiffs reached the United States in old, small, leaky
wooden sailboats. The boats are dangerously overcrowded, but these Haitians
continue to brave the elements across eight hundred miles of open sea. The vast
majority spent weeks adrift without food or water. Many died in the
attempt. ...
Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 450 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified on
appeal, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982). Once here, conditions are often very harsh. See
generally Helton. . . . And No Way to Treat Refugees-Holding Them in Detention
Centers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1986, at A35, col. 3 (op. ed.) (describing detention of
both excludable and deportable aliens).
127. See Letter from Attorney General responding to letter from 89 members of

Other factors have both moral and expedient dimensions. Afghans' situations may be more compelling in humanitarian terms
than Eastern Europeans' were, but the BIA has taken the position
that rewarding persons who "cut in line" frustrates "orderly" handling of refugees in Pakistan. 128 Other countries' receptiveness may

reduce the need for the United States to protect certain groups. 12 9

While these factors may have some proper place in decisions Congress has committed to executive discretion, the courts' role should
be limited to reviewing that discretion, and should not include attempting to apply such considerations on their own.
The distorted definitions of "social group" employed by the Ninth
Circuit' 30 and the BIA' 3 1 appear to have been prompted by an expedient concern-fear of an "excessive" number of asylum applicants. 3 2 Each mistakenly saw its arbitrary limitation as necessary to
prevent a situation in which huge segments of, 3 3s or even entire,134
populations would be eligible to stay in the United States.' 35 While
there is no reason to suppose a "numbers crisis" is imminent, 36 if
one were, there would be many possible ways to deal with it-such
as making protection more genuinely temporary' 3 7 or tightening seCongress asking that Salvadorans be granted extended voluntary departure, reprintedin
T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 731-33 ("Because of the present and
potential political and economic instability in other countries in close geographic proximity to the United States, any grants of conditional immigration benefits must be considered in light of its [sic] potential inducement to further influxes of illegal immigrants.").
A federal lawsuit alleges that one immigration judge in Arizona denied Salvadorans and
Guatemalans changes of venue because he wanted the word to get back that applying for
asylum "doesn't get you much time." Campos v. Nail, CIV-85-964-PHX/RCB (D.
Ariz.) (January 1988 trial record).
128. See In re Salim, Interim Dec. No. 2922 (BIA 1982).
129. In the mid-1970s, the "White Australia" policy was modified to admit many
Southeast Asian refugees. B. GRANT, THE AUSTRALIAN DILEMMA 16-18 (1983).
130. See ihfra notes 208-75 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 171-93 and accompanying text.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 193, 249-52.
133. In re Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 33 (BIA 1985) (Congress intended
that "not all harm with political implications, such as that which arises out of civil strife
in a country, qualif[y] an alien as a 'refugee' ").
134. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986).

135. This ignores the possibility of refuge elsewhere; the only type of refuge which
is mandatory-withholding of deportation-is country specific.
136. By historic standards, current immigration is low. See generally M. MORRIS.
IMMIGRATION-THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY (1985) (concluding after review of
empirical literature that "the country is not about to be engulfed by a great alien tide"

and "has not lost its capacity to absorb immigrants and benefit from their presence").
Some economists predict a labor shortage. See, e.g., STANFORD UNIVERSITY: FOOD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FOOD RESEARCH INSTITUTE STUDIES, MEXICAN-AMERICAN MIGRATION AND PROJECTIONS ON THE LABOR FORCE, VOL. 17, No. 2 (1979). Congress is con-

sidering major increases in quotas for regular immigration. See Senate Passes Legal
Immigration Reform Bill, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 265 (1988).
137. Temporary protection would comply with international law, and many countries take that approach. See G. GoODWIN-GILL, supra note 47, at 207, 225-26; 1 A.
GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 52, at 430 (describing provisional asylum, in which a state
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verity standards. 13 8 Refugees represent a small portion of the entire
legal and illegal immigration flow;139 Congress might prefer to adjust
other parts of that flow were it convinced numerical restrictions are
necessary. Congress could step up enforcement against illegal immigration or reduce admissions in the numerically dominant catego-

ries-joining relatives or possessing scarce skills. Congress could also
take steps to encourage the development of refuge elsewhere, a process which is frustrated when the United States evades its own international commitments.'"4 Such options are available to Congress but

not to the courts or the executive.
Judicial or executive action to "adjust" this particular part of the
immigration flow not only intrudes on congressional power, but the
admits asylum seeker without guaranteeing opportunity to settle). While 5,000 people
can adjust annually from section 208 asylee to permanent resident, the Attorney General
may terminate asylee status prior to adjustment if conditions in the asylee's country improve sufficiently. However, the INS has not exercised this power. Withholding of deportation lasts only until conditions improve or the United States finds another source of
refuge. Informal executive moratoria on deportation are theoretically temporary as well.
T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 727-29.
In fact, refuge under any mechanism tends to become permanent as people develop
work and family ties which lead to permanent status, or "lose touch" with the INS. The
employer sanctions and documentation requirements of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act facilitate a stricter approach to time limits. See G. TYSSE, THE 1986 IMMIGRATION ACT: A HANDBOOK ON EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND NONDISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENTS 19-20, 23-31 (1987). Such a policy would cause great pain and instability in
the lives of refugees, would involve inequalities which might be objectionable per se, and
would make refugees highly vulnerable. It would be difficult, moreover, to predict which
"improvements" would last. One can imagine sending refugees back to Uganda after
Obote's fall, when Amin was promising a return to civilian government and posing as a
restorer of unity. See R. OLIVER & A. ATMORE, AFRICA SINCE 1800, at 347-48 (1981).
Despite these problems, enforcing temporariness is one option Congress might consider
were it to conclude that the current law covers too many people.
138. In 1965, Congress eliminated the requirement that applicants face "physical
persecution," defined as torture, detention, or death, and substituted the language "persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion." Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(f),
79
Stat. 911, 918 (1965).
139. The annual quota for legal immigration, not including refugees and certain
very close relatives of citizens, is 270,000. Mailman, supra note 99. The number of illegal immigrants in the United States appears to be between four and six million, though
estimates are unreliable. J. CREWDSON, THE TARNISHED DOOR: THE NEW IMMIGRANTS
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA 107 (1983). Asylum applications numbered
14,684 in 1980, 57,884 in 1981, 34,318 in 1982, 25,469 in 1983, and 23,980 in 1984.
Jaeger, Political Asylum in North America and Western Europe, in 9 IN DEFENSE OF
THE ALIEN 85, 87 (L. Tomasi ed. 1987).
140. See 125 CONG. REC. 23,240 (statement of Sen. Hatfield) ("As a result of our
efforts and encouragement, other nations are following our example. At the recently held

Geneva Conference on Refugees, nearly every nation in attendance pledged to increase
aid and admit significantly larger numbers of refugees into their borders."). Thailand has
responded to United States criticisms of its handling of refugees by pointing to this country's interdiction and abuse of Haitians.

particular means chosen may subvert central aims of the 1980 Act.
While Congress did not define "social group," it did express intentions which rule out certain interpretations. Excluding persecution
based on membership in large or diffuse groups and the related requirement that refugees prove "singling out" for unusual abuse141
tend to limit protection to victims of relatively stable regimes, such
as the recent governments of the Eastern bloc, while denying it to

victims of regimes using ongoing violence against large parts of the
population to maintain power. 42 Demotion and imprisonment of individual government critics in Bulgaria, and murders of peasant cooperative members or natives of villages considered "subversive" in
Guatemala serve roughly similar goals. Although the latter is more
"severe," the former is more easily recognizable as "persecution"
under restrictive interpretations of "social group." This not only resurrects a preference Congress wanted to abolish, but involves a kind

of political choice which courts should be reluctant to make.
There is yet another reason for courts to be loath to narrow the
scope of the Refugee Act. While the Refugee Act attempted to depoliticize asylum determinations, 43 that decision itself has political
implications. The Refugee Act of 1980 was, in a sense, a quite radical document. It was clear in 1980 that dictatorships backed by the
United States had generated large numbers of exiles. 4 Mexico,
Costa Rica, and other countries' 45 had been absorbing refugees, and
it was foreseeable some would seek refuge here if feasible. 46 Despite
141. See infra text accompanying notes 396-444.
142. Not only do the types of persecution practiced by leftist and rightist repressive regimes tend to differ, but the fact that no one has standing, or probably, the inclination, to object to asylum grants by INS district directors means the executive may construe "social group" or other grounds loosely when it wishes.
143. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
144. For example, after the 1971 Banzer coup in Bolivia, which was followed by
major increases in United States military and economic assistance, over 5,000 people
went into exile. J. NASH, WE EAT THE MINES AND THE MINES EAT Us xi-xii (1979).
Many Chileans went into exile following the 1973 Pinochet coup. See G. GOODWINGILL, supra note 47, at 112 (estimating 14,000); Teitelbaum, Migration and U.S.-Latin
American Relations in the 1980's, in THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA IN THE
1980's, at 481, 491 (1986) (estimating 30,000). For a discussion of U.S. involvement,

compare P. SIGMUND,

THE OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE AND THE POLITICS OF CHILE,

1964-76, at 275-92 (1977) (arguing for primacy of internal factors but conceding United
States involvement) with J. PETRAS & M. MORLEY, THE UNITED STATES AND CHILE:
IMPERIALISM AND THE OVERTHROW OF THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT (1975) (United
States role was key in "disaggregating" Unidad Popular government).
145. For a discussion of the tradition of asylum in Latin America, see G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 47, at 14, 106-07.
146. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 4,507 (1980) (statement of Rep. Chisholm) ("only
a mere handful" of Latin American and African refugees have been admitted despite

appalling human rights situations). In describing provisions of the Conference Committee bill for admitting persons who had not left their home countries, Congresswoman
Holtzman referred to Chile and Cuba as places "where there are political detainees or
prisoners of conscience of special humanitarian concern to the U.S." 126 CONG. REC.
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an extremely negative reaction, thousands of Haitians risked their
lives and came throughout the 1970s. 147
Congress, during the same period, took various measures to reduce
United States support for dictatorships in Latin America and to
force respect for human rights, 4 " as did the Carter Administration.' 4 9 Fully aware that United States policies affect refugee flows
in this hemisphere, 150 Congress gave the executive discretion to protect anyone who could demonstrate a "well-founded fear" of persecution, and mandated protection for anyone who could establish a
risk of persecution at the "clear probability" level.' 5' The executive
branch, under the structure created by the Refugee Act of 1980,
may no longer pursue policies which create refugees, and then deny
responsibility for their fate if they escape to this country. This does
not mean all refugees must be allowed to stay, but it does imply
that: (a) safe places must be found or developed for those entitled to
withholding of deportation; 5 2 and (b) discretionary determinations
4,499 (1980). Senator Kennedy mentioned "state of siege" detainees in Argentina as
qualifying for refuge. 126 CONG. REC. 3,757 (1980).

This is not to suggest that Congress expected the magnitude of asylum seeking which
did occur. Indeed, it would have been very difficult to predict the magnitude of increase
in asylum applications in 1980, prior to the election of Reagan and the related escalation
of repression and violence in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala. See
generally LeoGrande, U.S. Policy Options in Central America, in THE FUTURE OF CENTRAL AMERICA: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE U.S. AND MEXICO

99, 102 (1983).

147. See supra notes 70, 126.
148. See R. BONNER, WEAKNESS AND DECEIT 8-9, 36 (1984) (noting that Congress, not Carter, was responsible for human rights policies in El Salvador).
149. See generally Crahan, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Realism vs.
Stereotypes, in THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1980's, at 411, 428-41
(1986). For a discussion of the ambivalence of this policy with respect to Central
America, see Leo-Grande, Bennett, Blachman & Sharpe, Grappling With Central
America: From Carter to Reagan, in CONFRONTING REVOLUTION 295 (1986).
150. Congressman Drinan noted in debate that "[w]e have reduced aid to certain
nations saying we will not be the partners to this brutality. Yet, all to [sic] often, those
victims on whose behalf we speak, are denied admission to the United States or subject
to long, agonizing periods of uncertainty in gaining admission." 125 CONG. REC. 35,826
(1979). This point was made forcefully in testimony on a related matter. See Caribbean
Migration: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and
International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 250
(1980) (statement of Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights) ("in countries where human rights are being violated on a massive scale, significant migrations are
likely to continue," and warning that "the only way to stop effectively the flow of refugees in these situations is to take measures to end the abuses of human rights").
151. This assumes the correctness of Stevic, which set the "clear probability" standard for withholding of deportation. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984); see Helton,
supra note 17.
152. For a discussion of United States assistance in overseas refugee programs, see
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS IN COOPERATION WITH THE

must be made concerning refugees falling short of the "clear
probability" standard. Effects of executive policies and statements 153
on the number of refugees are a "cost" the Refugee Act forces presidents to consider,1 4 rather than counting on deportations and border
guards to deal with such ripple effects. The Constitution divides foreign policy powers between Congress and the President; 155 tensions
resulting from this division involve precisely the kinds of political
considerations which have led courts to refuse to intervene in substantive immigration decisions.
In sum, virtually no one in our society suggests that fundamental
questions of community self-constitution and foreign policy should be
resolved by courts. While there are strong arguments that courts

should prevent certain considerations-most notably, racial prejudice
and hatred-from affecting immigration policy, courts have rejected
any such role. 156 The other "expedient" or political factors discussed
here are clearly constitutionally permissible considerations, but only
for the appropriate branch. Congress is empowered to seek "desirable" aliens who will bring capital and skills. It may award refuge
based on ideological or "interest" criteria, or allow the executive to
consider such issues in making discretionary determinations.' 57
Courts facing the pleas of aliens have denied they have any proper
role in setting substantive standards for admission to this country. 58
When pressed by the executive, or alarmed by growing asylum

caseloads, they should be no less stubborn. If asylum eligibility is to
be curtailed to fend off "alien hordes," only Congress properly has
DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND ALLOCATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1982, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in A. LEIBOWITZ, supra note

13, § 4.04, at 4-96 to -98.
153. Attacks on journalists and opponents of Duvalier increased dramatically following Reagan's election, based on confidence that human rights pressures were a thing
of the past. See Conway & Buchanan, Haitians, in REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 57, at 100.
154. Numerous commentators have observed this connection. See, e.g., Miller &
Papademetriou, Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy, in THE UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE: U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE 1980's, at 155, 178 (1983). The authors stated:
In Haiti, like El Salvador, U.S. foreign policy plays a central role in encouraging or discouraging refugee flows over the short term and the long run. One
wonders if migration from Haiti and El Salvador would be such grievous
problems in the 1980s if the United States had not supported tyranny in those
two countries over the preceding decades.
Id.
155. See generally C. LOFGREN, supra note 86, at 3-38, 167-225.
156. The Chinese exclusion statute of 1884, which extended to "all subjects of
China and Chinese," was upheld in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889), cited with approval in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
157. For a review of administrative decisions under section 208, see Helton, The
Proper Role of Discretion in Political Asylum Determinations,22 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
999 (1985); see also infra note 341.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
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the power to do so and the ability to choose appropriate means. As a
matter of separation of powers, courts must adhere to and enforce

immigration laws, and are powerless to rewrite them according to
their own or the executive's vision of a more "practical" approach.
C. Current Interpretationsof "Social Group"
In making asylum available to persons persecuted "on account of
membership in a particular social group," Congress intended to
make domestic law conform with international law, in which "social
group" constitutes a broad, flexible, and ideologically neutral category.1 59 Several courts have respected that language and intent. 160
However, despite the "plenary power" of Congress over immigration,
both the judiciary, which has addressed the "social group" ground at
greatest length, and the executive have strayed far from the original
purpose of the "social group" provision, albeit in virtually opposite
ways. The BIA stresses immutable characteristics'' as defining
groups, while the Ninth Circuit views voluntary association 6 2 as
key. Both approaches narrow eligibility in ways which contradict the
statutory language and have no basis in legislative intent; they appear instead to be policy oriented efforts to limit eligibility to some
"manageable" level. Since the BIA typically adopts a stringent approach to eligibility, 6 3 its construction is predictable. The Ninth
Circuit's view is more surprising, 6 as well as more disturbing, both
substantively and in terms of appropriate institutional roles. Both are
important practically, since the BIA handles appeals from all over
the country, while the Ninth Circuit handles a large percentage of
the asylum cases and generates influential case law.' 65
Both outcomes are of theoretical interest as well. "Defining" statutory language seems a natural first step in applying a new statute's
broad language.' 66 Confronted with rival definitions, one is tempted
159.
160.

See supra text accompanying notes 47-58.
See infra text accompanying notes 194-207.

161. See infra text accompanying note 172.
162. See infra text accompanying note 231.
163. S. LEGOMSKY, supra note 75, at 325.
164. For a description of how the Ninth Circuit's jurisprudence has departed from,
and in some cases led, developments elsewhere, see Blum, The Ninth Circuit and the
Protection of Asylum Seekers Since the Passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 327, 353 (1986).
165. S. LEGOMSKY, supra note 75, at 234 (1987) (over 60% of immigration cases
are decided by Ninth Circuit).
166. Even a quite critical commentator treats Sanchez-Trujillo as "the first significant judicial interpretation of the term 'particular social group,'" and states that

either to figure out which better effectuates Congress's intent, or to
seek middle ground. I will argue that the arbitrariness of both restrictive definitions instead leads to the question of whether attempting to "define" "social group" is a reasonable enterprise at all. Given
that an administrative agency and a court of appeals steeped in
American legal traditions have thrown up virtually opposite definitions, it appears futile to seek a "definition" encompassing the diversity of persecuted groups in the world. The drafters intentionally
used broad language to create a residual category which, by its very
nature, cannot be defined by enumerating characteristics. European
courts have shown that it is possible to confront "social group"
claims on a case-by-case basis, with no attempt at a general definition. 6 7 Not only does congressional language not cry out for narrowing glosses, but narrowing definitions inevitably distort language and
subvert legislative intent.
1. The Board of Immigration Appeals
The BIA recognizes the usefulness of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteriafor DeterminingRefugee Status Under the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to
interpreting domestic law.1 8 The Handbook indicates that a "social
group" "normally comprises persons of similar background, habits or
social status."' 6 9 In keeping with this broad approach, even the INS
originally saw "social group" as a highly inclusive residual category
for persons facing risks not otherwise covered.' Recently, however,
the executive, through the BIA, has changed course.
In In re Acosta,' the Board considered the petition of a San Salvador taxi driver who reported being threatened by both government
and guerrilla soldiers seeking to force his cooperation. The Board
rejected the laim that taxi drivers, or those active in a cooperative,
formed a "particular social group," suggesting that the petitioner
could abandon this strategic line of work. The Board found it decisive that being a taxi driver is not an "immutable" characteristic,"' 2
or one which "members. . .should not be required to change because
it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences."' 3
"[p]rior to this decision, the courts had not developed any workable tests for recognizing
a social group claim." Comment, supra note 47, at 917 (citations omitted).
167. For citations to cases doing this, see supra note 54.
168. UN HANDBOOK, supra note 48.
169. Id. at 19 (issued in 1979 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who supervises state compliance with the Refugee Convention and Protocol).
170. See Helton, supra note 47, at 50.
171. Interim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985).
172. The Board noted that the petitioners had not shown that former taxi drivers
were singled out. Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 29.
173. Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 31.
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Acosta appears plausible, in part, because of its resonance with
American equal protection doctrine, 174 which provides for heightened
judicial scrutiny of state action which classifies people by certain immutable characteristics or which burdens "fundamental" interests. 76
However, this implicit analogy is only apparent. 76 Though the BIA's
decision is carefully reasoned, it is a tightly constructed house of
cards, built on three flawed bases. The first is its choice of a maxim
to guide statutory interpretation; the second is its definition of perse-

cution; and the third is its view on the burden of proof (which was
subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court).
The Board invoked ejusdem generis, the principle that general
words enumerated along with specific words should be construed as
similar to (or, as the Board put it, in a manner "consistent with")
the specific words. 178 Because race and nationality are immutable,
while religious and political beliefs are things people should not be

forced to change in order to live safely, the Board limited "social
group" to characteristics meeting one or the other of these crite-

ria.171 This ignores the fact that the term "social group" was intended to compensate for the narrower categories' inability to en-

compass the full range of persecution. 80 It also fails to explain why
"social group" membership should not be treated like religion and

174. The BIA did not comment on this similarity.
175. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (ban on interracial marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (sterilizing certain convicts).
176. Most obviously, "discrimination" is not the same as "persecution." Asylum
law deals not with mere government decisions to disadvantage certain traits or behavior,

but with severe mistreatment of persons with those characteristics. Second, that the main
bases for discriminatory abuse in our society, or at least those which have received constitutional recognition, involve "immutable" characteristics, does not suggest Congress
would impose analogous limitations when writing an asylum law. Many societies producing asylum applicants are not places where only persons with immutable characteristics
are persecuted. Congress indicated no intention to limit asylum to members of "minority
groups" or "suspect classifications." In fact, our society is unusual in the extent discriminatory treatment has focused on "immutable" characteristics such as race and gender, in
part, because our economic system and institutional structure of federalism make it relatively feasible to change or hide many other things about oneself and, in part, because of
the absence of openly class-based politics. Finally, there is an obvious distinction between
the role of a court in reviewing presumptively "majoritarian" decisions by American legislatures in light of constitutional equal protection guarantees, on one hand, and that of
courts and administrative tribunals applying broadly worded immigration statutes, on the
other. The separation of powers concerns which mandate caution in the former instance
require literality in the latter.
177. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1987).
178. Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 30.
179. Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 30-31.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 47-58.

political opinion-as something people should .not be forced to
change.
The "immutability" focus is connected to the Board's conception
of persecution as "harm or suffering. . .inflicted upon an individual
in order to punish him for possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome."'' However, much persecution is not
aimed at forcing "change" or at "punishing," but is based on the
1 82
view that it is right or useful to severely mistreat certain people.
As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has put it,
"[m]embership in a particular social group may be at the root of
persecution because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to
the Government or because the political outlook, antecedent or economic activity of its members, or the very existence of the social
group as such, is held to be an obstacle to the Government's
policies."' 183
Along with its extensive reflection on "social group,"' 84 in Acosta
the Board clearly set forth its view that the "well-founded fear"
standard for asylum and the "clear probability" standard for withholding deportation are "not meaningfully different and, in practical
application, converge."' 5 This theory was rejected by the Supreme
Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.8 6 Acosta's stress on immutability
is subtly linked to that holding: a mere possibility of changing jobs
or relocating might well prevent most applicants from showing that,

even if they did so, they would still face a "clear probability" 187
of

persecution or a practically indistinguishable "likelihood" thereof.
It is rarely possible to predict confidently whether such strategies
will succeed in avoiding persecution; how much that matters depends
on the applicant's evidentiary burden. Now that the Supreme Court
has made it clear that a "well-founded fear" (which may fall far
short of a "clear probability") of persecution is sufficient for asylum,
the mere possibility of changing jobs or relocating is far from
dispositive.
The BIA test permits the ready characterization of claims as defi181.

Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 17 (emphasis added).

182.

See, e.g., C.

DUGARD, HUMAN

RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL OR-

53-55, 62, 85-88 (1978) (describing development of apartheid, including reservation
of best jobs for whites); Schlemmer, InstitutionalizedInequality and Differentiation:An
Evaluation of Race Discrimination in South Africa, in 5 CASE STUDIES ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 293-326 (W. Veenhoven ed. 1976) (describing
material benefits of apartheid for minority).
183. UN HANDBOOK, supra note 48, 78.
184. Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 29-33.
185. Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 25.
186. 480 U.S. 421 (1987); see supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
187. The Board described the necessary showing in fairly mysterious terms in
Acosta, trying to distance itself from the "50% formulation or' INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407 (1984). Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 22-23.
DER
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nitionally inadequate-because the characteristics involved are apparently "mutable" or not self-evidently "fundamental"-without an

examination of either the actual risk a person faces because of them,
or the real feasibility of obtaining safety at home. Neither Acosta

nor subsequent BIA decisions explain how "fundamental" character-

istics are to be identified,1 8 or even whether the concept is a descrip-

tive one aimed at identifying the actual centrality of given activities
to applicants' lives, or a normative one aimed at protecting only
traits that "we" judge fundamental. 189 The first approach raises difficult empirical questions, 90 while the second is problematic in light
of Congress's decision to protect victims whether or not the charac-

teristics resulting in persecution are ones most Americans find appealing. Conceptions of what is "fundamental" vary. A requirement
that traits linking members be viewed as fundamental by adjudica-

tors threatens to reintroduce the cultural and geographic narrowness
and bias Congress removed from the definition of refugee by the

1980 Act.' 9 ' It may also introduce a class bias which has no place in

refugee law.' 92 It is probably easier for adjudicators to see work in
188. In a pre-Acosta decision, the Board rejected a student's claim, noting she had
not established that students and former students were a persecuted class. MartinezRomero v. INS, 18 I. & N. Dec. 75 (BIA), aft'd, 692 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1982); see also
Castaneda-Hernandez v. INS, 826 F.2d 1526 (6th Cir. 1987).
189. Of course, "we" are not homogeneous. In re Taboso, A23 220 644 (Feb. 3,
1986), reprinted in 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1009 (1986), suggests that what is considered "fundamental" may vary before different courts and in different contexts. In that
case, the immigration judge found that under the Acosta standard, homosexuals in Cuba
face persecution on account of membership in a particular social group. The applicant
described severe human rights violations aimed at male homosexuals, including detention
and physical and verbal abuse of him personally on repeated occasions. The judge concluded that the applicant is "a member of a group of persons who share a common,
immutable characteristic (i.e. homosexuality), and that this characteristic is one which
members of the group cannot change or should not be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences." The judge noted the INS itself
treats homosexuals as a "particularly identifiable group," in that it has procedures for
enforcing the bar on adjustment of status for "self-declared homosexual aliens." Id. at 56, 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES at 1010. The judge granted withholding of deportation to
Cuba, but denied asylum because of the applicant's criminal convictions. The INS appealed to the BIA. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding no "resemblance" between claimed rights of homosexuals to "engage in acts of sodomy" and
family, marriage, and procreational interests previously recognized as fundamental).
190. See infra notes 312-15, 372-73 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 32-40, 57-58 and accompanying text.
192. The international drafters decided that states could not bar refugees because
of concern they would become "public charges," but only for much weightier national
security reasons. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of
Refugees and Stateless Persons, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/44 (1951). The Egyptian proposal, which was not accepted, was to permit expulsion of a refugee on three grounds,
namely:

high status occupations such as musician or psychiatrist as "fundamental" than to so view taxi driving or farming.
The BIA's only attempt to ground its position in congressional intent comes in the observation that Congress decided not to define as
refugees all persons displaced by strife. 193 The Board overlooked the
considerable space between that rejected course and its own restrictive alternative.
2.

The Courts: Applying Without Defining

Several courts have applied the "social group" provision in a
broad, common sense way, without attempting to "define" the cate-

gory. In Ananeh-Firempong v. INS,'94 the First Circuit decided a
Ghanaian had presented a prima facie case for withholding of deportation because of her membership in the Ashanti tribe and in the
social class of "professionals, businesspeople, and those who are
highly educated."195 The court quoted the UN Handbook's broad
language"9 6 and noted that, as required in Acosta, the characteristics

were essentially beyond her power to change. 197 The Fourth Circuit
declined, in Cruz-Lopez v. INS,""8 to determine whether a Salvadoran's proposed group of "affluent students who attend private
schools, have relatives in the intelligentsia, receive direct threats
against their lives, and have friends and family members who have
been singled out for persecution"'

99

was a cognizable "social group,"

and found that in any event, the refugee had failed to demonstrate a
sufficient risk of persecution.200 Castaneda-Hernandezv. INS20 1 in-

(a) because he has been convicted of a crime or offense punishable by more
than three months' imprisonment; (b) because he has engaged in activities of a
subversive nature or which are prejudicial to public order, the internal or external security of the State, public morals or health; (c) because he is indigent
and is a charge on the State.
1d; see also U.N. GAOR Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16, at 7 (1951) (statement of French delegate that "France and the United Kingdom, however, had no intention of opposing the
right of asylum on grounds of indigence. Reasons such as the security of the country
were the only ones that could be invoked against that right."). United States law does
not apply most exclusions, including those for illiteracy and likelihood of becoming a
public charge, to applicants for asylum and withholding of deportation. See 8 U.S.C. §§
1158, 1182(b) (1982).
193. Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 28, 33.
194. 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen to
apply for withholding of deportation).
195. Id. at 623, 626.
196. See supra notes 169, 183 and accompanying text.
197. Ananeh-Firempong,766 F.2d at 626. The court did not, however, say immutability was required.
198. 802 F.2d 1518 (4th Cir. 1986).
199. Id. at 1521.
200. Id. at 1520 n.2.
201. 826 F.2d 1526 (6th Cir. 1987).
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volved a twenty-four-year-old Salvadoran who argued that he risked
persecution because "[a]ll young men who are not in the military are
subject to persecution," 202 and because he had "actively critic[ized]"
government policies.20 3 The Sixth Circuit remanded for further
factfinding. The court was impressed by affidavits from academics
and a journalist averring that the government would view a young
man who had not served in the military and had fled the country as
an enemy, and might arrest, torture, or kill him.2"4 The court found
that the BIA had been "entirely too dismissive" when it found that
petitioner's allegations involved conditions affecting all Salvadorans,
and thus failed to support the claim of persecution due to "social
group" membership.205 In Fernandez-Roque v. Smith,0 6 a district
court ordered the BIA to reopen cases to consider whether Cubans
on the Mariel boatlift were a persecuted "social group. 20 7 Thus, the
First and Sixth Circuits and a district court have taken unrestrictive
approaches to identifying "social groups," without lengthy discussions; the Fourth Circuit also has refused to reject a broad
interpretation.
3. A Step Backwards: Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS
Unfortunately, the court of appeals decision featuring the most extensive, though arguably unnecessary, 20 8 discussion of "social group"
diverges from these judicial interpretations by taking an approach
nearly opposite to, but at least as narrow as, the BIA's. In SanchezTrujillo v. INS,20 9 a Ninth Circuit panel210 found that young, urban,
working-class Salvadoran men of military age who had not served in
the military or otherwise demonstrated loyalty to the government
were not a "particular social group."'21' Its rationale differed from
that of the BIA decision below. Though confronted with some characteristics over which individuals clearly lack control, the BIA had
202. Id. at 1528 (quoting the trial hearing record at 124).
203. Id.
204.
205.
206.
cia-Mir v.
207.
when new
viewed as
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 1531.
Id.
599 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. GarSmith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1022 (1986).
The court found that the BIA abused its discretion in refusing to reopen cases
evidence indicated that persons who came on the boatlift were persecuted and
"scum" in Cuba. Fernandez Roque, 599 F. Supp. at 1106, 1109.
See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
The panel consisted of Judges Choy, A',.rcon, and Beezer.
Sanchez Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574-77.

rejected the Sanchez-Trujillo asylum seekers' claim on the basis
that "sex and age were not significant factors with regard to the risk
of harm.1112 The Board acknowledged that persecution "follows"

certain groups, naming religious leaders, educators, campesino213 or
agrarian reform groups, and journalists, but noted that respondents
had not claimed membership in any such group, and that Congress
did not protect all "displaced persons. 214 The BIA also apparently
shared the immigration judge's view that the variables defining the
group were arbitrary and not sharply defined.
The Ninth Circuit went much further. 215 The result in SanchezTrujillo-refusing to protect all members of the proposed group-is
defensible. Even advocates of an expansive definition of "social
group" acknowledge that membership in a target group does not automatically establish entitlement to protection. 216 The result may be
inevitable in light of existing law concerning political refuge, which
has strong, perhaps unshakable, foundations in ideas of sovereignty
and realpolitik.12 Much "suspicion" of young men in El Salvador21is8
expressed in the context of efforts to force them into the military:
harsh treatment helps enforce conscription in the face of intense fear
and widespread moral and political objections. Pressure to "serve"
extends to those who share the government's political orientation as
well as to those who are neutral or hostile, and is based on the supposed "bona fide occupational qualification" for fighting-being
young and male.2 19 This abuse may be based not on any proscribed
factor, but on a separate concern with compelling military service.
Fleeing conscription has historically been viewed as an inadequate
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
paras. 70,

In re Sanchez & Escobar, Interim Dec. No. 2996, at 9 (BIA 1985).
This Spanish word may be translated as "peasant" or "farmer."
Sanchez & Escobar, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 128.
See infra text accompanying notes 227-33.
See, e.g., Blum, supra note 164, at 327, 353 (quoting the U.N. Handbook at
73, 79); Helton, supra note 47, at 42 (contrasting social group with racial or

religious groups, where he argues that membership creates a presumption of entitlement
to protection); UN HANDBOOK, supra note 48, %79 (mere social group membership will
not necessarily create eligibility).
217. The traditional line is expressed in Villegas v. O'Neill, 626 F. Supp. 1241
(S.D. Tex. 1986) (any action against deserter would be prosecution, not persecution).
See UN HANDBOOK, supra note 48, 11 167-73 ("fear of prosecution and punishment for
desertion or draft-evasion does not in itself constitute well-founded fear of persecution
under the definition," but various circumstances concerning the character of hostilities,
the availability of conscientious objector status, and the moral views of the person in
question may create a basis for refugee status).
218. See, e.g., Mendez-Efrain v. INS, 813 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1987) (petitioner
failed to establish a legally sufficient claim of persecution). Much of the evidence on risks
to young men involved these dangers. See Brief for Petitioners at 11-15, Sanchez-Trujillo
v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-7609) (on file with the author). This
evidence is summarized in Comment, supra note 47, at 918-19.
219. Of course, in practice, conscription is often far from universal; student or occupational deferments and bribes often make privileged classes immune.
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basis for asylum,22 0 generally without inquiry into the morality of a
government's internal or external use of force. More recently, the
BIA has applied the same approach to "discipline" by guerrilla
forces aimed at preventing desertion. 221 The traditional view of conscription is changing; several courts have remanded to gather information about reasons for objecting, 222 or indicated that the extent of
punishment likely to result is relevant,2 2 3 and, at least one granted
withholding of deportation on the ground that refusal to fight in the
armed forces made the applicant a prime target.22 4 Nevertheless,
characterizing pressure to fight as "persecution" would require evidence of individual moral beliefs, and is not a promising basis for a

group based claim.225
Another possible objection to the petitioner's claim in SanchezTrujillo is that the incidence of persecution in the proposed group
was too low to justify, much less require, protection. 22 6 However, an220. See, e.g., Delgado-Corea v. INS, 804 F.2d 261, 263-64 (4th Cir. 1986) (wish
to avoid conscription in Nicaragua no basis for asylum). For a discussion of foreign approaches, see G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 47, at 33-35. See generally Brelick, Conscientious Objectors as Refugees, in U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE
SURVEY-1986 IN REVIEW 29 (1987) ("The community of nations has been slow to
recognize the right of conscientious objectors to refuse military service, and even slower
to grant asylum to those who flee countries where conscientious objection is not
recognized.").
221. See In re Maldonado-Cruz, Interim Dec. No. 3041, at 10 (BIA 1988) (noting
that "[a] guerrilla organization may therefore have a rational basis to punish deserters,
devoid of any intent to inflict harm on account of political opinion," and describing analysis as "virtually identical to that applied in the case of a deserter from a conventional
military force"). Contra Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988) (forced recruitment by revolutionary is tantamount to kidnapping and constitutes persecution).
222. See Sarkis v. Nelson, 585 F. Supp. 235, 239-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (remanding
for further testimony and BIA consideration of whether, inter alia, "performance of military service would be contrary to petitioner's genuine political, religious or moral convictions, or contrary to valid reasons of conscience"), on remand, 599 F. Supp. 724, 726-27
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (petitioners failed to allege that military service contrary to political,
religious, or moral convictions).
223. See, e.g., Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259, 1263-65 (9th Cir. 1985)
(evidence insufficient that petitioner would be persecuted for resisting conscription in
Nicaragua).
224. Aviles-Torres v. INS, 790 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986).
225. Rather than opening the way for such analysis, the Ninth Circuit's approach
may discourage it by suggesting that harsh treatment of sizable groups associated with
war rarely, if ever, creates asylum eligibility. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571,
1577 (9th Cir. 1986).
226. INS v. Cardoza-Fonsecaleft open the degree of risk required to make fear
"well-founded": "There is simply no room in the United Nations' definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted that he or she has no 'well-founded fear' of the event happening ...

[I]t is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 440 (1987). The BIA has done little to clarify matters. In In re Mogharrabi,
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alyzing whether group members' fears are "well-founded" and
whether they risk "persecution" on account of group membership
would require some attempt to assess the level of risk and its relation
to that faced by others, rather than conclusory dismissal.
The court went beyond the defensible conclusion that merely belonging to the proposed group did not justify asylum, and found that
the class was not, as a threshold matter,2 27 a "particular social
group" within the meaning of the Refugee Act of 1980.228 The court
did not even mention the BIA's principal "social group" opinion-In
re Acosta 22 -in formulating its own, virtually opposite, limitation.
The court set forth a four part inquiry:
First, we must decide whether the class of people identified by the petitioners is cognizable as a "particular social group" under the immigration statutes. Second, the petitioners must have established that they qualify as
members of the group. Third, it must be determined whether the purported
"social group" has in fact been targeted for persecution on account of the
characteristics of the group members. Finally, we must consider whether
such "special circumstances" are present to warrant our regarding mere
membership in that "social group" as constituting per se eligibility for asylum or prohibition of deportation. 30

/

The court found the petitioners had not met even the first hurdle,
using an extraordinarily narrow definition of "social group" purportedly drawn from the terms "particular" and "social":
The statutory words "particular" and "social" which modify "group," indicate that the term does not encompass every broadly defined segment of a
population, even if a certain demographic division does have some statistical
relevance. Instead the phrase "particular social group" implies a collection
of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest. Of central concern is the existence of a voluntary
associational relationship among the purported members, which imparts
some common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that discrete social group.
Perhaps a prototypical example of a "particular social group" would consist of the immediate members of a certain family, the family being a focus
of fundamental
affiliational concerns and common interests for most
231
people.

The court noted "[i]ndividuals falling within the parameters of
this sweeping demographic division naturally manifest a plethora of
Interim Dec. 3028, at 9-12 (BIA 1987), the Board acknowledged that "a reasonable
person may well fear persecution even where its likelihood is significantly less than
clearly probable," and found that "an applicant for asylum has established a wellfounded fear if he shows that a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution." Id. at 9-10. Yet the Board claimed that this would entail only a minor shift from
its previous approach.
227. For a discussion of the significance of the holding's threshold character, see
infra text accompanying notes 267-75.
228. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574-77.
229. Interim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 17193.
230. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574-75 (citations and footnotes omitted).

231.

Id. at 1576 (citation omitted).
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different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary
political leanings, ' 28 2 and concluded, "such an all-encompassing
grouping. . .simply is not that type of cohesive, homogeneous group
to which we believe the term 'particular social group' was intended
233
to apply.
The panel offered no support in legislative history-which it dismissed as "generally uninformative" 2 4-- for its constricted definition. After suggesting that "analogous" interpretations in international arenas might be helpful, the court went no further than
mentioning-and implicitly rejecting-the United Nations High
Commissioner's Handbook.3 5 Specific applications by other states
which are parties to the Convention and Protocol were ignored entirely,23 6 though such interpretations are relevant to treaty interpretation.237 To treat foreign and international interpretations as no
more than potentially useful analogies ignores the congressional intent to bring the United States into conformity with international
law.2 38 Rather than exploring areas of legislative history which bear
indirectly on the interpretation of "social group," or examining international obligations, 239 the court purported
to draw on the meanings
2 40
of "particular" and "social group.
The court slightly relaxed its insistence on voluntary association
232. Id. at 1577.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1575.
235. Id. at 1576. To review the formulation presented by the UN Handbook, see
supra text accompanying notes 169, 183.
236. For the citations to relevant materials, see supra note 54.
237. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) ("The High
Commissioner's analysis of the United Nations' standard is consistent with our own examination of the origins of the Protocol's definition, as well as the conclusions of many
scholars who have studied the matter.") (footnote omitted); id. at 450-51 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (reiterating majority's direction that BIA look for meaning of "well-founded
fear" in international obligations, and noting that "[s]uch language has a rich history of
interpretation in international law and scholarly commentaries").

238. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
239. The international legal background was thoroughly summarized, and the status of international law as part of domestic law stressed, in the Amicus Curiae Brief of
ACLU Foundation of Northern California, ACLU Foundation of Southern California,
and National Lawyers Guild, Seattle Chapter in Support of Petitioners, Sanchez-Trujillo
v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-67609) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. See Comment, supra note 47, at 939 ("Congress intended that the
Act include language which originated in the Refugee Convention and Protocol, language which reflects the intent of the drafters of those instruments. By not giving this
background of the Refugee Act enough consideration, the Sanchez-Trujillo court essentially belittled the commitment that the Act embodies.").
240. Sanchez-Trufillo, 801 F.2d at 1574.

and cohesion in a footnote acknowledging that "a persecutor's perception of a segment of a society as a 'social group'" might be relevant, but indicating that "neither would such an outside characterization be conclusive." 2 4' The court also conceded that mere group

membership could conceivably, under "special circumstances,"2' 2
justify protection, and noted reassuringly that "[f]ew could doubt,
for example, that any Jew fleeing Nazi Germany in the 1930's or
40's would by virtue of his or her religious status alone have established a clear probability of persecution."24 Of course, that conclusion was not so inescapable at the time.244 The effect of the court's
focus on internal group dynamics is that what should be central-perceptions and attitudes of persecuting powers-becomes peripheral and determinative only, if ever, in the most "extreme" cases.
Perhaps most remarkable is the court's use of the family to illustrate the kind of "group" it has in mind. 45 Families are, of course,
groups in which many relationships were never voluntarily assumed
and few can easily be terminated. The family is, in fact, a problematic candidate for "social group, 2 46 though family members' fates
are relevant evidence.247 The family's appeal seems to be that it
241. Id. at 1576 n.7.
242. Id. at 1575 n.4.
243. Id. at 1574 (citation omitted). Persecution of Jews would be covered by the
religion ground; the relevance of the court's concession seems to be that individual evidence would be unnecessary. The court found in the instant case that since "the petitioners have failed to identify a cognizable 'social group' or sustain their burden of proof we
need not further define the contours of the 'special circumstances' requirement." Id. at
1575 n.4.
244. Jews in Germany and occupied areas were not able to convince Western democracies that their risks justified relaxing immigration quotas or even expediting procedures so that existing quotas could be filled. See generally H. FEINGOLD, THE POLITICS
OF RESCUE: THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION AND THE HOLOCAUST, 1938-45 (1970); A.
MORSE, WHILE SIX MILLION DIED: A CHRONICLE OF AMERICAN APATHY (1968); D.
WYMAN, THE ABANDONMENT OF THE JEWS (1984).
245. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
246. Most "family" claims derive from some other, at times difficult to pinpoint,
type of persecution. See, e.g., Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1985)
(though petitioner had little information as to who killed his relatives, or why, evidence
suggested that his family was "particularly affected" by conditions). Where the only
basis is family membership, the claim may border on the kind of "personal" grievance
which cannot justify asylum. See Florez-DeSolis v. INS, 796 F.2d 330, 335 (9th Cir.
1986) (guerrillas came to petitioner's home not for political reasons but to collect a
debt); Zayas-Marini v. INS, 785 F.2d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1986) (threats to member of
Paraguayan political elite from other members resulted from "personal animosity" and
"personal dispute," and thus not basis for protection).
247. To review cases where family members had been threatened or harmed, see,
e.g., Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 1987) (alien whose father
had disappeared and many of whose relatives had been arrested and threatened showed
well-founded fear of persecution); Chavarria v. INS, 722 F.2d 666, 668 (11 th Cir. 1984);
Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1978). Family members' apparent safety
was viewed as evidence against the petitioner in Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406, 413 (6th
Cir. 1987).
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presents a "small, readily identifiable group. 2 48 Not only does the
Ninth Circuit impose ad hoc limitations which distort statutory language and have no basis in congressional intent, but the example it
treats as "paradigmatic" blatantly fails to meet those criteria.
The court's decision makes sense only in terms of another set of
concerns. 4 9 The court gives us some sense of what those are. The
Ninth Circuit prefers that groups be small and "readily identifiable," and states that "[m]ajor segments of the population of an embattled nation" will "rarely, if ever" constitute a "social group" for
asylum purposes. 250 It insists that the interpretation of "membership
in a particular social group. . .must be informed primarily through

a careful evaluation of the statutory language, and a practical appreciation of the reasonably limited scope of the term 'refugee' as
reflected in our previous decisions."'' The court concluded that:
"To hold otherwise would be tantamount to extending refugee status
to every alien displaced by general conditions of unrest or violence in
his or her home country." 252 Thus, the court's real concerns are
three: first, that persecution really be on a statutory basis, which requires both that the group exist as a real social phenomenon rather
than merely as a statistical artifact, and that group members face
distinctive risks; second, that groups be small;2" 3 and third, that they
248. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985), cited in
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
249. When literary and social critics see smart people making very bad arguments,
they suspect the existence of a hidden, often subconscious, agenda and try to figure out
what it is. This familiar method is spelled out explicitly in The Archaeology of Knowledge. M. FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 186 (1972). ("Theoretical
contradictions, lacunae, defects may indicate the ideological functioning of a science (or
of a discourse with scientific pretensions); they may enable us to determine at what point
in the structure this functioning takes effect.") One of the concerns commonly revealed
through such an analysis is fear of -"the other"--the alien. See, e.g., S. DE BEAUVOIR,
THE SECOND SEX (H. Parshley trans. & ed. 1974); see also Henkel, InternationalProtection of Refugees and Displaced Persons: A Global Problem of Growing Complexity,
in 8 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 142, 143 (L. Tomasi ed. 1986). The author wondered:
What is prompting these developed, and in the main basically. prosperous countries to adopt such restrictive postures? We can discern at least some of them:
economic slowdown; "compassion fatigue"; fear for the loss of ethnic, cultural
or national identity; xenophobia or outright racism; and in the most atavistic
sense, just plain deep-seated fear of the stranger. A psychologist rather than a
lawyer is needed adequately to explore the mysterious ramifications of this
question.

Id.

250. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577.
251. Id. at 1576 (emphasis added).
252. Id. at 1577.
253. The court almost says as much. See id. at 1576 ("we [have] regarded evidence of persecution directed against a family unit as relevant in determining refugee

be "readily identifiable."254 The court has improperly addressed the
first concern, and the second two are illegitimate.
The court correctly required that persecution really be on an enumerated basis. The court raises the specter of a "disparate impact"
claim based on evidence that men over six feet tall face unusually
high risks from political instability.5 5 It is a fair interpretation of
persecution on account of "social group" membership to require
more than an unexplained correlation. To say, for instance, that all
persons "persecuted" form a "social group," even if they have nothing else in common, would read the five grounds out of the Act altogether. This result may also be dictated by an ordinary understanding of groups as amalgamations which are not arbitrary. However,
correlations which might initially strike American adjudicators as
statistical artifacts may reflect real social phenomena. 256 The court's
requirement that groups be voluntary, cohesive, and homogeneous
does not promote conformity to the statutory criterion, but arbitrarily narrows it.257 Nor can protection be denied to people who face
elevated risk of persecution on account of race, nationality, religion,
political views, or "social group" membership because those around
them suffer "general" oppression or war. 258 Like the BIA's approach, the Ninth Circuit's decision c4nnot be justified as necessary
to avoid opening the United States to All the oppressed and displaced
people of the world.
Where a group is the target of persecution, there is no statutory
basis for denying protection simply because many people are at risk.
Despite the government's repeated references in Sanchez-Trujillo to
the size of the proposed group,2 59 concern with group size could only
be legitimate had Congress authorized it-and Congress did not.
Congress did not limit protection to members of small or minority
racial, ethnic, religious, political, or "social groups." The Ninth Circuit itself saw European Jews, a large group, as a paradigmatic case
status, noting that a family was 'a small, readily identifiable group.' ").
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Even height variations, offered by the court as an absurd example of the
lengths to which asylum seekers might attempt to "gerrymander" societies, could be socially relevant or a visible proxy for things which are. See Sulzberger, To Be Obscurely
Massacred, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1972, § 4, at 9, col. 1 (describing conflict between Tutsi
(tall) and Hutu (short) peoples in Burundi); Howe, Burundi Massacre in the Heart of
Africa, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1972, § 4, at 2, col. 1.
257. See infra text accompanying notes 286-324.
258. See infra text accompanying notes 396-444.
259. Brief for Respondent at 22, Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir.
1986) (No. 85-7609) (noting that immigration judge had concluded that group would
cover 12% to 17% of a total population of 4.8 million, and warning that "if the aliens
prevailed, the entire population of El Salvador or large segments of that population

would be entitled to asylum and withholding of deportation") (on file with the author).
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for protecting all members of a group.260 Members of a majority
race may be persecuted by a minority.261 Refugee flows following
United States withdrawal from Indochina were large,262 and included substantial portions of some groups identified with the American "presence" or viewed as reactionary for other reasons. 263 "Smallness" is simply not relevant to the statutory definition of refugee,
which applies both to overseas admissions and to asylum.
Nor is ease of identification relevant. By requiring individualized
inquiries into risk and creating separate standards of proof for discretionary asylum and mandatory withholding of deportation,264
Congress necessitated difficult factfinding. In creating a category as
flexible as "social group," Congress required adjudicators to assess
which groups are persecuted. 2 5 In any event, any serious attempt to
determine whether groups actually fit the Ninth Circuit's criteria

would require factfinding and sociological analysis much more complex than those required by a more literal interpretation.266 In summary, the court failed to present a coherent definition or to justify its
criteria.
Moreover, while emphasizing the threshold character of its approach,267 the court failed to pursue the implications of that path.
The threshold definitional approach to the scope of protection ignores a crucial distinction between two uses of the "social group"
provision. In its concern to prevent the more problematic
use-substituting for individualized evidence-the court apparently
blocked even the previously noncontroversial use of "social group" as
a "catch-all" for persons at risk for reasons not otherwise covered.268
Persons facing risk of harm due to some group identity rather than
260. However, the court did not make clear whether Jews would be protected as a
"social group" per se, since they could also be protected under the race or religion
grounds.

261.

See UN

HANDBOOK,

supra note 48, at 76.

262. See supra notes 57, 60.
263. Van Esterick, Lao, in REFUGEES

IN THE UNITED STATES,

supra note 57, at

149.
264. The latter point assumes the correctness of Stevic. See supra note 17.
265. For an argument that one explanation for narrowing statutory interpretations
is that courts find it less disturbing to decide that applicants are ineligible "as a matter of
law" than to assess the truthfulness of their factual accounts, see Martin, Comparative
Policies on Political Asylum: Of Facts and Law, in 9 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 105,
108-09 (L. Tomasi ed. 1987).
266. See infra text accompanying notes 312-17.
267. Sanchez v. Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1575.
268. This was noncontroversial prior to In re Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA
1985). See supra note 170 and accompanying text.

because of random or universal abuses, idiosyncratic personal conflicts, or by way of legitimate criminal punishment, were previously
covered even if the reason for abuse was not race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. That Congress meant to bring domestic law
into conformity with international law, which clearly permits this
type of claim, is beyond doubt. 26 9 The Ninth Circuit thwarted that
intent.
While the "residual" character of "social group" was, until Acosta
and Sanchez-Trujillo, undisputed, the more difficult issue is whether
group membership alone can justify or require protection where an
individual cannot establish personal "targeting." There should be no
barrier in principle to this use of the provision, which the Ninth Circuit conceded would have been appropriate for Jews in Nazi Germany. 70 The applicant must prove risk sufficient to permit asylum
under the "well-founded fear" standard or to require withholding of
deportation under the "clear probability" standard. Pointing to
group membership could meet that burden in whole or in part. In its
haste to resolve "social group" claims at the definitional level, the
Ninth Circuit blocked off this empirical inquiry and set forth a narrow definition which threatens to foreclose even the formerly noncontroversial coverage of persons whose exposure to danger is clear but
not explainable in terms of race, religion, nationality,
or political
2 72
271
opinion. The court dismissed Ananeh-Firempong in a footnote,
expressing "no view" as to its merits, but concluding that it had not
273
addressed the "outer limits" of the "social group" category.
Though stressing the "threshold" character of its decision,274 the
Ninth Circuit ignored its approach's potential to exclude the claims
based on tribal membership
and family class position found sufficient
2 5
in Ananeh-Firempong.1
Technically, Sanchez-Trujillo's definition of "social group" might
be viewed as dicta. The court did not find that the persons before it
faced an unusual risk of harm which they could explain only by
pointing to membership in a large, diffuse group. Rather, it asserted
in somewhat confusing terms that the risk they faced was indistinguishable from that faced by the rest of the population.276 Even if
269. See supra notes 12, 41-59 and accompanying text.
270. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574. But see Dally v. INS, 744 F.2d 1191
(6th Cir. 1984) (individualized evidence required to meet "clear probability" standard).
271. 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 194-97.
272. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1575 n.6.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1575.
275. This is disturbing; it is generally regarded as essential to fairness that courts
attempt to develop rationales which will hold up in subsequent cases, thus promoting
consistency among parties. See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
YALE L.J. 82, 102-04 (1986).
276. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577-78 ("[T]he evidence indicates that the
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the "social group" definition is not strictly necessary, it is likely to
prove influential. Labeled a "threshold" holding 27 7 it is the only extensive judicial treatment to date. 27 8 The Ninth Circuit has developed the most extensive, and in general most protective, body of asylum

lawY 7 9 This reputation makes it less likely that Sanchez-

Trujillo will be recognized as constricting and poorly reasoned. Few

asylum
seekers have the resources required to litigate their cases
fully, 28 0 so language from the few cases that do reach the courts of
appeals has substantial impact on cases resolved below. The paucity

of "social group" claims reaching the courts in the wake of SanchezTrujillo suggests many petitioners' attorneys may be discouraged by
the decision from pursuing such claims. At the very least, SanchezTrujillo represents the Ninth Circuit's current position. The circuit
may change course, particularly if confronted with a narrower and
more compelling candidate group. The "exception" which the court
suggests may exist for groups which do not conform to its definition
but which are viewed by persecutors as meaningful may be recognized and even swallow the rule. 8' If the approach persists, its imrisk of persecution relates principally to the existence of actual or imputed political opinion. This factor applies equally to all segments of the population of El Salvador and its
existence turns upon individual circumstances."). It is not clear whether the court found
no higher risk for members of this category, or that after "controlling" for some variables-such as the "normality" of young men dying in wars-the disparity disappears.
Compare id. at 1577 ("the IJ [immigration judge] and the BIA reasonably found that
the evidence was inconclusive to establish that mere age and gender, even when combined with labor class background, urban, residence, or political neutrality, had any bearing on the likelihood of persecution") with id. at 1577 (conceding that, as is
"hardly. ..surprising," a "substantial number" of victims were young men).
277. Id. at 1575.
278. A number of courts have applied the concept as intended without any elaborate discussion. See supra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
279. See Blum, supra note 164.
280. Most asylum seekers rely on volunteers and on charitable legal assistance programs, which are generally understaffed and overworked. See generally COMMITTEE ON
LEGAL ASSISTANCE

&

COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW OF THE

ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
NEEDS OF ALIENS IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAi4 AREA (Nov. 1986). For a descrip-

tion of how the INS's "Haitian Program" undermined counsel's ability to reach and
represent asylum applicants, see Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th
Cir. 1982); J. MILLER, THE PLIGHT OF HAITIAN REFUGEES 107-14 (1984). More re-

cently, the INS has placed refugees in "remote detention" facilities far from counsel.
The Ninth Circuit has barred this treatment of aliens who already have lawyers, but
refused to intervene on behalf of unrepresented persons. Committee of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1986), modified, 807 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1987). A

district court has recently issued an injunction attempting to ensure that persons in such
facilities will have improved opportunities to obtain counsel. Orantes-Hernandez v.
Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
281. This approach seems to be advocated in Comment, supra note 47.

pact will depend in part on whether the BIA adheres to Acosta or
adopts an even more narrowing construction. Immigration judges
and INS district directors may even use whichever theory "works" in
a given case. So long as Sanchez-Trujillo is confined to the Ninth
Circuit, broad interpretations of persecution on account of political
opinion 282 will limit the risk of threshold definitional disqualification.283 The construction will be far more damaging if implemented
in jurisdictions with narrower approaches to political grounds.
In narrowing "social group," the Ninth Circuit has strayed far
from deference; its restrictive and peculiar interpretation distorts
statutory language and ignores legislative history. Its approach was
not urged by the Attorney General as a litigation posture, and contradicts the BIA's approach in Acosta. 284 Faced with an influx of

asylum seekers from this hemisphere, the Ninth Circuit may have
succumbed to its own sense of foreign policy imperatives-a sense
that the line must be drawn somewhere. If a reading more faithful to
statutory language and congressional intent would grant refuge to
large groups from nearby countries, a more "reasonable," narrower
approach must be sought. Of course, judges' deepest underlying social visions are rarely knowable, 285 and even more rarely reported in
law reviews. Whatever its reasons, the effect of the court's decision is
to alter the asylum policy which Congress attempted to
institutionalize.

232. The Ninth Circuit entertains claims based on political opinion which is not
actual but "imputed" to a party by a government. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777
F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985). It has recognized that the "personal" can be political. See
Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (woman who worked as maid for
Salvadoran army officer and had been raped and threatened with execution as a subversive by him stated claim for asylum, since officer's view that he had a right to dominate
women was political, as were his use of power derived from military position and her
resistance to his demands). The court has acknowledged that neutrality can be a political
opinion. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1324-26 (9th Cir. 1984). In
Sanchez-Trujillo itself, after rejecting the social group claim, the court moved on to
examine each petitioner's case in light of the "individual" circumstances involving "actual or imputed political opinion." Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577-78.
283. In Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988), the court did not
reach petitioner's claim of persecution based on membership in the social group of small
merchants and fishermen who refused to pay bribes to the Tonton Macoutes and were
thus victimized by Haiti's allegedly "kleptocratic" government, because it found that he
was eligible for protection based on political opinion cynically imputed to him in order to
facilitate extortion.
284. For a discussion of Acosta, see supra text accompanying notes 171-93. The
Brief for Respondent argued that the proposed group fails to fit into Acosta's requirements and stressed that the roots of petitioners' problems are in a "generalized" war.

Brief for Respondent, supra note 259, at 29-33.
285. For an attempt to elucidate such a vision and a discussion of the difficulties of
doing so, see H. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND
STUDY OF TORT ACCIDENT LAW 92, 204-07 (1987).
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4.

Ordinary Usage and the Meaning of "Social Group"

The BIA and Ninth Circuit have narrowed the "social group"
concept in virtually opposite ways,2 86 focusing on immutability and
voluntariness respectively. Not only is neither approach grounded in
or compatible with legislative intent, 8 7 but each conflicts with ordinary understandings of "social group"28 8 in speech, in sociology, in

court decisions, and in government documents. Where Congress has
not stipulated a precise meaning for statutory language-either explicitly or by using terms of art-courts normally look to ordinary
usage, rather than stipulating a partial, restrictive meaning on their

own initiative. Assigning unusual or atypically precise meanings to
words is, in effect, legislating;289 it is unsurprising that the Supreme
Court insists on ordinary meanings in reading immigration statutes.290 Much as the petitioners in Sanchez-Trujillo argued, 91 the
only limitation the "social group" requirement imposes is that the
286. There is a limited "intersection" of groups whose members might be eligible
under either definition: voluntary associations of people who share a "fundamental" characteristic and, perhaps, persons sharing immutable characteristics which cause all or almost all of them to be persecuted, despite lack of cohesion.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 41-59.
288. For a discussion of this usage, see Helton, supra note 47, at 39 ("social
group" is used to refer to voluntary associations, statistically described groups, groups
possessing internal solidarity, and so on).
289. R. ROBINSON, DEFINITION 59-62 (1950) (stipulative definition, which consists
of laying down what a word is to mean when one uses it, rather than "finding out what
some set of people actually had meant by [the] same word," is also known as "legislative
definition").
290. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987), the Supreme Court
held that "well-founded fear" can exist where persecution is not more likely than not,
stating that the "ordinary and obvious meaning of the phrase is not to be lightly discounted," and noted that for the INA, "we have considered ourselves bound to assume
that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used"
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
291. The Sanchez-Trujillo petitioners argued:
The analysis has been developed most fully perhaps in the jury composition
context where criminal defendants have claimed particular groups are underrepresented on their juries. In order to make such a claim based on a relationship to a group, the defendant is required to demonstrate that the group is
distinct from the rest of society and definable in some non-arbitrary way. The
criteria for determining whether a distinct, identifiable (i.e. particular or cognizable) social group exists are not static, but vary depending on the nature of
the injury alleged and the local historical and political context in which
cognizability of the group is being claimed.
See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 218, at 17; see also Amicus Brief, supra note 239,
at 14 ("First, this court should consider whether the petitioner has identified a particular
social group that is subject to persecution. In making its evaluation the court should
recognize that membership in virtually any type of group or social category may be a
basis for persecution.").

group must be socially meaningful; it cannot be merely a set 2 2 of
persons connected in no way other than all facing persecution. Nor
before
does "particular" impose any restriction; placing29 "particular"
3
"certain.
means
merely
fashion
this
a noun in
Though "membership in a particular social group" has a particular meaning in international covenants protecting refugees, 29 4 "social
group" is not otherwise a legal term of art. American case law uses
the expression in a broad, nearly all-inclusive sense; it encompasses
voluntary associations as well as groups based on "immutable" characteristics or defined by outsiders' stereotypes.29 5 American constitutional adjudication has singled out "discrete and insular" groups for
292. See W.

QUINE,

Natural Kinds, in

ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER

ESSAYS 114, 117-18 (1969).

293. One commentator has concluded that "[t]he word 'particular' can simply
function as singling out one of these groups for identification; it need not narrow the

scope of the group being defined." Comment, supra note 47, at 923. In fact, none of the
meanings of "particular" in this context lends itself to the narrowing construction suggested but not elaborated by the court. A dictionary offers the following meanings for
"particular":
1. of or pertaining to a single or specific person, thing, group, class, occupation, etc., rather than to others or all; special rather than general: one's particular interests in books. 2. immediately present or under consideration; in this
specific instance or place: Look at this particular clause in the contract. 3.
distinguished or different from others or from the ordinary; noteworthy,
marked, unusual: She sang with particularwarmth at last evening's concert. 4.
exceptional or especial: Take particularpains with this job. 5. being such in an
exceptional degree: a particularfriend of mine. 6. dealing with or giving details, as an account or description, of a person; detailed; minute. 7. exceptionally selective, attentive, or exacting; fastidious; fussy: to be ?articular about
one's food. 8. Logic. a. not general; referring to an indefinite part of a whole
class. b. (of a proposition) containing only existential quantifiers. c. partaking
of the nature of an individual as opposed to a class. 9. Low. a. noting an estate
that precedes a future or ultimate ownership, as lands devised to a widow during her lifetime and after that to her children. b. noting the tenant of such an
estate. -n. 10. an individual or distinct part, as an item of a list or enumeration. 11. Usually, PARTICULARS. specific points, details, or circumstances; to give
an investigator the particulars of a case. 12. Logic. an individual or a specific
group within a general class. 13. INPARTICULAR, particularly; specifically; especially: There is one book in particular that may help you.
THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1414-15 (2d ed. 1987).
294. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
295. A summary of the results of a WESTLAW search of federal cases, showing
that "social group" is used to refer to all kinds of groups, defined by age, class, voluntary
characteristics, and organizational membership, for example, is on file with the author.
Comment, supra note 47, at 931-34, concludes that some groups are legally relevant
because of internal cohesion and shared attitudes, while others are relevant as targets for
outsiders' animus. H. Steiner describes modern courts' tendencies to view parties in tort
cases as representing broader business or consumer groups, and notes that:
[T]he common law has long included doctrines whose reach is defined in terms
of groups: status groups of an ascriptive character deriving from political and
social order; groups that individuals can choose to enter and leave (married
women); or groups defined in terms of physical and mental characteristics (minors, mentally incompetent).
H.STEINER, supra note 285, at 115, 117.
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protection from political processes. 296 Other government documents
illustrate a similarly ordinary use of "social group." For instance,
Pentagon studies on how to increase American "influence" in a num-

ber of societies identified a variety of "social groups" as promising
targets.29 7
Like ordinary usage, sociological treatments make clear that any
attempt to define "social groups" as either "voluntary" or "immutable" is bound to fail. Courts face severe difficulties in assimilating
and testing social science insights, and probably should not be expected or even encouraged to follow developments on the cutting
edges of social theory. 298 However, given that Congress defined asylum eligibility in terms most frequently considered in sociology, and
that sociology has helped to shape ordinary usage, some attention to
that discipline's insights is in order. Students of society have recognized for hundreds of years that a key distinction among "social
groups" is precisely the extent to which they are ascriptive--defined
in terms of immutable characteristics-or voluntary.299 Many impor296. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
297. In 1959, the Pentagon commissioned a 471-page study by the American University Special Operations Research Office, entitled "Psychological Operations: Cambodia," which attempted to identify which "social groups" were both "effective" and "susceptible" to American pressures. The "social groups" found most promising were the
urban middle class and officer corps; other groups examined included peasants, ethnic
Chinese, police, Buddhist monks, and youth. Similar studies were done for Egypt,
Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Syria, Thailand and Vietnam. W. SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW 55-58 (1979). Another "ordinary" use of "social group" is presented by a 1936

Federal Housing Administration underwriter's manual cited in Bradley v. School Bd.,
338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972), which states that:
Deed restrictions are apt to prove more effective than a zoning ordinance in
providing protection from adverse influences. Where the same deed restrictions
apply over a broad area and where these restrictions relate to types of structures, use to which improvements may be put, and racial occupancy, a
favorable condition is apt to exist. If, in addition to physical attraction of the
neighborhood, the present class of occupants is of such quality as to make the
area desirable to the social group which will form the prospective market, additional appeal is created. Of prime consideration to Valuator is the presence or
lack of homogeneity regarding types of dwellings and classes of people living in
the neighborhood.
Id. at 215 (citations to transcript omitted).
298. For one case study, see Davis, "There Is A Book Out.
An Analysis of
Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987) (describing
and criticizing family courts' frequent capitulation to "psychological parent" theories
without adequate understanding of their limitations).
299. See generally R. ARON, MAIN CURRENTS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT 73143, 237-302 (1965) (discussing Comte and Tocqueville); R. DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND
CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 218-23 (1959); 2 R. FLETCHER, THE MAKING OF
SOCIOLOGY 27-83 (1971) (discussion of Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft distinction); A. GID-

tant classifications, such as social class, fall between these absolutes,
with the degree and type of mobility varying among societies. Some
group characteristics are important because outsiders care about

them, whether or not they are central to individual members' identi-

ties. Some "social groups" are defined by similarity among members,
and others by unity. Both members of a society and outside observers frequently disagree violently over the extent of social cohesion, 300
social mobility, 01 the importance of ascription and family connections, 02 the importance of "luck" and "merit,"303 and the "voluntariness" of "voluntary associations."3 04 Sociologists so bold as to attempt to define "social group" invariably produce amorphous, allinclusive definitions. 305
The Ninth Circuit requires that groups be cohesive 306 and "actuated by some common impulse or interest. 30 7 Both sociological and
(1973); S.

DENS, THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF THE ADVANCED CAPITALIST SOCIETIES
SET & R. BENDIX, SOCIAL MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 72-75, 288-94

Lip-

(1959) (high
social and labor mobility characteristic of industrialized societies regardless of political
conditions); T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 180-200 (1951) (categorizing principal
types of social structures as "universalistic-achievement," "universalistic-ascription,"
"particularistic-achievement," and "particularistic-ascription").
300. A famous example is a series of studies of Tepoztlan, a Mexican village. An
original anthropological work researched in 1926 by Robert Redfield described a harmonious, quite "homogeneous" community. Years later, Oscar Lewis found a highly individualistic, conflict-ridden society, and found many indications that these phenomena were
not new. See 0. LEWIS, LIFE IN A MEXICAN VILLAGE: TEPOZTLAN RESTUDIED (1972).
301. See generally R. DAHRENDORF, supra note 299 (contrasting "classes" and

"strata").
302. Compare W. DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? (1967) (wealthy, largely hereditary, elite controls America) with T. SOWELL, ETHNIC AMERICA: A HISTORY (1981)
(United States open to talent and effort).
303. Compare R. DE LEONE, SMALL FUTURES: CHILDREN, INEQUALITY AND THE
LIMITS OF LIBERAL REFORM (1979) (stressing limits on social mobility) with R.
DAHRENDORF, LIFE CHANCES: APPROACHES TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY (1979)
(social mobility in United States very substantial).
304. Compare V. SHUE, PEASANT CHINA IN TRANSITION: THE DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT TOWARD SOCIALISM, 1949-1956 (1980) (communists implemented collectivization through gradual, largely market-oriented and voluntary mechanisms) with D. MITRANY, MARX AGAINST THE PEASANT: A STUDY IN SOCIAL DOGMATISM

(1951) (Marxists

in power rely on coercion).

305. A commentator states that social groups can be defined according to "kin,
family, ethnic, territorial, age, sex, political, governmental, language, religious, residential, class, occupational, recreational, propinquity, business, nationality, scientific, char-

ity, insurance, educational, honorary, learned, [etc. factors] . . . ." R. BIERSTEDT, THE
SOCIAL ORDER 258 (1957). In the 1970 edition, the author described at length the great
variety of social groups. Id. at 272-301 (3d ed. 1970); see also N. SMELSER, SOCIOLOGY:
AN INTRODUCTION 4-5 (1967) (noting that "[s]ociologists frequently speak in terms of
groups of persons instead of individual persons," that "[s]ometimes sociologists study

social groups as units in their own right, interacting with one another without particular
reference to their individual members," and that among the groups commonly examined

are political parties and "entire social class groupings").
306. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577 ("particular social group" refers to "cohesive, homogeneous group[s]").
307. Id. at 1576 ("the phrase 'particularsocial group' implies a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or
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popular discourse often refer to groups which lack cohesion. "Minority group," probably the common expression closest to "social
group," describes people united by some common characteristic,
such as race or religion; members differ in many ways and are not,
except in some very small groups, "closely affiliated" with one another.3 0 8 Classes, of course, vary in the extent and kind of "class
consciousness." Much political organizing consists of trying to develop cohesion among people who share "objective" interests.
The Ninth Circuit introduces yet another complexity by demanding "homogeneity." 30 9 The court quoted the immigration judge to
the effect that the proposed class "may be so broad and encompass
so many variables that to recognize any person who might conceivably establish that he was a member of this class is entitled to asylum
or withholding of deportation would render the definition of 'refugee'
meaningless." 31 0 Only in egalitarian groups without role differentiation would the homogeneity criterion literally be met. Again, treating the family3 ' as paradigmatic is strange, since families are not
noted for egalitarianism or role similarity. This requirement seems
based on concern that members of a heterogeneous group face uneven risks. However, persecutors frequently disregard individual variations within target groups. The Ninth Circuit simply assumed that
membership in a diverse population would be minimally relevant to
individual risk, rather than treating the extent to which risk varies
from member to member as an empirical question.

Paradoxically, while it is easy to recognize these elementary sociological insights, and thus to see that the views of both the Ninth
Circuit and the BIA are incomplete, it would require far greater insight to administer either restrictie scheme. Applying either definition rigorously would require immense sociological sophistication,
and might demand a level of social science explanation, as opposed
to description, which is not attainable even under the best conditions,3" 2 much less in asylum proceedings. Before reaching the quesinterest" (emphasis added)).
308.
ANALYSIS

broadly).
309.
310.
311.
312.

See G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES: AN
OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 17 (1965) (defining "minority group"

Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577.
Id.
Id.at 1576.
See generally C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING 40-53, 83-84 (1979) (criticizing the "mistaken
pursuit of authoritativeness" in social science policy research, and observing that "reporting" rather than "explaining" social phenomena is generally more feasible and may often

tion of whether a group faces persecution, it would be necessary to
determine whether it is sufficiently "voluntary" and "hgmogeneous"
to satisfy the Ninth Circuit 1 ' or, conversely, sufficiently "immutable" or "fundamental" to meet BIA standards. 14 Such determinations are often difficult for our own society, and much more so for
others. It is hard enough to find out whether a village has been
picked out as subversive, and much more difficult to determine
whether residence varies over time or has been stable from "time
immemorial," whether villagers who go elsewhere would be identifiable, and the like. Whether persons doing particular work form a
qualifying "social group" would require analysis of the social meaning of work. Land, certain occupations, and communal work responsibilities may be passed down through kinship groups, with limited
individual choice; 315 guilds and governments sometimes tightly control occupational entry. Persons with a common occupation may vary
in ways which affect government attitudes; whether they have contact with each other is not always obvious. Determining whether
"immutable" features outweigh "voluntary" ones, the readiness with
which characteristics once "chosen" can be changed, or the extent of
a group's internal differentiation would often require information inaccessible to asylum seekers, their attorneys, the INS, or
adjudicators.
For the Ninth Circuit, part of the appeal of its limiting criteria-and of the "paradigmatic" example of the family-was that
such groups appeared "readily identifiable."3 6 In fact, though, far
from reducing the complexity of the adjudicator's task, these oversimplified theoretical dichotomies aggravate it. For better or worse,
it is unlikely that asylum adjudicators will permit themselves to become bogged down in anthropology dissertations. It is far more likely
that the "immutable" and "voluntary" categories will be invoked
casually. Adjudicators may either assume other societies are like our
own, or employ misleading stereotypes to identify differences. So
used, these categories may obscure more than they reveal.
The Acosta and, to a lesser extent, Sanchez-Trujillo criteria may
be social science's most useful contribution to "problem solving").
313. See supra text accompanying notes 231-33.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
315. See R. BIERSTEDT, supra note 305, at 250-51, 297 (in some societies occupational status is function of age and kinship); Stephens, Family and Kinship, in N.
SMELSER, supra note 305, at 520-21; see also Wolf, Closed CorporatePeasant Communities in Mesoamericaand CentralJava, 13 S.W. J. ANTHRO. 1 (1957) (contrasting subsistence cultivators who control land and maintain perpetuity of rights and membership,
and limit privileges to insiders, with "open" peasant communities where communal jurisdiction over land is absent, membership is unrestricted, and wealth is not redistributed).
In a society of "closed" villages, "just moving" means losing supports which are vital to
survival in hard times. Id. at 12-15.
316. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
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often be relevant in assessing risk of persecution. Pressure to change
certain "nonfundamental" characteristics is not a basis for asylum;
requiring people to conform to government dictates in certain matters-such as paying taxes or receiving vaccinations-does not strike
us as persecution. "Mutability" is relevant: if a person can realistically escape danger by selling shoes rather than clothes, or by moving to another neighborhood, the case for asylum is weakened. Mutual acquaintance and solidarity within a group may affect the
likelihood of persecution. However, these factors could cut either
way. Solidarity might make a group more threatening and thus increase the "need" for persecution, or make persecution too politically
costly. "Homogeneity" bears on how probative abuse of some members is of risks to others.
However, treating immutability, cohesiveness, or homogeneity not
simply as relevant factors but as definitional prerequisites would require sociological expertise and capacity for inquiry on the part of
adjudicators and parties which far exceed what can realistically be
hoped for. Asylum law, as Congress wrote it, places heavy burdens
on asylum seekers. Requiring evidence with the historical depth necessary to show the feasibility of mobility out of a group, or demanding proof of homogeneity and cohesion, would impose tremendous
new evidentiary burdens. Eligible persons would often face insurmountable problems of proof, both because relevant information is
inaccessible,3 17 and because evaluations of such subtle matters vary.
Both the BIA and Ninth Circuit leave some room for "special

cases" outside their respective immutability and voluntariness
frameworks. The BIA acknowledges that certain characteristics are
so fundamental to personal identity that people should not have to
change to live in safety," 8 and its conception of "immutability" includes shared past experiences.3 19 The Ninth Circuit concedes that
outsiders' hostility could, in special circumstances, help define a "social group," leaving open whether that alone would ever be
enough. 320 Thus, both formulations leave room for fleeing from soci317. In In re (Name Confidential), A27 479 990-New York City (Apr. 21, 1986),
an anthropologist who had worked in Nueva Eden, El Salvador, submitted a detailed
affidavit describing marriage and residence patterns, and how natives and inhabitants
were perceived elsewhere. L. Crandon, Affidavit (Apr. 21, 1986) (on file with the author). In most cases, of course, it would be impossible to find an expert with such extensive knowledge concerning the proposed group.
318. In re Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 31 (BIA 1985).
319. Id. (giving former military leadership or land ownership as examples).
320. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576 n.7.

ological analysis should it become too difficult or generate horrifying
results; adjudicators could simply explain that the case at hand is
"special." However, prescribing a rigid definitional analysis for run
of the mill cases, and focusing attention on questions which are
likely to prove unanswerable, diverts attention from the difficult inquiries which Congress mandated-the extent of risk, and whether
that risk is of "persecution" on a statutory basis. Nor should we be
confident about the "world community's" ability to recognize "special cases" in time; the court's example of Jews in Nazi Germany is
instructive. The Nazis concealed the extent of their plans and actions,32 I as have other persecutors, 22 and people elsewhere were unwilling to believe the worst reports. 23 Rigid limiting definitions will
be particularly damaging if the government renews attempts to
screen out, without a hearing, "frivolous" applications-which would
presumably include those which allege facts failing to meet the stat-

utory test even if accepted as true. 24
PART

II:

INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A
CORRECT READING OF "SOCIAL GROUP"

In the rest of this Article, I will suggest ways in which moving

from efforts to define "social group" in the abstract toward exploring
whether particular "social groups" are persecuted can help resolve
321. See L. DAWIDowICz, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS, 1933-1945, at 148, 15455, 206 (1975) (in early years, Hitler "propagate[d] the annihilation of the Jews in esoteric language," while war provided "cover" Hitler needed for "unchecked commission of
murder").
322. During China's Cultural Revolution, ideological struggle and transformation
were emphasized rhetorically, and many foreigners took avoidance of physical force to be
a distinctive aspect of Maoism. See, e.g., Friedman, The Original Chinese Revolution
Remains in Power, 13 BULL. OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 42 (1981) (acknowledging his own and colleagues' misunderstanding of Cultural Revolution); see also F.
SCHURMANN, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 513, 516 (1968)

(though there was some physical fighting, most struggle was verbal and constituted a
"scientific campaign to change the soul of man"). The ideology of the military junta
which ruled Argentina from 1976 to 1983 "was hard to pinpoint in its public statements,
which were impregnated with euphemisms and protocol denouncing official corruption
and subversion and defending true democracy. . . . There was no such thing as missing
persons. Nor secret trials. Nor the death penalty." J. TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITHOUT A
NAME. CELL WITHOUT A NUMBER 103 (1981).
323. See W. LAQUEUR, THE TERRIBLE SECRET 3 (1980) (describing "final solution" as "an open secret almost from the beginning," and examining roots of denial of
reality).
324. On August 28, 1987, the Department of Justice published proposed regulations giving INS "asylum officers" power over future applications, ending hearings in
"frivolous" cases, preventing cross-examination of government witnesses, restricting testimony favorable to aliens, and closing hearings. Helton, The ProposedAsylum Rules: An
Analysis, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1070 (1987). This proposal was withdrawn in the
face of strong resistance, and it appears that the current structure will be maintained
essentially intact. See Proposed Asylum Regulations to be Republished Shortly, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 271 (1988).

[VOL. 26: 739, 1989]

Social Groups
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

theoretical and evidentiary problems in asylum proceedings. A
proper interpretation of "social group" can improve asylum adjudications in several crucial ways. First, eliminating improper threshold
requirements would both limit discretion in asylum proceedings and
make surviving discretion explicit, thus correcting institutional imbalances. Second, a proper application of the "social group" basis
could clarify eligibility in three kinds of difficult cases: cases where a
''social group" claim involves a type of persecution on the border of
another statutory ground; cases involving groups which fit uneasily
into the predominantly Western derived categories created by the
other grounds for protection; and cases in which adjudication is distorted by an excessively strong version of a judicial and administrative gloss which requires that petitioners show they have been "singled out" for persecution. In sum, a broad, literal interpretation of
"social group"-and, as will be addressed in Part III, greater receptiveness to group-level evidence-would better serve the prevailing
understanding of the constitutional role of Congress in immigration
matters. It also would help bring United States practice into conformity with our international obligations.
A.

Institutional Considerations:Restoring the Proper
Constitutional Balance

The practical effects of a broader "social group" conception-while less dramatic than some would hope or others
fear-would be substantial, and could help restore a proper constitutional balance in asylum law. Cases in which "social group" claims
standing alone would meet the clear probability standard-such that
courts would themselves bar deportation to the country where persecution is faced-would probably be rare. More often, group membership combined with another ground would meet that standard.
Probably the most common effect of recognizing currently disqualified groups would be to establish "well-founded fear." Applying the
correct eligibility standard would limit the executive to the role Congress has assigned-making discretionary decisions about persons
who have a "well-founded fear" of persecution which falls short of a "clear probability"-while displacing the executive from a legislative
role of developing basic eligibility standards. 325
325. Again, this assumes the correctness of INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407 (1987).
As discussed at supra note 17, it is not clear that Congress intended to permit deportation of persons to countries where they would have a well-founded fear of persecution.
My argument here is not that discretion is undesirable, but that where it exists, it should

If courts refused either to narrow asylum eligibility or to acquiesce
in executive efforts to do so, the executive would have to exercise
openly the discretion (which is now reflected in low visibility decisions) on focusing apprehension efforts and deciding which petitions
to grant and which to resist. The Reagan Administration avoided
that responsibility, supporting limits on its own formal discretion. 26
The INS, when opposing petitions, and the BIA, when denying
them, usually maintain that because the alien meets neither the
"well-founded fear" nor the "clear probability" standard, they have
327 the BIA treated the standards
no choice. Before Cardoza-Fonseca,
28
as identical, though BIA and immigration judges unsuccessfully
attempted to insulate decisions from reversal by reciting that even if
the standards were different, the alien failed under each. 29 Although
conflating the standards is no longer viable, narrowing "social
group" lets the executive disregard risks which people genuinely and
reasonably fear, denying protection to persons statutorily entitled to
it, and sparing the executive from its responsibility to act openly in
discretionary cases.
Adhering to the statutory meaning of "social group" would open
now nearly invisible decisions to scrutiny, 330 permitting Congress and
the public to detect ways in which executive implementation may
subvert congressional intent. An examination of contexts in which
the executive has exercised discretion openly suggests the importance
of scrutiny. While INS "prosecutorial discretion" and immigration

judge and BIA discretion often invoke unobjectionable humanitarian

aims, 31 the asylum area has generated some problematic discretionary determinations. In In re Salim, 33 2 the BIA held that an Afghan
be exercised openly.
326. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Stevens noted that "[i]f anything is
anomalous, it is that the Government now asks us to restrict its discretion to a narrow
class of aliens." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 444 (1987). He went on to
observe that "Congress has assigned to the Attorney General and his delegates the task
of making these hard individualized decisions; although Congress could have crafted a
narrower definition, it chose to authorize the Attorney General to determine which, if
any, eligible refugees should be denied asylum." Id.
327. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
328. In re Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985).
329. This failed in, e.g., Brice v. United States Dep't of Justice, 806 F.2d 415, 418
(2d Cir, 1986); Martinez-Sanchez v. INS, 794 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing
to honor BIA's "insurance clause for the standard of proof" and deciding that wrong
standard had been used).
330. For discussions of the general democratic virtues of making decisions and
their bases explicit, see T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1979) (covert interest group
involvement in regulation of private sector undermines democratic control); Ackerman &
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1351-55 (1985).
331. See generally Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the
Immigration Law, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 144, 149-52 (1975) (discretion often exercised
to avoid disrupting people's lives).
332. 18 1. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982).
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had "clear probability" entitlement not to be deported to Afghanistan, but denied asylum. The respondent was ordered deported to a
Pakistani camp because by entering dishonestly he had "cut" in the
years-long line of Afghans seeking admissions as refugees.3 3 While
the decision that certain groups could best be "helped" abroad was
anticipated and accepted by Congress,3 34 the discretionary decision
to deny asylum to Afghans on this basis is one of which Congress

should have notice, and of which it has had notice because of the
openly discretionary character of the executive's decisions.
In dealing with Central Americans and Africans, even though
there are no overseas refugee admission programs, the Salim ration-

ale has occasionally surfaced.33 5 Central Americans have faced even
more dubious "discretionary" arguments. For instance, the INS
views entry with the assistance of a paid "smuggler" '36 as a strong
negative factor. 337 A class action brought to light another factor
which may result in denial of asylum-illegal work in this country. 338 "Smoking out" discretion would let Congress and others focus
333. See also Walai v. INS, 552 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Afghan denied
asylum, but eligible for withholding, could be deported without Pakistan's prior consent,
but would be brought back to United States if rejected). See generally P. Weiss Fagen,
supra note 69, at 46-50.
334. See 126 CONG. REc. 37,225 (1979) (statement of Rep. Fish) (describing repatriation or nearby resettlement as often "the best solutions and the solutions most desired by the refugees themselves," and giving Afghans in Pakistan as example where
eventual repatriation, not resettlement, appropriate); see also 125 CONG. REc. 23,232
(1979) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (technically eligible Palestinians have not been admitted as refugees "because we have made a policy decision that our best humanitarian
response" was to "assist... where they were locally resettled and... resettlement in the
United States was not necessary").
335. See In re Saavedra-Hernandez, A24 327 050 & A24 327 051, Slip. Op. at 7
(BIA 1986) (ordering withholding of deportation for Salvadoran petitioners, but upholding denial of asylum on grounds that "respondents willingly participated in a criminal
scheme to circumvent our immigration laws so that they could come to live in the United
States").
336. Coyote, the Spanish term, is not necessarily disparaging.
337. See In re Shirdel, Interim Dec. No. 2958, at 7 (BIA 1984) (upholding discretionary denial of asylum and observing that "[w]e have in the past considered it a strong
negative factor to enter the United States with the aid of a professional smuggler because
of the threat it presents to the enforcement of our immigration laws").
338. In Diaz v. INS, 648 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Cal. 1986), a district court enjoined
the INS from denying work permission to asylum applicants whose cases it deemed to be
without substantial merit, though it permitted the INS to screen out "frivolous" applications. The court found that the INS's position that plaintiffs had somehow managed to

"get by" so far was not only "at odds with the law in this circuit," but "does not do

much to enhance the defendants' reputation for common decency." Id. at 647. The court
noted that affected persons might be forced to abandon claims or to "work illegally to
survive which, as conceded by the district director at oral argument, might be considered
by the INS as a negative discretionary factor in adjudicating the asylum request." Id. at

on whether such irregularities should prevent asylum. In fact, perhaps as a result of criticism, the BIA has reduced the stress on entry-related illegality. 33 Light might be cast not only on asylum but
on "broader" foreign policy matters: denial of asylum to Salvadorans
because the predicament of being tortured or of having one's village
destroyed is too common, and might inform considerations of
whether and how to support the Salvadoran government. 40 Such
oversight possibilities are denied when the executive evades responsibility by attributing negative discretionary decisions to the basic eligibility formula.
Apart from facilitating congressional and public scrutiny, placing
executive conduct on a openly discretionary plane would facilitate

judicial review. Commentators and courts have disagreed over how
much congressional goals and designs in passing the Refugee Act
constrain executive discretion. 341 Given the congressional shift toward an ideologically neutral conception of refugee, it would be improper to grant asylum to persons fleeing leftist dictatorships who
have a "well-founded fear" of persecution but cannot establish a
"clear probability," while rejecting similarly situated Salvadorans
and Guatemalans. The shift since 1965 to an ostensibly nonracist
immigration policy, 342 and the absence of any statutory authority to
discriminate, bar racial discrimination against Haitians. The con652. Rewritten regulations mandate that permission is to last throughout administrative
and judicial review if the application is "nonfrivolous." 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.12(c)(8),
274a.13(a) (1987).
339. See In re Pula, Interim Dec. No. 3033 (BIA 1987) (circumvention of orderly
refugee procedures is a relevant factor in exercise of discretion but insufficient alone to
require the most unusual showing of countervailing equities). In that case, the Board
indicated that "[i]n the absence of any adverse factors. . .asylum should be granted in
the exercise of discretion." Id., revised slip op. at 10, quoted in BIA Amends who
Designates Asylum Decision, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 137 (1988).
340. See infra notes 428-34 and accompanying text; Comment, Action Specific
Human Rights Legislationfor El Salvador, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 255 (1985) (describing certification process making aid to Salvadoran government depend on presidential
certification that human rights situation improving).
341. The Ninth Circuit takes the view that "where the Board has not identified an
alternative source of refuge, it can deny asylum only on the basis of genuine compelling
factors-factors important enough to warrant returning a bona fide refugee to a country
where he may face a threat of imminent danger to his life or liberty." Hernandez-Ortiz
v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 519 (9th Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit will disturb a denial only
upon a showing that "such action was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion."
Young v. United States Dep't of Justice, 759 F.2d 450, 455 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985) (continuing standard of review under prior statute). See generally Helton, supra note 157, at
1004-07. A recent Supreme Court case suggests an expansive view of agency discretion,
at least where the integrity of procedures is at stake. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988)
(BIA refusal to reopen deportation proceeding because alien had not sufficiently explained failure to assert asylum claim at outset upheld, using abuse of discretion
standard).
342. See Keely, Immigration Policy and the New Immigrants, 1965-75, in
SOURCEBOOK ON THE NEW IMMIGRATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 15 (R. Bryce-Laporte ed. 1980).
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gressional decision to make asylum eligibility independent of immigration status34 3 arguably bars treating illegal entry and the methods

associated with it as adverse factors, at least when the unlawful behavior was necessary to reach safety.344 Denying petitions of anyone
falling short of the "more likely than not" standard would constitute

refusal to exercise discretion rather than a permissible exercise
thereof. Evaluation of particular grounds for exercising discretion
must rest on an examination of congressional intent and language;
unacceptable bases can only be spotted if discretion is exercised explicitly. The executive should be required to articulate rationales for
discretionary denials of asylum status rather than hiding behind an

artificially constructed statutory eligibility formula.
B.

Theoretical Contributions of a Literal Reading
1.

"Hard Cases"

Apart from dealing with new and "creative" forms of persecution,3 45 the "social group" category functions to eliminate some areas

of doubt by providing a straightforward resolution for matters on the
periphery of another type of persecution. 346 For instance, the BIA

has recently suggested that persons persecuted for political opinions
which the persecutor erroneously or cynically imputes to them are

not protected,347 while courts have generally disagreed.3 48 Since re343. See supra notes 29-31.
344. Cf. Nasser v. INS, 744 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1984) (discretionary denial of
asylum justified because the fraudulent attempt by Iraqi living in Greece to enter United
States was not essential to flight from Iraq).
345. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
346. The UN has said:
Membership in a particular social group may be at the root of persecution
because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to the government or because the political outlook, antecedents or economic activity of its members, or
the very existence of the social group as such, is held to be an obstacle to the
government's policies.
UN HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 78. G. Goodwin-Gill writes:
The reference to "membership of a particular social group", however, makes
little practical difference in the respective areas of competence of UNHCR
[United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] and states parties to the
Convention. It can be seen as clarifying certain elements in the more traditional grounds for persecution-race, religion, or political opinion, and examples of persecution on social group grounds will often prove, on closer examination, to have a political basis; thus, the group may be persecuted because the
government considers it inherently disloyal and, rightly or wrongly, attributes
dissident opinions to members of the group as a class.
G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 47, at 12-13 (citations omitted).
347. In an opinion not designated as precedential, the BIA insisted that "the alien

gimes that violate human rights rarely conduct careful, detailed investigations of political beliefs, but rely on stereotypes, guilt by association,349 and "hunches" 350 to identify opponents, mistakes are
frequent. 351 Torture and informants often produce "false positives."
The "social group" category makes this question largely academic,
since even if imputed political opinion were not covered as political
opinion, imputations
are most often based on group
3 52
generalizations.
The same conclusion should apply to certain other persons singled
out for "political" purposes which have little to do with their own
political views. 353 Persons "framed" as "examples," for instance,
may be selected according to group criteria rather than at random.

Witnesses to persecution or corruption may form an endangered
group. 541 Such people may be difficult to fit into the "political opinmust show that it is his own, individual political opinion that a persecutor seeks to over-

come by infliction of harm or suffering." Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 288
(5th Cir.) (describing and deferring to BIA's rationale), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826
(1987).
348. The Ninth Circuit has long held and recently reaffirmed that persons victimized because of imputed political opinion are protected. Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395,
1397 (9th Cir. 1985) (death threat based on erroneous belief that petitioner was guerrilla
established clear probability of persecution due to political opinion); Kovac v. INS, 407
F.2d 102, 104 (9th Cir. 1969) (Yugoslav defector eligible for asylum even though "[t]he
opinion on account of which he would have been punished was the one the masters of
Yugoslavia would have attributed to him").
349. See, e.g., Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1987) (petitioner arrested
and tortured after seen speaking with a leftist professor in a park).
350. See, e.g., Platero-Cortez v. INS, 804 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1986) (former Salvadoran "security" agent testified as to how petitioner's name had been placed on list of
people he was assigned to kill). A classic description appears in R. COBB, THE POLICE
AND THE PEOPLE: FRENCH POPULAR PROTEST 1789-1820, at 14-37 (1970).
351. The commission appointed by President Reagan and headed by Henry Kissinger to report on the situation in Central America said of Guatemala's "security
forces": "In the cities they have murdered those even suspected of dissent. In the countryside, they have at times killed indiscriminately to repress any sign of support for the
guerrillas." PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA,
THE REPORT 119 (1984) [hereinafter KISSINGER COMMISSION REPORT]; see also R.
SHAPLEN,TIME OUT OF HAND: REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 26-27,

91-131 (1970) (hundreds of thousands of persons killed after 1965 coup in Indonesia
"mostly communists or communist sympathizers") (emphasis added).
352. This is not always true, and interpreting persecution "on account of political
opinion" is a necessary and appropriate judicial role.
353. The Ninth Circuit has held that:
[I]n determining whether threats or violence constitute political persecution, it
is permissible to examine the motivation of the persecutor; we may look to the
political views and actions of the entity or individual responsible for the threats
or violence, as well as to the victim's and we may examine the relationship
between the two.
Hernandez v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985).
354. See Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.) (Salvadoran woman
said she had witnessed murder of her activist uncle by soldiers who then raped her, and
believed herself to be in danger as a surviving witness), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826
(1987). The Fifth Circuit ignored a possible "social group" claim, based on family members' involvement with an agricultural cooperative, and deferred to the BIA'S decision
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ion" category since their own views may be irrelevant; what matters
are the opinions officials find it expedient to attribute to them.
The political character of participation in certain social movements might be questioned as well. Whether certain cultural activi-

ties reflect "political" orientations may be unclear. 3 In In re
Acosta,3 56 for instance, the petitioner claimed that the San Salvador
taxi cooperative to which he belonged was viewed by the government
as having socialist and insurgent tendencies, while the guerrillas saw
members as progovernment because they had not joined work stoppages. 51 Whatever the merits of the particular claim, members of

certain occupation-based organizations are sometimes targets. 58
Whole occupations may be targets because of supposed political beliefs or because the work is considered evil or undesirable.3 59 Joining
associations that Americans often do not view as "political"-such
as certain trade unions-may be seen as a political statement or as
sufficiently threatening to warrant reprisals. 6 ° Such membership information is more available both to the authorities and to American
asylum adjudicators than are the precise opinions of "ordinary" people. Indeed, the "social group" provision has been used to protect
trade unionists.361
Even membership or activism in certain political parties might
that the applicant did not qualify under the political opinion ground because her personal
opinion did not cause her risk. Many victims of the Tonton Macoutes in Haiti report
similar experiences.
355. For an account of a Salvadoran who had performed in a play viewed as critical by the government because it involved an uprising against the rich, see LAWYERS
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & HELSINKI WATCH, MOTHER OF EXILES 43-44 (1986)
(on file with the author) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMITTEE]. He reported that even after
the group, which had specialized in comedies and satires, disbanded, former members
continued to be murdered. Id.
356. Interim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985).
357. Id. at 8.
358. KISSINGER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 351, at 101, says of El Salvador:
"Both traditionalist death squads and murderous guerrillas have attacked political party,
labor and peasant leaders working to establish and consolidate democratic institutions,
killing them and dismantling their efforts to build democracy."
359. The military juntas which ruled Argentina from 1976.to 1983, for instance,
considered psychiatry and psychoanalysis left wing and alien. Therapy was thought to
"condition the urban terrorist to wage his clandestine battle," and practitioners were
tortured to get patient's names. J. TIMERMAN, supra note 322, at 93-101.
360. Some victims of the Haitian Tonton Macoutes and their successors, the National Security Volunteers, fit this classification, but were written off as victims of "personal" disputes by the United States government. See infra note 539.
361. See Cent. Am. Refugee Def. Fund Newsl., Sept. 1986, at 1, 5 (National Immigration Project of National Lawyers Guild) (reporting asylum grant on social group
basis to secretary general of Salvadoran fishermen's union who had been kidnapped,
beaten, and tortured, and whose colleague had been killed).

have a problematic connection to the "political opinion" provision.
Many parties are unified and driven as much or more by patronage
as by ideology. 362 Some ostensibly partisan struggles may be understood more accurately in terms of class conflict-in effect, as conflict
among "social groups."36 These matters on the periphery of "political opinion" are encompassed in the notion of "membership in a particular social group."
Some immigration judges have rejected claims by Latin American
Catholics who allege persecution due to involvement in "base communities" and other religious activities, finding it implausible that
Latin American regimes persecute Catholics." 4 While such persecution should be viewed as religious and political, 365 the "social group"
provision removes any doubt.
"Social group" also encompasses certain groupings on the margin
of "nationality" and "race."366 In Ananeh-Firempongv. INS, 367 the
concept was applied to tribal membership in Ghana. It is often unclear how African "tribes" fit into Western social scientists' categories.366 Many scholars prefer to avoid the term because they think its
connotations overly "exotic. ' 3 9 Many "tribal" divisions are based on
what were "nation-like" boundaries before they were destroyed by
colonialism, 370 and feelings of "tribal" unity are sometimes stronger
362. See E. BANFIELD. THE MORAL BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY (1958); E.
BANFIELD & J. WILSON, CITY POLITICS (1963); Scott & Kerkvliet, How Traditional
Rural Patrons Lose Legitimacy, in FRIENDS, FOLLOWERS, AND FACTIONS (1977).
363. See P. OQUIST, VIOLENCE, CONFLICT, AND POLITICS IN COLOMBIA 83, 90-91,

330-32 (1980) ("the violence" in Colombia in late 1940s through 1958, particularly later
phases, must be understood in terms of class conflict and "vendettas" rather than as
purely "partisan").
364. See P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 39 (describing negative attitude of
INS toward claim by lay Catholic teacher).
365. In re Paniagua, A24 166 230-Los Angeles (BIA 1985), reported in 2 IMMIGR. L. & PROC. RPTR. B1-53 (1985) (granting asylum on political opinion ground to
activist in Catholic study group), also cited in 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 227 (1985).
The more traditional attitude is reflected in BIA member Vacca's dissent: "Surely, there
is not evidence in the record to show that the government of a country which is predominantly Catholic is opposed to the teachings of the Catholic church or is against private
charity to the hungry and the homeless." 2 IMMIGR. L. & PROC. RPTR. at B1-64.
366. The UN High Commissioner indicates that these terms too are to be treated
broadly. Race is a social category which includes ethnicity. UN HANDBOOK, supra note
48, at 68. Nationality extends beyond citizenship to refer to members of ethnic or linguistic groups, and may overlap with race. Id. 1174.

367. 766 F.2d 621, 628 (1st Cir. 1985).

363. See R.OLIVER & A. ATMORE, supra note 137, at 316-17, 319 (noting great
diversity among types of "tribes").
369. See P. CURTIN, S. FEIERMAN, L. THOMPSON & J. VANSINA, AFRICAN HISTORY
579 (1978) ("ethnic loyalty" in Africa has much in common with the "nationalism" of
nineteenth century Poland, and calling it "tribalism" causes "immense confusion" and
"tends to distort the fundamental similarities among social processes").
370. See generally EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM AND THE PARTITION OF AFRICA (E.
Penrose ed. 1975); 1. WALLERSTEIN, AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE 29-43

(1961).

Social Groups

[VOL 26: 739, 1989]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

than nationalism.17 ' These processes puzzle anthropologists and historians, 72 and are unlikely to be understood by asylum adjudicators.
Tribal identifications can change very rapidly, sometimes due to government actions.3 73 Thus, certain tribes are problematic under the
BIA approach, and probably few could survive strict application of
the Sanchez-Trujillo criteria. It was partly in order to overcome the
ethnocentricity of previous law that Congress abandoned geographical and ideological limitations37 4 by adopting the Protocol definition
of refugee, adding to the more precise grounds for persecution the
flexible "social group" concept.
In some contexts, the "social group" category serves as a basis for
granting asylum without accepting persecutors' ideological categories. Groups which do not think of themselves as separate, distinct,
or cohesive are sometimes persecuted by governments which disagree. The flexible "social group" category makes it unnecessary to
resolve who is "right." Jewish victims of anti-Semitic persecution
qualify as members of a "social group" even if they are not religious;
it is not necessary to consider whether being "Jewish" is a matter of
"race," "nationality," or something else. 75 The Eta people in Japan
look no different to outsiders, and there is no obvious basis for considering them a "race." ' 76 However, they are viewed as a racial minority, with a distinct origin, and at times have been mistreated on
that basis. 377 "Social group" provides a neutral way of describing
differences which a government believes to exist and finds relevant,
without accepting often loaded characterizations of them as differences of "race" or "nationality."
2. Transcending Ethnocentrism
A related function which the "social group" category should serve
is to assist immigration tribunals and reviewing courts in viewing
other societies on their own terms, without imposing foreign notions
of what demographic or associational divisions are socially meaningful and apt to result in persecution. The "social group" category re371.
372.

373.

R. OLIVER & A. ATMORE, supra note 137, at 316-17, 319, 321.
P. BOHANNAN & P. CURTIN, AFRICA AND AFRICANS 59-64 (1971).
P. CURTIN, S. FEIERMAN, L. THOMPSON & J. VANSINA, supra note 369, at

579-82.

374. See supra notes 32-40, 56, 58 and accompanying text.
375. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (Jews form a
race for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
376. See M. HANE, PEASANTS, REBELS, AND OUTCASTS 139-43 (1982).
377. Id.

quires decisionmakers to focus on the realities of power and persecution in another society, rather than applying dangerously misleading
"'common sense." Groups may be important which are not significant, or do not even exist, in contemporary Western societies. Examples of the latter include "tribes" and "castes." Groups which do

exist here, but are less central to our lives and the way governments
view us, may be even more likely to be dismissed as possible "social
groups" for asylum purposes.
For instance, counsel for Central American asylum seekers have
argued that governments view certain villages as hostile, and abuse
their inhabitants or natives.3a 8 While it may be difficult for American legal decisionmakers, unfamiliar with Central America, to grasp
or believe that foreign governments would decide to persecute people
based on such apparently crude screening devices, anthropologists,
historians, and sociologists with regional expertise have provided
considerable evidence, both in materials prepared for asylum cases
and in academic writings, that such categorizations are used.37 9 In
much of the world, villages are tightly knit social units. 380 In deeply
polarized societies, village membership and place of origin may in
fact convey a great deal of information about the "subversive" or
"loyal" character of an inhabitant.381 Opposition or other political
activities are often conducted on a neighborhood3 82 or village ba3 and retaliation is often collective as well. 84 Refusal by some
sis, 83
378. See Brief by Sister Kathryn Walsh, Accredited Representative, In re (Name
confidential), A27 479 990-New York City (Apr. 21, 1986) (on file with author). This
should not be confused with the claim, rejected in Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d
285, 290 (9th Cir. 1984), that persons may be eligible because of pressures on them as
inhabitants of a strategically situated village.
379. See, e.g., Stanley, Economic Migrants or Refugees from Violence? A TimeSeries Analysis of SalvadoranMigration to the United States, 22 LATIN Am.RES. REV.
132, 136 (1987).
380. See, e.g., Tan, The Municipios of the Midwestern Highlands of Guatemala,
39 Aht. ANTHROPOLOGIST 423, 438 (1937) ("If the municipios typically are set apart one
from another by language, costume, and a consciousness of racial, cultural, and historical

uniqueness, as well as by differing ecological compositions and population elements, they
constitute economic, political, and religious units as well.").

381. For a discussion of Italy's "Red Belt," see

COMMUNISM IN ITALY AND

243, 391-92, 397-400, 406-11, 472, 600-01, 603-04 (D. Blackmer & S. Tarrow
eds. 1975). For a discussion of "Viota la Roja," a Colombian coffee growing community
with a long leftist history, see Jimenez, The Limits of Export Capitalism: Economic
Structure, Class and Politics in a Colombian Coffee Municipality 1900-1930 (unpublished Harvard dissertation 1986).
382. See, e.g., L. PEATrIE, THE VIEW FROM THE BARRIO 71-90 (1968) (describing
controversy over sewers in Venezuela).
383. See, e.g., K. SHARPE, PEASANT POLITICS: STRUGGLE IN A DOMINICAN VILLAGE (1977) (describing organization of peasant cooperatives).
384. One Salvadoran asylum seeker reports that in her town, "the people" demonstrated against the government. Because her family had money, they did not participate.
However, soldiers started killing people "without taking the time to see if they were
really anti-government or not." LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 355, at 21-22; see also
J. NAsH, supra note 144, at 88 ("When, as often happens in the labor strife of the
FRANCE
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villagers to give up land the state wants for other purposes sometimes leads to attacks on everyone who refuses to evacuate.3 8 5
Counterinsurgency programs often provide extra "security" where

the opposition is strong.388
The Ninth Circuit may be right that in El Salvador "the risk of
persecution relates principally to the existence of actual or imputed
political opinion. 38 7 However, its view that, except for persons at
particular risk, such as "political or social activist leaders and members of organizations directly identified as opposing or criticizing the
government, 388 exposure to risk "applies equally to all segments of
the population of El Salvador"3 8 9 based on purely "individual" factors3 90 is a view which few if any students of that society would accept.3 9' Imputations of political opinion are rarely random; they are
generally based on membership in groups of one kind or another.
Classifications which strike Americans as crude and irrelevant
were also used in China during the Cultural Revolution. People with
overseas relatives,3 92 young people whose families were privileged
before the revolution, 93 and people who had studied or worked with
[Bolivian] mines, there is a 'red massacre' or bloodbath provoked by a strike or worker
protest, children are killed along with women and men.").
385. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 355, at 3-5 (account of attacks on
South African village).
386. The Kissinger Commission reported:
The Guatemalan Army continues to apply counter-insurgency tactics developed
through 20 years of experience in the field. At the heart of these tactics is
aggressive and persistent small-unit patrolling in areas of guerrilla activity. A
key feature of the counter-insurgency effort has been the organization of about
400,000 campesinos and Indians into Civil Defense Forces. These forces are
poorly armed-only about one in ten men in some units is armed with a gun,
usually an M-1 rifle-but they provide security for villagers, go on patrol regularly and have taken heavy casualties in contacts with insurgents.
KISSINGER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 351, at 118.

387. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986).

388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Even Senator Allan Simpson, who opposes extended voluntary departure for
all Salvadorans, acknowledges that certain groups face elevated risks. He says:
[W]e should develop guidelines that would identify certain classes of people
who might well be subject to particular risk if returned to El Salvador. There is
evidence that this may be true of teachers and medical personnel. In such
cases, a "case-by-case" review of the need for extended voluntary departure
would certainly be in order.
Simpson, We Can't Allow All Salvadorans to Stay, Wash. Post, July 10, 1984, at A13,
col. 2.
392. See A. CHAN, R. MADSEN & J. UNGER, CHEN VILLAGE 116, 151-53, 157-58,
176, 182 (1984) (story of "Overseas Deng").
393. For a discussion of "class struggle" based on pre-1949 status, see id. at 103-

foreigners 3 " or who were influenced by Western art, literature, and

music3" were deprived of freedom and, in some cases, of life.
For American adjudicators, it may be difficult to recognize that

certain groups, too diffuse or internally disparate to constitute meaningful social units here, might be viewed as relevant "social groups"

by members, persecutors, or both. By establishing persecution on account of "social group" membership as a basis for protection, Congress required that this possibility be investigated.
3.

"Singling Out" and "Modern" Persecution

Reading the "social group" language literally, as Congress intended, elucidates the Refugee Act's central concept of "persecution" by highlighting the sense in which asylum seekers must show
that they have been "singled out" for persecution. Reluctance to recognize large "social groups" seems to be rooted in concern that the
concept of "persecution" retain an individualistic focus. 396 State Department spokespersons,3 97 the INS, 398 the BIA, 399 and some
courts 40 0 and commentators 401 have distinguished between "genera68.
394. See D. MILTON & N. MILTON, THE WIND WILL NOT SUBSIDE: YEARS IN
REVOLUTIONARY CHINA 1964-69, at 301-02, 316 (1976).
395. R. GARSIDE, COMING ALIVE: CHINA AFTER MAO 88-89, 90, 101, 348-49, 365
(1981).
396. See Helton, Forward,The Sanctuary Movement: Ecumenical, Municipal and
Legal Challenges to United States Refugee Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493, 538
(1986) ("Persecution on account of membership in a social group as grounds for refugee
status has been resisted by the courts, perhaps because it is regarded as conflicting with
the requirement for an individualized asylum case.").
397. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs argues that asylum law is designed to aid victims of human
rights violations on an "individual" basis, while broader problems of violence and poverty
are "addressed" by the United States "every day in its foreign policy." Dietrich, U.S.
Asylum Policy, in U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY-1985 IN
REVIEW (1986).
398. INS district directors sometimes take this to incredible lengths. One denied
asylum to a Salvadoran teacher and union activist who reported twice being kidnapped
and beaten. The second time he was held for 30 days, burned with acid, and left for
dead. After he left the country, his brother was mistaken for him and found decapitated,
castrated, with eyeballs out of their sockets. The petitioner presented medical evidence of
torture. The district director denied asylum in January 1985, saying that in El Salvador
"kidnapping and other excesses are endured and perpetrated by all." Van Der Hout, The

Politics of Asylum, 5 CAL. LAW. 72 (1985).
399. In re Sibrun, Interim Dec. No. 2932, at 7-8 (BIA 1983) ("the Act requires
that this qualifying persecution derive solely on account of one of the five prescribed
grounds in the statute. Generalized oppression by a government of virtually the entire
populace does not come within those specified grounds").
400. The Ninth Circuit's position on this issue is somewhat unclear. Compare Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1984) (focusing on threat severity and the likelihood of fulfillment) with Sarvia-Qintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1394
(9th Cir. 1985) (evidence should indicate that alien's predicament is appreciably distinct). The Sixth Circuit has also wavered. Compare Yousif v. INS, 794 F.2d 236, 242
(6th Cir. 1986) ("general description of upheaval" insufficient and petitioner "must show
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lized" economic and political "oppression" of a country's people and
the "singling out" of individuals for "persecution." The executive is
effectively free to "waive" the singling out requirement, °2 since no
one has standing to object to asylum grants, and few critics of ideological bias would be inclined to do so. Surprisingly, most critics of
restrictive definitions of persecution have focused on the degree of
risk, without addressing in depth the "singling out" requirement.4 03
The "singling out" gloss is often expressed unclearly. It sometimes

appears evidentiary-that it is not enough to show that many people
are injured without pointing to abuse or threats aimed at the peti-

tioner. 4 Other decisions suggest that the kind of injury must be
unusual, and that no matter how much personalized evidence an in-

dividual can offer of past and future injury, the claim will fail if the
abuse suffered is common. 40 5 "Singling out" has been presented as
that he as an individual will be... singled out for persecution or some other 'special
circumstances' ") with Reyes v. INS, 693 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1982) (proof that individual
would be singled out not required). The Seventh Circuit did not require "singling out" in
Carvajal-Munos v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984) (it can be inferred that
applicant would be persecuted based on treatment of like individuals). The District of
Columbia Circuit observed in Sanchez v. INS, 707 F.2d 1523, 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
that "[i]f we were to agree with the petitioner's contention that no person should be
returned to El Salvador because of the reported anarchy present there now, it would
permit the whole population, if they could enter this country some way, to stay here
indefinitely" (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit required an "individualized" showing
of danger in Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978).
401. See, e.g., Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MICH.
Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91.
402. The United States has pressed the United Nations to treat all Afghans in
Pakistan, including participants in the armed struggle, as refugees. Kamm, Aid to Afghan Refugees: Donors Bend the Rules, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1988, at A2, col. 3; see also
Brelick, supra note 220, at 32-33 (noting that "[c]uriously, while the State Department
appears to ignore conscription at gunpoint practiced by both El Salvador and Iran, this
fact provided the basis for a positive advisory opinion on behalf of Afghan draft evaders"). The United States generally recognizes Afghans as having an entitlement to withholding of deportation to Afghanistan itself. See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying
text.
403. See, e.g., Note, The Need for a Codified Definition of "Persecution" in
United States Refugee Law, 39 STAN. L. REV. 187 (1986). The author stresses the political manipulation which is facilitated by the absence of a standardized definition of "persecution"; while she addresses the "singling out" question, id. at 204-05, 208-09, she does
not indicate how this issue should or most likely would be resolved in the codification she
advocates. See also Note, Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political Asylum, 99
HARV. L. REV. 450, 468-71 (1985) (rejecting the "singling out" requirement as lacking
statutory basis and advocating asylum for persons mistreated by governments courts find
"politically illegitimate").
404. See, e.g., Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1987) (withholding claim must be factually supported by specific evidence showing alien is, more
likely than not, subject to persecution as an indivqdual).
405. For example, the Second Circuit has said:

implicit in the plain meaning of persecution,4" 6 and as a practical
necessity, since the United States cannot offer and has not committed itself to provide refuge to all the world's oppressed or displaced
people.40 7 The congressional decision neither to protect all displaced
persons 408 nor to follow Western Europe in explicitly recognizing "de
facto refugees" 409 supports some type of "singling out" requirement.
However, like the attempt to restrict "social group" to small
groups, a strong "singling out" requirement-which demands more
evidentiarily or substantively than a showing of risk of the prescribed
gravity on account of one or more statutory criteria-is supported
neither by the statute's language nor by its history. The Ninth Circuit has described well the limited extent to which "singling out"

may properly be required: "the evidence should be sufficiently specific to indicate that the alien's predicament is appreciably different
from the dangers faced by all his countrymen.

41 0

More recently, the

court has explained that the petitioner must show that "he or those
similarly situated are at greater risk than the general population"
and that the risk is a serious one.411 The BIA's own position has
[Petitioners'] status in Hong Kong as exiles from the mainland of China will
not distinguish them from thousands of others, and the physical hardship or
economic difficulties they claim they will face will be shared by many others.
Those difficulties do not amount to the kind of particularized persecution that
justifies a stay of deportation. . . . [W]hether they would be persecuted in
mainland China is not relevant to the claim they make here.
Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967).
406. See Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982) (generalized and undocumented fears of persecution or political upheaval affecting general population do not constitute persecution).
407. See supra notes 193, 250-53 and accompanying text. A proposal in the debates on the Refugee Act to treat Haitian "economically oppressed emigrants" as refugees was criticized by Senator Kennedy, and withdrawn. See 125 CONG. REc. 23,251
(1979) (statement by Sen. Kennedy) ("We cannot accept economic factors alone as
causing someone to be defined as a refugee."). Even among persons qualifying as refugees, Congress envisioned that only a minority would be permitted to come to the United
States. See 125 CONG. REC. 35,814 (1979) (statement of Rep. Holtzman) ("Obviously,
with 10 to 13 million refugees worldwide [protecting all here] would be a practical, if not
philosophical, impossibility.").
408. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. While an earlier version of the
Act in the Senate had defined "refugee" as including persons in their own country who
have been displaced by military or civil disturbances, or uprooted by arbitrary detention,
and who are unable to return to their usual place of abode, it was rejected in conference
committee. Compare S. REP. No. 256, supra note 32, at 4 with H.R. REP. No. 781,
supra note 64, at 19 (joint explanatory statement of conference committee).
409. See G. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 47, at 17. This category has historically
covered Eastern Europeans who were not active dissidents and who were not personally
at risk. Though the United States never openly recognized such a category, Eastern
Europeans with "weak cases" often received asylum. Extended voluntary departure has
often been granted to whole national groups without requiring individuals to show they
have been "singled out." See supra note 103.
410. Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing
Zepeda-Melendez, 741 F.2d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1984)).
411. Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing
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grown increasingly restrictive in recent years. 12 Persecution "on account of" a statutory basis may fairly be read to imply that the target group must face a higher risk of injury than the general population, but it cannot be read to require that danger be unique to group
members. Requiring individualized evidence in every case is no more
justifiable; the statute established burdens of proof, but does not insist on any particular type of evidence.
It is difficult even to make sense of the "singling out" requirement.
"Neutral" policies may constitute persecution as applied to some
persons. Uniformly applicable dress laws in Iran, for instance, have
very different significance for fundamentalist Moslems and their opponents.41 Requirements that women wear Islamic dress and stay
out of public life create a profound sense of violation for some
women, while being no more than an inconvenience or mandate to do
what they prefer for others. 14 Acosta41" recognized that a "social
group" may be defined by a shared characteristic so fundamental
that people should not be required to change it.416 The reflexive dismissal of asylum claims based on "nondiscriminatory" requirements
ignores that insight.
The "singling out" notion is also peculiar in that several bases for
asylum are intrinsically group criteria-race, nationality, and membership in a particular "social group"-and even the
others-political and religious conviction and activity-are usually
shared by many people. As the BIA pointed out in holding that the
Protocol was compatible with and supplemented domestic provisions
for withholding of deportation:
Platero-Cortez v. INS, 804 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1986)).
412. For a flexible approach, see In re Martinez-Romero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 75, 78
(BIA 1985) (inquiry should focus on whether violence affects population indiscriminately
or is directed against an individual or his social group). For an analysis of recent trends,
and insights on BIA member thinking deriving from interviews, see Note, A Refugee by
Any Other Name: An Examination of the Board of Immigration Appeals' Actions in
Asylum Cases, 75 VA. L. REV. 681, 699-705 (1989).
413. See LAWYERS COMMITEE, supra note 355, at 27, 31 (immigration judge rejected asylum petition of Iranian man based, inter alia, on dress restrictions, because

these rules affected all Iranians).
414. Cf. Ghadessi v. INS, 797 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1986) (evidence that
Khomeini's government "might act upon its suspicions of her political opposition" and
the "unfavorable attitude toward female activists in that radical Islamic environment"
stated prima facie case). See generally D. HIRO, IRAN UNDER THE AYATOLLAHS 220,

256, 258-59 (1986) (describing dress requirements for women, violations of which are
punishable by prison, sex discrimination in universities, and exclusion of women from
judiciary and legal profession).
415. In re Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985).
416. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.

Congress sought generally to shield aliens from the actions of their own
home governments in singling them out for punitive treatment, not because

of their individual conduct or demerits, but solely because they are members of dissident or unpopular minority groups. The inclusion of the two

new classes [nationality and membership in a particular "social group"]
within the ambit of section 243(h), far from creating a conflict, is41 7clearly
compatible with the beneficent purposes underlying that provision.

We consider race and nationality criteria wrong partly because they
are irrelevant to individual qualities. Asylum is available to persons
persecuted on identifiable, generally collective grounds, not to victims of mysterious Kafkaesque attacks or people whose peril stems
from personal conflicts with powerful officials.418
The problems with "singling out" are not only theoretical. Most
"persecution" occurs in a context of "general" oppression or instability or both. It is rare that stable, tolerant, and democratic governments single out a few people for persecution. The more common
situations-those which prompted the 1951 Convention, the 1967
Protocol, and the 1980 Refugee Act-involve generally "oppressive,"
often unstable governments which treat certain groups in particularly abusive ways. Such governments sometimes do not care, and
often do not explore carefully, whether target individuals actually
have disfavored views or traits.419 When such attacks single out particular "social groups"-even if conducted with utter indifference as
to individual characteristics-they are "covered" persecution.
Rejecting groups as "too large" or "too diffuse" excludes many of
the world's most desperate refugees. It has the perverse effect of denying asylum to people who are the focus of persecution, if only that
focus is crude enough.42 0 When abuses are widespread and grotesque, victims meet the argument that their risk is not cognizable
because it is indistinguishable from that faced generally in their
country. The Ninth Circuit has occasionally recognized and avoided
this consequence. 421 However, there and elsewhere, threats which are
among the most likely to be carried out are often characterized as
"generalized" oppression and distinguished from persecution.
Pleas for asylum from countries at war provide a dramatic exam417. In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (BIA 1973).
418. See supra note 246.
419. See supra notes 347-52 and accompanying text.
420. One commentator has suggested that "[tihe message to tyrants is clear. Make
your atrocities random enough, and spare yourself the embarrassment of having your
subjects qualify for asylum in the United States." Rowe, Murder by Deportation,WASH.
MONTHLY,

Feb. 1984, at 13, 20.

421. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 1985) (exhibits
documenting Salvadoran government's abuse of civilians strengthens case); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) (fact that petitioner "resides in a
country where the lives and freedom of a large number of persons are threatened" does
not lessen significance of evidence of threat to his life or freedom).
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pie.422 Where segments of the community have taken up arms
against the government or vice versa, abusive acts are often ascribed
to the "horrors of war" as distinct from individualized "persecution, ''41 3 even though it is often "persecution" which provokes armed
resistance, 424 and425that same "persecution" rarely stops once "civil
war" breaks out. Persecution and "civil war" are often a contin-

422. For a discussion of the international legal regime concerning refugees from
war, including refugee law, the law of war, and international human rights law, see M.
VEUTHEY. RtFUGAS ET CONFLITS ARMtS (Projet de teste difinitifpour un manuel du
droit des rbfugibs en prbparationpour l'UNESCO) (1983); see also Coles, Some Reflections on the Protection of Refugees from Armed Conflict Situations, in 7 IN DEFENSE OF
THE ALIEN 78 (L. Tomasi ed. 1985). For a discussion of recent, abandoned efforts in
international fora to expand protection for refugees, see Note, The Definition of Refugee
in InternationalLaw: Proposalsfor the Future, 5 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 183 (1985);
Grahl-Madsen, Regulating the Refugees: U.N. Convention/Protocolon TerritorialAsylum and Legal Developments in Various Countries, in 5 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 64
(L. Tomasi ed. 1983).
423. This tendency was apparent in Acosta, though that decision does recognize
that divisions arising out of war may provide bases for asylum, listing "military leadership" as a "shared past experience" which might define a social group. In re Acosta,
Interim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985). Immigration judges have taken Acosta to extreme
and unwarranted lengths. One judge rejected a former national policeman's claim based
on his fear of the Salvadoran guerrillas, reasoning that "[in any event, the holding in
Acosta clearly excludes from consideration harm arising out of civil or military strife in
the country in question." In re (Name confidential), A24 028 838-New York City,
reported in 2 IMMIGR. L. & PROC. RPTR. BI-51 (1985) (Immigration Judge's Oral Decision at 8 (1983)).

424. Diskin & Sharpe, El Salvador, in CONFRONTING REVOLUTION, supra note
149, at 50, 53-54 (nonviolent direct action and armed insurgency arose out of collapse of
"reformist optimism" with 1972 electoral fraud and accompanying repression); Mandela,
The Casefor a Violent Resistance Movement, in THE AFRICA READER: INDEPENDENT

AFRICA 319-32 (1970) (repression of nonviolent protests against apartheid makes armed
struggle necessary); Trudeau & Schoultz, Guatemala, in CONFRONTING REVOLUTION,
supra note 149, at 23, 46 ("armed insurgency is largely a response to repression by the
military and oligarchy which has closed moderate avenues to reform").
425. For a discussion of Guatemala, see J. FRIED, M. GETTLEMAN, D. LEVENSON &
N. PECKENHAM, GUATEMALA IN REBELLION: UNFINISHED HISTORY 235-37, 240 (1983)

(reporting that as death squad activities dropped in cities in early 1980s, military campaigns, including scorched earth policies, bombing, massacres, and creation of "strategic
hamlets" in the countryside "clearly surpass in geographic scope and brutality anything
previously experienced in the country," and attributing the increase in violence to the
fact that "[t]he guerrilla opposition, strengthened by the support and participation of
large numbers of Guatemalans, particularly the country's Indian campesinos, is for the
first time mounting a serious threat to the regime"). In El Salvador and Guatemala, even
apparently "random" killings are often based on supposed indications of support for the
guerrillas. See R. BONNER, supra note 148, at 360 (on El Salvador); R. WHITE. THE
MORASS 104-06 (1984) (massacres in Guatemala have increased at times and places of
popular resistance, and Indians have been singled out because of rebel sympathies). The
Salvadoran death squads have shifted in recent years to fewer but more carefully focused
murders. Diskin & Sharpe, supra note 424, at 76-78.

uum, not sharply distinct phenomena.426 The basic meaning of a refugee is a person for whom the bonds of trust, loyalty, protection, and
assistance existing between citizen and country have been broken
and replaced by the relation of an oppressor to a victim. 1 7 Ironically, the most dramatic refusal by a government to protect a segment of its citizens-waging war against them-is often treated as
disqualifying for asylum purposes.
An examination of the changing hurdles facing Salvadoran petitioners illustrates this phenomenon. Salvadoran targets of death
squads428 were often denied asylum in the early 1980s on the
grounds that they had really come for "economic opportunity. '429
However, even the Reagan Administration eventually retreated to
some extent from that line. 43 Death squad activity has since been
largely though not wholly replaced by "regular" military force such
as bombing and artillery shelling of "hostile" areas.431 Fluctuations
in political violence, not economic variations, still best explain patterns of Salvadoran emigration. 32 Many Salvadorans seeking asylum have lost family members in bombing raids or have left because
4 33
they feared continued government bombing of their villages.
Salvadorans fleeing current military tactics-singling out villages
suspected of harboring guerrillas-are generally denied asylum on
the grounds that they are victims not of "persecution" but of the
"generalized horrors of war." Immigration judges and INS examina426. See, e.g., J.

MERRIMAN, THE AGONY OF THE REPUBLIC: THE REPRESSION OF

THE LEFT IN REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE, 1848-1851 (1978).

427.

In re Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986, at 33 (BIA 1985) (citing I A. GRAHL-

MADSEN, supra note 52, at 97, 100).

428. Death squads are ostensibly private, often officially well-connected groups,
which single out peasant, student, religious, and labor activists for intimidation and execution. See Pyes, Roots of the Salvadoran Right: Origins of the Death Squads, in EL
SALVADOR: CENTRAL AMERICAN IN THE NEW COLD WAR 86 (1987) [hereinafter EL
SALVADOR]; Christian, El Salvador's Divided Military, in EL SALVADOR, supra, at 90.
For estimates of the number of people killed and an analysis of the timing of violence,
see Stanley, supra note 379, at 135-36.
429. See Parker, Geneva Convention Protectionsfor Salvadoran Deportees, Immigr. Newsl., May-June 1984, at I (from 1980 to July 1983, 76 Salvadorans were
granted asylum and over 35,000 were deported).
430. See Dietrich, supra note 397.
431. This occurred partly because the congressional linkage of military aid to
human rights improvements gave the military a strong incentive to "clean up its act."
The "improvements" were noted by diverse commentators. Compare AMERICAS WATCH
& LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, FREE FIRE: A REPORT
ON HUMAN

RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR

(1984) with

KISSINGER

COMMISSION REPORT,

supra note 351, at 113, 115, 157-58.
432. Stanley, supra note 379, at 136. His data confirmed a shift away from departures based on death squad singling out of individuals toward decisions to leave prompted
by "sweep" attacks on whole communities.
433. See Diskin & Sharpe, supra note 424, at 50, 74-81 (noting shift from death
squads to "air war" and "indiscriminate" attacks on areas where the armed left is strong,
aimed at cutting off guerrillas' food supply by forcing civilians to flee).
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tion officers "make a distinction between people who have a wellfounded fear of death and those with a well-founded fear of
persecution. 43 4
It is true that Congress did not intend asylum for all wartime
"displaced persons. ' 43 5 However, attacks based on the political tendencies of a community sometimes are not merely the universal
"horrors of war," but constitute the singling out of a certain "social
group"-a geographic area with a distinct political history-for special abuse. The fact that such violence occurs in the context of war
should not bar victims from asylum eligibility. While the statutory
definition of "refugee" is narrower than the ordinary meaning, which
includes persons displaced by war, victims of war were within the

scope of Congress's concern and were central to that of the interna-

tional drafters.436 Victims of war were mentioned during the deliber-

ations on ratification of the 1967 Protocol.437 President Johnson
434.
435.

P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 43.
See supra notes 193, 408. Arguments that the United States is barred under

the Geneva Conventions or customary international law from deporting people to countries where civilians are mistreated in war have not prevailed. See Note, supra note 84.
436. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 608, supra note 12, at 18 (additional minority views of
Reps. Hyde and Sawyer) (we should make sure "that the other nations of the world are
doing their part to alleviate the misery caused by war and disruption"). Estimates of the
number of refugees in the world confirm that Congress was considering the plight of
victims of war, though its definition of refugee did not encompass all of them. One congressman said:
The largest part of the world's [14 million] refugees are the upward of 8 million in Africa, most of whom are not candidates for resettlement, 3 to 4 million
Palestinians. There are also refugees in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and in Latin
America ....
[T]he overwhelming majority of them are either candidates for
repatriation or for local resettlement locally. The situation in the Soviet Union
and in the countries of first asylum in Southeast Asia is unique. There, resettlement is the only option. This simply is not true elsewhere.
125 CONG. REc. 37,225 (1979) (statement of Rep. Fish). Victims of war were central to
the 1951 UN Convention, which covered only persons who became refugees as a result of
pre-1951 events, although not all victims of war qualified as refugees. UN GAOR Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.2/SR.22, at 6 (1951) (statement of Mr. Robinson, Israeli delegate) ("Nor did
that text cover all man-made events. There was no priovision, for example, for refugees
fleeing from hostilities unless they were otherwise covered by article 1 of the Convention."). However, the UN High Commissioner recognizes that wars do produce qualifying refugees. Senator Kennedy, reading a UN High Commissioner Report dated Sept.
13-18, 1981, stated:
The UNHCR should continue to express its concern to the United States government that its apparent failure to grant asylum to any significant number of
Salvadorans, coupled with continuing large-scale forcible and voluntary return
to El Salvador, would appear to represent a negation of its responsibilities assumed upon adherence to the Protocol.
128 CONG. REc. 5,827 (1982).
437. See CONG. REc. 27,757 (1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire on Ratification

noted that both "oppression" and war create "refugees. 438 While
the congressional definition of refugee does not include all displaced
persons, neither does it bar otherwise eligible persons because their
persecution occurs in the context of generalized violence.
If "persecution" is difficult to recognize in the context of civil war,
it is even harder during foreign wars, even though such episodes are
often used to suppress internal dissent.43 9 Revolutions have often
grown out of foreign wars. 44 People displaced by the "random"
events of civil as well as foreign war often become hostile to the
regimes they blame for that displacement, 441 and are sometimes
"singled out" for violent attacks as a consequence.442
Other disasters, including some partially "natural" in origin, involve similar government strategies. 443 For instance, denial of famine
relief to antigovernment areas 44 4 is not merely "generalized oppresof Protocol and UN Convention on Status of Refugees) ("During the period when we are
seeing a brutal civil war in Nigeria-Biafra and the reckless invasion of Czechoslovakia-both conflicts resulting in numerous refugees-it would be most fitting for the Senate to ratify the Convention and the Protocol and for the press to take notice of them.").
While "displaced persons," who were defined as refugees in the Senate bill, were not
included in the version of the Refugee Act which emerged from the Conference Committee in 1979, neither is there any suggestion that harms arising out of war could not
create a basis for protection.
438. 114 CONG. REC. 27,757-58 (1968) (Letter of transmission of Protocol and
UN Convention on Status of Refugees) ("Refugee problems in their origin and in their
resolution cannot be divorced from the strife, tensions, and oppression which are so detrimental to the well-being of nations and peoples.").
439. For a classic account, see V. BERGHAHN, GERMANY AND THE APPROACH OF
WAR IN1914, at 85-103, 165-68, 211-14 (1973).
440. THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES INWESTERN EUROPE 73-76 (C. Tilly
ed. 1975) (wartime exactions have provoked resistance, and state's weakness and diversion have encouraged enemies to rebel).
441. KISSINGER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 351, at 98-99. The report'noted
"[t]he refugee camps and overcrowded cities to which [Salvadoran and Guatemalan displaced persons] have fled become breeding grounds for discontent and frustration." Id. at
99.
442. For a discussion of Central America see, e.g., EL SALVADOR, supra note 428,
at 264-66 (describing an attack on refugees near Honduran border). For a discussion of
the Palestinians, see G. LENCZOWSKI. THE MIDDLE EAST IN WORLD AFFAIRS 492-97
(1980); D. SHIPLER, ARAB AND JEW: WOUNDED SPIRITS IN A PROMISED LAND 52-78
(1986). For a discussion of the special insecurity faced by women refugees in camps, see
N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1985, § 1, at 9, col. 1. See generally M. VEUTHEY, supra note 422,

at 5-6 (discussing "doubly victimized" refugees, who are first displaced and then attacked in refugee camps).
443. Famines are often considered unfortunate "natural" events for which Ameri-

can refugee law provides no relief. See Parker, Victims of NaturalDisasters in United
States Refugee Law and Policy, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L L. STUD. 91, 137. However,

roots of famines are sometimes more political and economic than meteorological. See
generally A. SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION

(1981) (the key question is not how much food "exists" but who can command
CONQUEST THE HARVEST OF SORROW:

what resources given entitlement relations); R.

(arguing that Stalin exacerbated Ukraine famine in order to break nationalist resistance to Soviet rule and peasant resistance to collectivization).
444. For a discussion of political manipulation of famine relief, see FOREIGN ARSOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE TERROR-FAMINE (1986)
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sion"; it is as "focused" as-and likely more effective than-more
"individualized" attacks on residents. The "social group" eligibility
criterion was designed to protect people facing persecution because
of some collective identity. That groups so persecuted may be large
or that their elevated risk may occur in the context of "general"
oppression or war are not disqualifying.
While many victims of war and oppression do not risk persecution
on a statutory basis, some do. Excluding such persons from protection either by narrow constructions of "social group" or by blanket
exclusion of victims of war or generalized oppression is inconsistent
with United States obligations under international law, and finds no
support in legislative intent or statutory language.
PART III. EVIDENCE ON SOCIAL GROUPS: THE POTENTIAL FOR
IMPROVED FACTFINDING
Part III of this Article moves beyond the question of how to inter-

pret "social group" to examine a related but even more fundamental
problem with asylum proceedings: refusal to take seriously petitioners' group-level evidence, and reliance instead on unannounced judicial notice and on United States government assertions about country conditions. Group-level evidence is frequently more available,
more reliable, and more easily contested than evidence about individual experiences which are physically, and sometimes temporally, remote. Increased use of group evidence could help shift asylum hearings from their current emphasis on uninformed speculations about
petitioners' credibility toward something closer to the adversary
model which American law generally accepts for truthseeking.
A more inclusive interpretation of "social group" would help immigration adjudicators deal -more adequately with "background" information, which is not specifically addressed to the applicant's case,
but which focuses on people similar to her. A broad definition of
"social group" would make relevant some. evidence discounted under
one or the other restrictive definition. Information addressing the
risks groups face would become relevant as group members became
EAS STUDIES, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, ETHIOPIA:

Nelson

& I.

Kaplan

3d ed. 1981);

A

COUNTRY STUDY

138-41 (H.

J. SHEPHERD, THE POLITICS OF STARVATION vi (1975)

(describing the Selassie regime's 1975 order to international agencies to cut off relief
efforts in Eritrea, based on fear that rebels might benefit). For recent developments, see
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, FAMINE, A MAN-MADE

DISASTER? 58-59 (1985) (United Nations has not been able to insist on a ceasefire to
allow effective relief operations in Eritrea and Tigre Province).

potentially eligible for asylum. Many applicants bring a "social
group" claim in addition to another type of claim.445 Often they
claim they are at risk for having expressed opinions, as well as because of group membership. Other petitioners might include groupbased claims were they not so often dismissed as a threshold matter;
some counsel may consider "social group" claims a "last resort," the
very assertion of which may weaken the case. Combined claims may
make sense in many of the strongest cases for asylum. For petitions
resting in whole or in part on group membership, removing arbitrary
restrictions on the definition of "social group" would make certain
group-level evidence relevant.
The role proposed here for "social group" in refugee determinations would require the INS and adjudicators confronted with petitions based on group membership to undertake useful and appropriate inquiries. They would have to examine the extent to which group
membership creates a risk of persecution, and the extent of supplemental individualized evidence, if any, required to establish eligibility for asylum or entitlement to withholding of deportation. Rather
than engaging in a complex analysis of whether a group is "cohesive," "voluntary," or "immutable"--or using an ad hoc, "common
sense" answer to bar many claims at the outset-adjudicators would
have to examine the extent to which particular activities and characteristics subject people to persecution.
In cases alleging persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, evidence on persons like the petitioner could
and should be admitted and given weight regardless of how "social
group" is defined. 446 The likelihood that certain opinions or traits
will result in persecution often varies among people of unequal economic and social status and connections. However, even in these
cases, a narrow conception of "relevance" has led to the exclusion or,
more often, discounting of group-level evidence. Increased familiarity with the diversity of "social groups" and the information available about them-and recognition of the extent to which governments
target groups as opposed to random individuals-could increase receptivity to group-level evidence even in cases alleging another basis
445. See, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (combining
"social group" and political opinion grounds); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir.
1988) (same).
446. The UN Handbook states that a refugee should show:
that his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable to him
for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there. These considerations need not necessarily be based
on the applicant's own personal experience. What, for example, happened to
his friends and relatives and other members of the same racial or social group
may well show that his fear. . .is well founded.
UN HANDBOOK, supra note 48,
42-43.
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for persecution.
A.

The Limits of Individual Testimony

Using group evidence where it is available would be a great improvement over the current adjudication method, which places excessive emphasis on judges' guesses as to applicants' credibility. This

can work to asylum seekers' advantage. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, who is responsible for overseeing compliance of state parties with the Protocol, recommends that because

refugees have difficulty obtaining proof, "coherent and plausible" accounts which are consistent with "generally known facts" be given

the "benefit of the doubt."4'47 However, United States courts have

refused to force any such requirement on generally unwilling administrators.448 For a combination of reasons, applicants with strong
cases often fail to offer an account of their experiences which clearly

establishes their eligibility or entitlement. The system does not help
them do so. 1-589 application forms ask refugees, many of whom are
unrepresented at that stage or have barely consulted with counsel,4 49
to answer English language questions whose wording comes right out

of the Refugee Act. 450 Failure to provide information at this stage

may be used against refugees who attempt to do so later.4 51 Information supplied in writing may be ignored if the applicant does not
manage to communicate it orally at the hearing.452
447. Id. %1203-04.
448. See infra note 580 (describing application of "substantial evidence"
standard).
449. For persons who enter by land, the 1-589 must often be completed when persons are first arrested near the border, where legal services are particularly strained. The
district court in Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 457, 522 (S.D.
Fla. 1980), modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th
Cir. 1982), found that adequately preparing an 1-589 form required 10 to 40 hours of an
attorney's time. This figure for Haitians may overestimate the average because of language barriers.
450. See app. (1-589 Form).
451. See, e.g., Mendez-Efrain v. INS, 813 F.2d 279, 281 (9th Cir. 1987) (immigration judge found petitioner not particularly credible, "based on his physical demeanor
and on the fact that much of his oral testimony was not included in his asylum application"); cf. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 526 (absence of information on 1-589s apparently
"has more to do with the accelerated procedure than the validity of the plaintiff's
claims").
452. See, e.g., Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 821 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir. 1987) (error occurred through unwaived absence of counsel when alien was unable to articulate the
basis of his fears of persecution under oral examination by the immigration judge and
INS counsel, and the immigration judge never considered his detailed and circumstantial
affidavit).

Deportation and exclusion hearings rarely feature the informal
practice common in other administrative hearings, where persons
"testify in a simple, natural and direct fashion, without unnecessary
interruptions from either the attorney who is directing the questioning or his adversary."4 53 Judges sometimes block counsel's attempts
to elicit the petitioner's account.454 In a number of cases, the INS
has attempted, sometimes successfully, 455 to keep counsel out of the
process altogether, despite the statutory right to retained or volunteer counsel. While persons who subsequently find counsel may be
able to obtain remand on this ground,456 many cases may end in deportation or "voluntary" departure rather than in discovery of a lawyer willing to help. Where aliens are unrepresented, judges are sup-

posed to ensure that the case is fully explored, but they often fail to
45
do so. 7
There are also more subtle reasons asylum seekers have trouble
establishing valid claims. Asylum seekers are often in custody when
they complete asylum applications; 45 8 to people mistreated by the

INS 4 59 or who are from countries where police brutality is common,
waiting to tell one's story to a judge rather than to captors may seem

prudent. 4 0 At the hearing, some asylum seekers try to establish "in-

453. E. CLEARY, K. BROUN, G. Dix, E. GELLHORN, D. KAYE, R. MEISENHOLDER, E.
ROBERTS & J. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 1012 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE].
454. In re Maroquin, reported in 61 INTERPRETER RELEASES 78 (1984) (nonprecedential decision, Oct. 28, 1983) (reversing denial of asylum and remanding because
judge's hypertechnical rulings sustaining numerous objections to evidence or lines of
questioning had denied applicant a fair chance to present his case).
455. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1500 (C.D. Cal. 1988)
("[t]ransfer to isolated detention facilities. . .frequently prevents class members from
obtaining legal representation").
456. See, e.g., Rio-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1985) (immigration
judge's grant of two continuances which totaled little more than two days' working time
was abuse of discretion where alien was in custody, spoke only Spanish, and had been
taken to a city nearly 3,000 miles from his only friend in the country).
457. Hentoff, Refugees Revisited, INQUIRY, Jan. 1984, at 14, (quoting United Nations High Commissioner to effect that United States follows a "consistent practice
designed to secure the return of Salvadorans, irrespective of the merits of their asylum
claims," and that hearings are "carried out in a pro-forma [sic] and perfunctory manner
designed to expedite cases as quickly as possible and that detainees were not given an
effective opportunity to adequately present their cases"). A district court recently concluded that "non-English speaking detainees unrepresented by counsel often have virtually no understanding of the [deportation] proceedings." Orantes-Hernandez, 685 F.
Supp. at 1508.
458. See supra note 126.
459. See Amnesty Group Accuses U.S. of MistreatingRefugees, Wash. Post, Dec.
11, 1980, at A38, col. 3 (Amnesty International reports "persistent reports of ill-treatment of refugees and workers who arrive in new countries without proper documents.
These included Mexicans and Haitians arriving in the United States."); 2 in Border Patrol are Found Guilty in First Case on Brutality to Aliens, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1980,
at A17, col. 1.
460. Helton, PoliticalAsylum Is Under Attack: Immigration Bill Threatens Refugees With New Restrictions, L.A. Times, Jan. 24, 1984, Pt. II, at 5, col. 3 (refugees
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nocence" of activity which would provoke the authorities' hostility,
naturally but mistakenly assuming that this will help, or at least not
hurt, their petitions. It may be difficult for refugees from "friendly"
regimes to understand that revealing antigovernment sentiments and
activity will strengthen their asylum cases, even though having the
same information become known by the United States client government could result in detention, torture, or death. Some may even
think the purpose of the hearing is to establish that things are so bad
in their home country that no one should be forced to return. Regardless of the character of the regime fled, even refugees' attorneys
often have difficulty establishing the trust necessary to find the true
underlying circumstances.4 6 ' Applicants' fears that information will
get back to their governments are sometimes exacerbated by the
INS,4 62 and are sometimes well founded.4 6 3 It is often difficult for
people who have been engaging in clandestine activities to speak
openly and firmly in a hearing; hesitancy is often seen as evidence of
fabrication.4 64 Linguistic differences aggravate communication diffi"easily intimidated by uniformed border authorities who are.

.

.reminiscent of repressive

authority figures in their home countries. Even if. . .aware of their right to apply for
asylum, they seldom do so immediately on arrival, but rather assert such claims only
after achieving more secure surroundings.").
461. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 355, at 27-35 (affidavit of an attorney
stating Iranian clients were obviously terrified of being deported and concerned he might
be "acting not in their interests but in the interests of the government of either the
United States or Iran"). See generally Schirmer, A Different Reality: The Central
American Refugee and the Lawyer, in SALVADORAN AND GUATEMALAN ASYLUM CASES:
A

PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS

app. 8-b (1985 & 1988 update) (on file with author).
462. Rowe, supra note 420, at 13, 16 (INS allegedly threatened an applicant that
if she refused voluntary departure she would not get asylum, she would be put in a cell
with men likely to sexually molest her, and Salvadoran authorities would be told what
she said). A district court recently found that INS officers routinely coerce "voluntary
departure" by informing Salvadorans that if they apply for asylum, they will lose, but
the information would be reported to El Salvador, and they would never be able to return. Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1497 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
463. See, e.g., Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 930 (1987) (remanding to BIA). The asylum seeker, who was mistakenly suspected of being a guerrilla leader, was discussed by the FBI and the Salvadoran government, which wished to prosecute her for possession of "subversive literature," including a
tape of assassinated Archbishop Oscar Romero's last sermon. The case was widely reported in the Salvadoran press, and the head of the Salvadoran military had asked to be
told the date and number of her return flight. Her asylum petition was rejected because
she refused to complete the form without assurances of confidentiality, which the immigration judge refused to give.
464. Kalin, Troubled Communication. Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in the
Asylum Hearing, 20 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 230 (1986). (former members of political
parties and groups illegal in their home countries have deeply internalized the values of
secrecy and suspicion toward all outsiders, and are not likely to open up, but rather

culties.46 5 Asylum applicants often speak as though466 or admit
that 467 everyone in their country is at comparable risk, even when a
more "sophisticated" analysis might reveal their own situation to be
especially dangerous. In light of the general truism that finders of
fact, not witnesses, decide what evidence means, 46 8 it is ironic that
asylum seekers' own conclusions on "ultimate issues of fact" receive
tremendous, often devastating, weight.
Asylum seekers often cannot corroborate what has happened to
them. Potential witnesses are usually abroad; those who are in the
United States often do not testify because they fear deportation or
reprisals from compatriots. 69 Witnesses who do come forth are often
distrusted 470 and sometimes excluded. 471 The absence of letters from
home containing detailed bad news is sometimes held against applicants,472 but letters which are received are often discounted as vague
express themselves in a reserved and hesitant manner).
465. See generally Anker & Rubin, The Right to Adequate Translation in Asylum Proceedings, 9 IMMIGR. J., July-Sept. 1986, at 10.
466. Salvadorans, for example, often state that they left "por la situaci6n"-because of the situation-and for a variety of reasons, including trauma and guilt
at having left others behind, they reveal individual details with great reluctance. OrantesHernandez, 685 F. Supp. at 1497.
467. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 355, at 21, 25-26 (Salvadoran
asylum seeker who left husband and two children, including a three-week-old baby, because of killings of family members, explained that "[m]y country is a victim of violence.
It is not just my family that has suffered these things. Thousands in El Salvador suffer as
I have.").
468. Lay and, sometimes, expert witnesses have historically been barred from
making such ultimate evaluative statements, and if something slipped out, the jury was
instructed to ignore it. While the rigid rules used to enforce the underlying principle have
been relaxed recently, see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 453, at 30-32, the

principle that the factfinder draws the conclusion remains.

469. The failure to produce witnesses seems to be common in administrative contexts involving people with limited resources. See J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN,
W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS

61 (1978) (though questioning frequently centers on how claimant spends the day, neighbors and former employers are virtually never called to testify) [hereinafter SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS].

470. In Platero-Cortez v. INS, 804 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1986), the petitioner produced a witness who claimed to be a former member of the Salvadoran National Guard
who had been ordered to kill the petitioner. He refused because petitioner was a friend of
his. The immigration judge found the witness's testimony not credible, both because of
atrocities he had committed as a Guardsman, and because of his friendship with the
applicant. The BIA found the testimony not credible on the friendship basis alone.
471. See, e.g., Najaf-Ali v. Meese, 653 F. Supp. 833, 837 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (immigration judge excluded testimony from Afghan's children because judge mistook counsel's purpose as being "mere corroboration," and because children could have little influence because "they would naturally be biased in favor of their mother").
472. In one hearing I attended, the judge asked the petitioner, an 18-year-old Salvadoran, what he had heard from his family lately. He responded that he had heard that
the situation was still bad, but that his family was afraid to give specific details. The
judge replied in a loud voice: "What do you mean? Letters are here. They aren't in El
Salvador." (paraphrase). The petitioner explained calmly that his parents write letters in
El Salvador and mail them to the United States.
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4 73

or unreliable.

Government responses rarely engage claims sufficiently to help
distinguish strong cases from weak ones. The INS can, through the
Department of State, locate foreign affiants to check the veracity of

their claims 4 74 or seek other relevant information. In practice, INS

attorneys with large caseloads rarely, if ever, research factual dimensions of individual cases,475 and embassy cooperation might not be
forthcoming if requested. 4761 At hearings, which are generally
brief, 477 trial attorneys sometimes seek to expose "discrepancies" in
petitioners' testimony, often minor ones on which courts have said
immigration judges should not rely. 478 Some INS attorneys use hearings to try to ferret out undocumented relatives who have not yet

come to the Service's attention. More relevantly, trial attorneys inquire about use of "smugglers," time spent elsewhere before coming
to the United States, and other factors seen as relevant to any discretionary determinations required. 4 9 However, they rarely offer evi-

dence on the central question of persecution or argue aggressively

473. See, e.g., Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting critically that "[t]he BIA also waved aside the four letters from [petitioner's] friends
as gratuitous and non-specific," pointing out that the writers' "understandable fear of
reprisal may... account for the letters' lack of specificity"). In other cases, courts of
appeals have been equally willing to ignore letters. See Young v. INS, 759 F.2d 450,
457-58 (5th Cir. 1985) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority was disregarding that BIA had ignored two letters and discounted without explanation another letter,
all of which supported petitioner's account that he had been fired because of his son's
political affiliation, and that the entire family would be in "grave danger of death, considering the current political situation").
474. See Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 628 (Ist Cir. 1985) (noting
INS's ability to dispute veracity of information, its significance, and authority of sources,
and to introduce conflicting evidence casting doubt on petitioner's allegations); CarvajalMunoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 578 (7th Cir. 1984). There is a rarely, if ever, used procedure to verify information connected with asylum applications in a confidential manner,
without disclosing that an asylum application has been filed. See Guevara Flores v. INS,
786 F.2d 1242, 1252 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986).
475. See, e.g., P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 32 (noting that lawyers representing Haitians claim that "[n]o matter what-issues are raised in the individual cases. . .the
INS submits essentially the same 'package' of responses").
476. When asked to track the fates of deportees to El Salvador, the Embassy personnel responsible apparently considered this task "ridiculous" and did not attempt seriously to do so. Rowe, supra note 420, at 20.
477. P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 6, 15 (hearings in New York often take up
to two hours, but New York lacks the southwestern atmosphere of crisis).
478. See infra note 502.
479. Apart from discretionary Immigration and Nationality Act section 208 asylum, many request voluntary departure-the "privilege" to go to a country of their own
choosing, at their own expense, without the collateral effects of deportation. See OrantesHernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1494 (C.D. Cal. 1988); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(1982) (voluntary departure procedures).

that the grounds for fear are not cognizable.4 0° Sophisticated crossexamination aimed at testing veracity is rare.481 INS trial attorneys
rarely play the role of one side in an adversarial process for truthseeking. Indeed, it would be irrational for INS attorneys to be more
thorough or aggressive in cases where the nationality of the applicant makes the chance that asylum will be granted extremely
remote.48 2
Without other evidence, judges' subjective impressions of claimants' credibility become determinative, yet usually they have little to
go on. Unsurprisingly, both administrative and judicial tribunals
make highly questionable findings. Immigration judges frequently
focus on minor, insignificant discrepancies. 83 Some have made ludicrously restrictive evidentiary rulings. 4 " A major factor in credibility
determinations is whether the claim is raised affirmatively (by initiating contact with the INS) or defensively (in deportation proceedings), even though approaching the INS is inadvisable for anyone of
a disfavored nationality, no matter how meritorious the case.485
When the only account presented is the petitioner's, occasionally
buttressed with testimony from friends or relatives, the adjudicator
cannot listen to "both sides" and determine which story seems more
persuasive, or whether the truth lies "in between." The judge hears
only one side, and may imagine alternative scenarios with no relation
to reality; the "check" imposed when adversaries agree on certain
points, or at least on what the issues are, is absent. Linguistic and
cultural differences and confusions, 486 as well as the anxiety inherent
480. See B. HING, HANDLING IMMIGRATION CASES 223 (1985) ("As a practical
matter... the INS attorney seldom offers documentary or rebutting evidence (aside from
the BHRHA letter). . . ."). Even in Sanchez-Trujillo, where the hearing spanned over
three weeks, the government offered no evidence beyond State Department advisory opinions. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 218, at 5.
481. Some countries, in contrast, rely heavily on detailed questioning by persons
knowledgeable about the country the applicant has left in assessing asylum claims. Martin, supra note 265, at 109-11.
482. On nationality discrimination, see N.Y. Times, supra note 121, at 41, col. 1.
483. See infra note 502.
484. Rowe, supra note 420, at 18, describes a case in which a lawyer in El Centro,
California, tried to show the immigration judge a wound on her Salvadoran client, and
brought a surgeon to testify that the wound was from a gunshot. The judge indicated
that he would accept no testimony short of a forensics expert who had witnessed the
shooting.
485. See P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 36, 53 (noting that INS officials, immigration judges, and State Department Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs staff "all act on the assumption that asylum applications made by people in exclusion or deportation proceedings are less likely to be valid than those made affirmatively prior to apprehension, and preferably by in-status entrants," but that given the
pattern of denials, Salvadorans with strong claims are often advised by counsel to wait
for the INS to find them).
486. Judges sometimes imagine discrepancies. See, e.g., Zavala-Bonilla v. INS,
730 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[d]espite a confusing series of questions, objections,
translations, and answers, [petitioner's] testimony overall does not contradict her asylum
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in speaking at a hearing where something as important as asylum is
at stake, make accurate "intuitions" as to credibility particularly improbable. The inherent subjectivity of such determinations makes
them vulnerable both to conscious political manipulation and to unconscious rationalization of results which do not "rock the boat."
There is reason to doubt a Ninth Circuit panel's optimism:
An immigration judge alone is in a position to observe an alien's tone and
demeanor, to explore inconsistencies in testimony, and to apply workable
and consistent standards in the evaluation of testimonial evidence. He is, by
virtue of his acquired skill, uniquely qualified to decide whether an alien's
testimony has about it the ring of truth. The courts of appeals should be far
less confident of
487 their ability to make such important, but often subtle,
determinations.
There is much greater skepticism in Congress 48 and among com-

mentators 489 about the quality of first-level asylum factfinding.

There are signs that this situation is improving. Moves to increase
immigration judges' financial and administrative autonomy4 90 had
little immediate effect, probably because most have come up through
INS enforcement or trial attorney ranks. 491 However, there has been
rapid turnover and expansion in recent years, and efforts have been
made to diversify the backgrounds of immigration judges. At least
one new judge has a background in immigrant advocacy, and a number have not worked in the INS. 9 2 New personnel have begun to
make a mark: more persons from disfavored nationalities have been
granted asylum in recent years.4 9 3 Despite these encouraging developments, the general picture remains bleak.
The situation before the BIA is only slightly better. The vast maapplication statement concerning names used by her children in El Salvador").
487. Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
488. The 1982 version of the Immigration Reform & Control Act provided that a
specialized corps of immigration judges would henceforth hear all asylum claims, and
that no former immigration judge could become a member. S.2222, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., § 124 (1982).
489. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Political-Asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany
and the Republic of France: Lessons for the United States, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 183,

234-36 (1984) (advocating independent agency to adjudicate asylum claims, and noting
that immigration judges lack specialized training, and thus rely excessively on State Department "advice").
490. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
491. Note, supra note 77, at 1364.
492. See New Immigration Judges Appointed, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 880
(1987).

493. Id. For example, Jeffrey Zlatow, who became an immigration judge in El
Centro, a detention center in the California desert, after solo immigration practice, has
apparently granted asylum to a substantial percentage of Salvadoran applicants. N.Y.
Times, May 8, 1988, § 1, at 16, col. 1.

jority of applicants from disfavored nationalities are denied asylum
initially, and many hearings generate plausible issues for appeal. In
New York, until mid-1987, one stage in the appeals process was
waiting for the INS to answer the appellant's brief. Generally, the
INS filed a very brief response setting forth the standards for BIA
review but failing to address the individual case. In a recent innovation, processing is no longer held up to wait for an INS answer at
all; files are forwarded to the BIA without any response, and the
BIA processes appeals without even noting the absence of opposition
papers. 494 BIA review is often perfunctory, 495 and the BIA's tendency to designate as precedential sweeping decisions denying asylum, while failing to publish the considerable number of decisions
granting asylum or remanding for further factfinding, creates an
anti-applicant slant. The Board generally relies on the record developed below. The BIA's tendency to designate as precedential sweeping decisions denying asylum, while failing to publish the considerable number of decisions granting asylum or remanding for further
factfinding, creates what has been described as an anti-applicant bias
for the asylum process. It generally accepts immigration judges'
credibility findings and overall conclusions; it occasionally substitutes
a rationale where one is missing496 or substitutes one more likely to

withstand review.497

Court of appeals review is more aggressive. However, most asylum
4 98
seekers lack the knowledge or resources to appeal to that level.
Many are barred from judicial review by failure to invoke administrative remedies in a timely manner;499 overworked counsel often find
494. Telephone interview with Anne Pilsbury, director of Central American Legal
Assistance, in Brooklyn, New York (Sept. 24, 1987).
495. See generally Note, supra note 412, at 706-09; see also Notre Dame Center
for Civil and Human Rights, Issue Summaries, in SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE POLICY, STAFF REPORT, app. C, 43, 64-65 (1980), reprinted in A. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 13, at 5-107, 5-113. The Notre Dame Center pointed out that:
In many instances, the complexity [of multiple levels of review] works against
an applicant's best interests by making every stage of the process appear pro
forma and dilatory, thus encouraging the exercise of available discretion either
to refuse an appeal altogether (as in the case of the BIA), or to render a decision which accepts without genuine inquiry the adequacy of the record generated below and the adequacy of the manner in which it was generated and
rights were interpreted.
Id.
496. In Martinez-Sanchez v. INS, 794 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986), the immigration judge's oral opinion said that petitioner's credibility was not established without
saying why, while the BIA explained that this finding was "on the basis of his demeanor
as well as the inconsistencies in the record." The court of appeals found that the inconsistencies were too minor to justify an adverse credibility finding.
497. For an example, see supra note 470.
498. See supra note 280.
499. In Townsend v. INS, 799 F.2d 179, 181 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986), the court found
the immigration judge's view that petitioner contradicted himself "dubious, at best," and
based on misunderstanding. It still dismissed the appeal because the petitioner had failed
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it difficult to keep closely in touch with clients who are trying to live
unobtrusively. Procedural defaults are likely to become more important if standards for reopening cases are tightened in the wake of
INS v. Abudu.50 0

Where judicial review is obtained, reversals and remands are common. Courts require that immigration judges set forth a "legitimate,
articulable basis" for doubts about credibility, 50 1 and sometimes find
that immigration judges seized improperly on minor, irrelevant discrepancies or confusions to justify adverse credibility findings.80 One
court of appeals disputed the BIA's characterization of detailed alle-

gations of violence
and threats aimed at family members as too
"conclusory." 50 3 Courts occasionally correct the view that having
5 04

motivations, in addition to fear, is disqualifying.
However, courts' ability to correct credibility determinations is
limited. Transcript quality is sometimes very poor. 5 Considerable
to exhaust administrative remedies since the BIA had rejected his appeal for containing
an inadequate statement of "Reasons for this Appeal." The court described the killing of
petitioner's father, national chair of the Liberian True Whig Party, and petitioner's involvement as head of the party's youth section, and observed that the petition "may have
had substantial merit." The court noted that the applicant might be eligible for another
form of relief from deportation based on long-term presence. Id. at 182.
500. 485 U.S. 94 (1988) (abuse of discretion standard applies to review of BIA
refusal to reopen deportation case, and Board did not abuse discretion in denying motion
to reopen on ground that alien had not reasonably explained his failure to assert asylum
claim at outset).
501. See, e.g., Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).
502. See, e.g., Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1984). Confusions on dates have been particularly popular. See Martinez-Sanchez v. INS, 794 F.2d
1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986) (there was confusion about precisely when petitioner had
joined Salvadoran right wing paramilitary group). Confusion over the date of entry,
before the question became highly material with the passage of the amnesty provisions of
the 1986 Immigration Reform & Control Act, was often taken by the BIA as probative
on the issue of credibility. See Platero-Cortez v. INS, 804 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding confusion over dates of entry and of prior deportation irrelevant to merits); cf. Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting INS's suggestion that confusion over date petitioner's father was killed undermined evidence, given
immigration judge's conclusion that applicant's testimony was credible).
503. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1985).
504. See, e.g., Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1985) (it
is not inconsistent with claimed fear of persecution that a refugee, after fleeing homeland, comes to United States seeking economic opportunities, nor need fear be the only
reason for fleeing); Najaf-Ali v. Meese, 663 F. Supp. 833, 836 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (immigration judge and BIA unreasonably inferred that petitioner left Afghanistan only to
regain support and companionship of family members in United States).
505. In McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 1986), the court counted 96
"indiscernibles" and noted that this was not a new problem. The court affirmed, finding
that the breakdowns in transcription were not at "critical junctures." However, it wrote

that "[t]ranscript deficiencies reflect adversely upon the integrity of the administrative
process, and upon the possibility of meaningful review during the critical appellate

deference is necessitated by the view that "demeanor" can justify
adverse findings.508 Credibility findings are often implicit and thus
hard to dispute.50 7 The absence of evidence beyond the applicant's
often poorly developed testimony usually means that nothing in the
record suggests that remand would be other than futile. Moreover,
while courts reject some hasty and ill-founded impressions of dishonesty508 where falsifications are discovered, courts of appeals, as well
as immigration judges, sometimes draw unwarranted conclusions.
Lies told in order to enter the United States or to shield relatives

from the INS5 00 are sometimes treated as evidence of basic untruthfulness on the underlying issues of persecution, ignoring the possibility that desperate fear based on a situation accurately reported
might induce generally honest people to lie. Some witnesses are
stage." Id. (footnote omitted).
506. See Artiga Turcios v. INS, 829 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1987); see also B.HING,
supra note 480, at 222 ("Unlike the personal statement... more preparation must be
given to hearing testimony, where demeanor, clarity, and personality come into play. It is
critical that the applicant practice... testimony, because there is no doubt that the cred-

ibility of the applicant has great influence over the adjudication of the application.").
507. See In re X.Y., May 10, 1984, transcript and opinion, reprinted in T.
ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 686-700. The petitioner reported having

been imprisoned and beaten by Tonton Macoutes, who accused him of speaking against
Duvalier. The immigration judge rendered a brief oral decision, which concluded:
The applicant has stated that he spent seven months in prison, but escaped
when he was taken on a work detail to clean a bridge. He has stated that he
escaped into the forest at that time. He has stated that he believes if he stayed
in Haiti he would die. Although, if his testimony is credible, previously he was
detained and obviously not killed. This is the sum, in essence, of the applicant's
testimony. . . In sum, the burden being upon the applicant to establish that
he would be subject to persecution should he return or be returned to Haiti and
the evidence of record reflecting essentially conjecture that he would be subject
to persecution should he return to Haiti, I must find that his claim is not sufficient to merit a grant of asylum.
Id. at 699-700. The Ninth Circuit has responded to the problem of implicit determinations by holding that absent express findings by the immigration judge and BIA on credibility, courts must presume that testimony was found credible. Artiga Turcios, 829 F.2d
at 720.
508. See supra notes 501-02 and accompanying text.
509. For an example of a lie told to enter the United States, see Sarvia-Quintanilla
v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1985). The immigration judge found the applicant's testimony that he had left a leftist group when he discovered that some members
intended to use violent tactics incredible, reasoning as follows: "The [petitioner] admitted
that he has lied to suit his purposes. He lied to get the Mexican passport in Mexico. He
lied in order to be deported to Mexico. It appears that [he] will tell whatever story he
feels will benefit his situation at the time." Id. The court of appeals found that "[g]iven
the petitioner's admitted history of dishonesty, the immigration judge's decision to give
his testimony 'very little weight' was the only reasonable one." Id. at 1393. But see
Turcio v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1987) (in the context of fear of deportation to El Salvador, a false statement to the INS "does not detract from but supports
[petitioner's] claim of fear of persecution"). The government noted in Sanchez-Trujillo
that one petitioner claimed not to know his father's immigration status, and that though
he testified at the asylum hearing that his sister had lived in Los Angeles since 1971, he
had previously stated on a 1980 asylum application that she was in El Salvador. Brief for
Respondent, supra note 259, at 7.
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found not credible for reasons that reflect how little adjudicators
know about the situations they are evaluating. In some particularly
frightening cases, accounts have been dismissed as "too stereotypical"5 10 or even too "bad" 511 to be plausible. As long as asylum decisions depend so heavily on whether the claimant's testimony is "accepted" or "rejected," life and death determinations will be based on
unreliable estimations of individual credibility.
B. The Promise of Group-Based Evidence
Not only do individual applicants find it very difficult to explain
themselves and be believed, but much of what needs to be proved
exceeds their own knowledge or capacity to articulate at a hearing.
While the petitioner is generally the best source of information on
his motivations, fear must be "well-founded" as well as genuine to
qualify for asylum, and persecution must be "more likely than not"
to require withholding of deportation. 51 2 Evaluating risk often requires information from people with special knowledge, including not
only persons with academic credentials, but others with relevant
knowledge such as journalists, businesspeople, diplomats, human
rights activists, missionaries, and even former "securities forces"
members. Such people are often willing and able to provide valuable
perspectives, and counsel seek them out. 513 Such information can educate factfinders.514 The current tendency to exclude or, more often,
ignore petitioners' evidence on broader questions does not "individualize" consideration; instead, the individual's testimony is considered
out of context, or placed in the context of a State Department account of her country's situation which she has no meaningful oppor510. Immigration officials dismissed many Haitians' accounts of imprisonment,
torture, and murder as falling into one of "the five basic Tonton Macoute stories." See P.
Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 31. That experiences like those reported were common
has been acknowledged by United States and international official sources. See J.
MILLER, supra note 280, at 25-26.
511. See In re Paniagua-Vides, A24 166 230-Los Angeles, at 20 (BIA 1985), reported in 2 IMMIGR. L. & PROC. RPTR. B1-53, 57 (1985) (BIA granted asylum, noting
that immigration judge had found expert witness not credible because "he paints a picture of conditions in El Salvador that are so bad that it is not believable").

512. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
513. See R. STEEL, supra note 27, at 273; B. HING,

supra note 480, at 222-23,
219-20.
514. See, e.g., In re Fuentes-Villacorta, A24 373 048-San Francisco (Immigration
Judge 1982), described in B. HING, supra note 480, at 226 (immigration judge persuaded by Amnesty International information, articles, and testimony that student activists are, as a group, subject to persecution).

tunity to contest. 515
Attempts by petitioners and their representatives to use material
that goes beyond the individual case are often of little avail. Expert
testimony poses special problems in immigration proceedings, and
seems to be avoided by immigration judges and INS attorneys. 5 ,
Judges sometimes exclude background information as too general to
cast light on the individual's claim.51 More often, particularly
where, due to vigorous representation, exclusion will likely bring remand, 518 the evidence is admitted but ignored. Experts are sometimes barred from speaking but are permitted to submit affidavits.
This preference for affidavits is, of course, strange in light of the
general stress in American legal proceedings on orality and the
"powerful engine" of cross-examination. 519 Relaxation of strict evi-

dentiary rules is supposed to maximize openness to probative evi-

dence; here, it sometimes creates a situation in which evidence comes
in an easily discounted, far from compelling, form. Decisions often
simply ignore expert affidavits, 520 and at least once, a decision was
rendered without reading the affidavit presented. 52' Immigration
515. See infra text accompanying notes 557-73.
516. See, e.g., In re X.Y., reprinted in T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note
21, at 694-96 (refusing to let Michael Posner of Lawyers' Committee for International
Human Rights testify, on grounds that his testimony would be too general). The government urged a similar approach in Sanchez-Trujillo. See Brief for Respondent, supra
note 259, at I I ("Several other witnesses testified at the joint deportation hearing over
the Government's objections. The bases for the trial attorney's objections were that none
of the witnesses knew the petitioners, and that much of their testimony about the general
conditions in El Salvador was repetitive."); id. at 14 (describing relevancy objection to a
religious organization human rights director's "historical information about El Salvador," because he did not know petitioners, and events he described had not occurred in
their towns).
517. Sometimes judges refuse to admit proffered materials into evidence; on other
occasions, the materials are admitted but given no weight. For an example of the former
approach, see In re X.Y., reprinted in T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at
697-98 (immigration judge barred newspaper articles as too general, adding that "maybe
I could be stretching a point a little if I said. . .it would be more likely to find something
about me in the newspaper articles than about Mr. X.Y.").
518. In re Exame, 18 1. & N. Dec. 303, 304-05 (BIA 1982) (exclusion of newspaper accounts, governmental, and nongovernmental reports improper).

519. See generally M. DAMASKA,

THE FACES OF JUSTICE

61-64 (1986).

520. In the BIA's consideration of the Sanchez-Trujillo claim, the Board essentially ignored the ample expert testimony, without giving any reasons for doing so. See
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 218.
521. In In re (Name Confidential), A27 479 990-New York City (Apr. 21, 1986),
an anthropologist was not allowed to testify in person, but wrote a detailed affidavit explaining that the petitioner's village was cohesive in terms of villager's self-perceptions
and marriage patterns, and that it was perceived by the government as cohesive for pur-

poses of collective retaliation for dissent. See L. Crandon, Affidavit, supra note 317. As a

courtesy, the attorney referred the judge to the "social group" discussion in SanchezTrujillo, 801 F. 2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986). For a discussion, see supra text accompanying
notes 208-75. The judge announced that he would render a decision the next morning
after reading the materials presented, in contrast to his usual policy of ruling on the spot.
The next morning, he dismissed the petition on the grounds that the petitioner's asylum

[VOL. 26: 739, 1989]

Social Groups
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

judges frequently ask counsel to "circle each place where respon-

dent's name appears" on documents offered into evidence, so they
can read only these sections. Since human rights reports rarely mention the petitioner's name, they are discounted or ignored as being
about general conditions rather than the petitioner's own situation.

While this dismissiveness occurs even with materials which discuss

particular segments of the population, the materials presented are

sometimes overly general. Representatives sometimes provide only
very general background material, failing to generate evidence on
522
persons similar to the petitioner.
The reluctance in asylum proceedings to take seriously evidence

beyond the petitioner's oral testimony has complex roots, the most
important ones being bureaucratic rather than doctrinal. In part, it
reflects the "processing" mentality of an institution with heavy
caseloads.52 3 The work routine of immigration judges resembles that
of bureaucrats far more than that of most judges. They generally
rule orally immediately after hearing testimony rather than writing
detailed opinions 524 requiring thought and, often, reconsideration.5 25
They rarely talk to colleagues about their decisions." 6 Oral argument is generally not permitted.5 27 Many first-level adjudicators apclaim, based on his status as a young, urban, working-class male who had not served in
the military-which was not his claim at all-had been rejected by the Ninth Circuit.
522. See P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 38 ("majority of case files prepared for
the Salvadorans contain little more than the application itself and, perhaps, a few newspaper articles and human rights reports on general conditions in El Salvador"); id. at 32
("lawyers [for Haitians] do not always, or are not always able, to show the connections
between their clients' cases and the general backgrolind materials they claim to be relevant"). A "master exhibit" developed for Haitians' cases was 700 pages long. See
Helton, The Most Ambitious Pro Bono Ever Attempted, 12 HuM. RTs. 18, 46 (Fall
1984).
523. This became most blatant in the "Haitian Program" in which:
Consistent with the result-oriented program designed to achieve numerical
goals in processing, the Travel Control section in the Miami office recorded the
daily totals of asylum applications processed. The tally sheet contained space
only for the total number of denials; there was no column for recording grants
of asylum.
Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1031 (5th Cir. 1982).
524. P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 13.
525. Social security administrative law judges must issue detailed opinions. The
staff attorneys to whom some of them delegate opinion-writing sometimes challenge the
initial conclusions. SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 469, at 90.
526. Cf. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 275, at 100-02 (suggesting that discussion improves decisionmaking on multijudge courts). Even district court judges talk to
each other and to clerks, and serve on appellate panels.
527. See, e.g., In re X.Y., reprinted in T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note
21, at 698 (judge refused to let lawyer present argument, saying that "normally, oral
argument is not part of the deportation hearings").

pear more concerned with finishing hearings rapidly than with ensuring that cases are presented fully.528
Disinterest in expert testimony may also reflect suspicion that
sympathetic experts might say anything to help people avoid deportation.529 Of course, expert partiality is not peculiar to asylum cases,
and financial interest-a powerful source of bias-is virtually absent, though political views and humanitarian concerns could distort
perception, analysis, or reporting. Concerns with reliability do not
normally result in excluding or ignoring specialized information;
rather, cross-examination and, where justified, other impeachment
measures are used to ensure that statements receive their proper
weight. Opposing experts are often brought in. The INS, in contrast,
has shown no interest in creating "battles of experts. 53 °
In summary, the adversary processes our judicial system generally
uses to test evidence, expert as well as lay, are largely absent from
immigration court. A processing mentality extends to many INS attorneys and some immigration judges. Even where expert affidavits
are accepted, INS attorneys rarely challenge their accuracy. Without adversary testing, adjudicators tend to discount drastically, and
without explanation, oral or affidavit testimony as well as documentary submissions.
Excluding or discounting rather than testing and incorporating
group evidence greatly reduces factfinding accuracy. Information is
not rendered irrelevant by virtue of being aggregative; in fact, it may
often be more trustworthy and probative than the individualized evidence which typically dominates asylum proceedings. It is always
difficult to evaluate highly "interested" persons' credibility; in asylum, the situation is complicated by cultural differences and the frequent unavailability of other witnesses. Courts have been troubled by
both perceived alternatives-granting refuge based solely on "selfserving" reports, or insisting upon external corroboration 5 3' which
528. See supra note 457 and accompanying text.
529. A similar phenomenon has emerged in social security disability hearings. Administrative law judges suspect that treating physicians will say whatever their patients
wish. The discounting is so marked that claimants have actually been worse off with
treating physician testimony than without it, even though treating physicians' reports
tend to support claims. SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 469, at
56. In social security cases, this discounting is fostered by the fact that treating physicians-the physicians of the poor-tend to be less impressive than evaluating physicians.

Id.

530. Even in the long hearing in Sanchez-Trujillo, a key test case for the potentially expansive "young male" theory, the INS did not counter petitioner's experts with

its own. The only evidence the government introduced was State Department advisory
opinions. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 218, at 5.
531. Compare Dawood-Haio v. INS, 800 F.2d 90, 96-97 (6th Cir. 1986) ("we
ought not to jump to the assumption that what [governments] have not documented they
have not done") with Daily v. INS, 744 F.2d 1191, 1195-97 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding one

petitioner's allegations of severe beating by police inadequate because "there is abso-
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5 32
may be hardest to come by in the most compelling cases.

In fact, even if it is assumed that applicants are honest and accurate, or that adjudicators can somehow cut through deception or error to ascertain what has happened to them in the past, background
evidence about experiences of similarly situated individuals may

often be more probative, and have less potential for misleading the
factfinder, than individualized evidence. Social psychologists have
demonstrated that listeners tend to exaggerate the probativeness of
"vivid" stories, while giving inadequate weight to background information on the frequency of certain traits or events in a population.533
Group evidence is relevant to assessing whether an event which appears to reduce danger-such as release from detention, acquittal of
"subversion," or dismissal of political charges-really means the person is safe. Group-oriented background information is relevant to determining how likely a threat is to culminate in persecution: "you'll
be sorry" obviously had a different significance in Mayor Daley's
Chicago than in General Videla's Argentina. Evidence of threats or
acts of persecution aimed at other group members could inform consideration of an individual's risk.534 Conversely, evidence that a
country respects human rights could cast doubt on a superficially
plausible claim by undermining the applicant's credibility, or by suggesting that expressions of official hostility would not culminate in

persecution. 535

lutely no evidence" to substantiate his "self-serving statement" and rejecting another
petitioner's statement, "as compelling as it is," as "subjective" and unverified).
532. See P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 50 ("people who are genuinely afraid
very often dispose, as quickly as possible, of anything in writing that might identify them
as dissenters or opponents, and they are especially reluctant to take such material with
them if they decide to flee").
533. See generally Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability:A Judgment of
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 430 (1972); Nisbett & Borgida, Attribution and the Psychology of Prediction, 32 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 932
(1975); Tversky & Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1973). For a summary of this literature,
see D. SCHNEIDER, A HASTORF & P. ELLSWORTH, PERSON PERCEPTION 233-39 (1979).

534. A commentator has noted that instead of viewing individual and group claims
in conjunction:
[T]he [Sanchez-Trujillo] court analyzed the group and individual claims separately, not allowing the one to inform the other. The individual persecution was
dismissed as isolated or coincidental. In this respect, the court's approach here
resembled its treatment of the cognizability issue: each step of analysis was
isolated from the others so that the interaction of elements could not come into
play.
Comment, supra note 47, at 937 n.177.
535. See, e.g., Chatila v. INS, 770 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting Venezuela's
excellent human rights record and dismissing asylum and withholding petitions).

For some closed, highly repressive, or little-studied societies it may
be impossible to obtain information on human rights violations. The
statistical information necessary to offer rigorous demonstrations on
individual risk will rarely if ever be available. Nevertheless, openness
to whatever information is available is preferable to the current pattern in which judges feel free to assert, based on unimproved "common sense," that danger never existed, has passed, or can be escaped
within the country. Using group-oriented evidence to supplement and
check "common sense" is particularly important in assessing both
objective and subjective levels of danger, because certain facts about
decisions to go into exile are nonintuitive or even counterintuitive.
The "common sense" that currently substitutes for such inquiry is a
pervasive and dangerous feature of asylum proceedings.
For instance, adjudicators often assume that persons who have not
been politically active will not be persecuted. This theme is most recurrent in cases involving people fleeing "friendly" regimes, suggesting that disparate treatment of persons fleeing leftist and rightist
regimes may be based partially on implicit distinctions between "totalitarian" regimes, which seek to control all aspects of people's lives
and demand active support, and "authoritarian" regimes, which tolerate a sizable private sphere and settle for passivity. 36 Courts have
recently begun to realize that, even in noncommunist countries, neutrality can be a political position which may bring reprisals.3 7 However, it is often assumed that nonactivists are not at risk, and therefore that their "true" motivation for leaving must have been poverty
or-of little more avail-dislike of "oppression" or fear of the "generalized horrors of war."
A pervasive intuition, or at least argument, is that poor people
with little formal education are seldom sufficiently politicized or
threatening to be worth persecuting. In Haitian Refugee Center v.
Civiletti,538 the government denied that Haitian asylum seekers
would be persecuted if forcibly returned, arguing that since most
536. For a discussion of this distinction, see Linz, Totalitarianand Authoritarian
Regimes, in 3 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 175 (1975).
537. The court in Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS reasoned as follows:

When a person is aware of contending political forces and affirmatively chooses
not to join any faction, that choice is a political one. A rule that one must
identify with one of two dominant warring political factions in order to possess
a political opinion, when many persons may, in fact, be opposed to the views
and policies of both, would frustrate one of the basic objectives of the Refugee
Act of 1980-to provide protection to all victims of persecution regardless of
ideology. Moreover, construing "political opinion" in so short-sighted and
grudging a manner could result in limiting... benefits... to those who join one
political extreme or another; moderates who choose to sit out a battle would
not qualify.
749 F.2d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1984).
538. 503 F. Supp. 442, 480 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee
Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
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were "uneducated," they were probably politically unaware and thus
excluded from actual or potential participation in opposition activities. Even conflicts with obvious political overtones were characterized as "personal.1 5 39 The district court correctly rejected the claim
that only intellectuals and leaders of parties could be classified as
M0 Over the long term,
political opponents of the Duvalier regime.5
however, similar views may have shaped United States responses to
Haitian refugees. 4 '
While a correlation between education and socioeconomic status,
on one hand, and "degree" of political awareness or sophistication,
on the other, has been asserted for the United States, 42 there is no
reason to believe that any such correlation can be extrapolated to the
entire globe. 43 Indeed, many governments quite rationally take mass
539. The Department of State argued that most victims of the Tonton Macoutes
and their successors, the National Security Volunteers, are not refugees, because they
left due to "differences of opinion with local officials; feuds with neighbors or members of
the Tonton-Macoutes; or personal difficulties with local law enforcement officials" rather
than because of their own "political opinions." See Palmer, Haitian Migration to the
U.S., CURRENT POLICY, No. 191, June 17, 1980, at 6 (published by Dep't of State,
Wash. D.C.). The district court in Civiletti described one determination:
Jocelyn. . .was arrested for his activities in a labor union, imprisoned, and brutally beaten. [Hearing Officer] McCormick testified that she concluded
Jocelyn's problems "were of a personal nature with a particular individual
within the Haitian Government." The only problem with this analysis is that
the person with whom Jocelyn had the dispute was Luc Desir, head of the
Haitian Secret Police.
503 F. Supp. at 528 (citation omitted).
540. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 480.
541. See Haitians Quietly Better Life in the City, Despite Their Fears, N.Y.
Times, May 22, 1984, at B1, col. 1, B2, col. 5. A former cabinet minister, one of few
Haitians to receive asylum, is quoted as saying:
The first wave of Haitian immigrants, mostly intellectuals who fled the repressive regime of Papa Doc Duvalier were generally well received here in the late
1950's and 1960's but when the non-qualified, illiterate masses tried to escape
the poverty and police harassment in the mid-1970's, the American society
tended to reject them-like a disease.
Id.
542. Though such a relationship has been asserted for the United States by many
political scientists, see, e.g., S. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN (1963); S. VERBA & N. NIE,
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA (1972); R. WOLFINGER & S. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES?

(1980), the assumptions and methodology underlying such work have been powerfully
criticized even for the domestic context. See, e.g., E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 104-06, 107, 110
(1960) (arguing that massive electoral abstention in United States cannot be "explained"
by demographic correlations to poverty and lack of formal education, but only with reference to "the way in which the alternatives in American politics are defined, the way in
which issues get referred to the public, the scale of competition and organization and
above all by what issues are developed.").
543. See, e.g., J. NASH, supra note 144, at ix-xxi (describing role of peasants, min-

threats more seriously than challenges by an isolated intellectual
elite. 5 " Even though persons who are not sufficiently prominent to
draw international or press attention but who have characteristics
which identify them to their governments as enemies may be at the
greatest risk,545 some courts have assumed that obscurity implies
safety.5 "
Narrower examples of dubious judicial notice also abound. Passage of time since threats or detentions is thought to suggest that the
government has "forgotten" the petitioner. 547 Immigration judges
sometimes suppose that persons facing a serious, personalized threat
would leave immediately, and that delay shows that the petitioner

felt no great alarm or faced little objective danger.548 In fact, persons
fleeing individual threats often do not leave as rapidly as persons
fleeing attacks on their villages, because they must go into hiding to
make preparations to get out of the country. 5 " Release from detention is taken to indicate that suspicions were "cleared up. '550 Another intuition held by many immigration judges and some courts is
that governments do not allow opponents to travel freely.55' Of
ers, factory workers, and urban poor in Bolivian democratization efforts). See generally
B. MOORE, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (1966); J. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE

(1985).

544. See generally C.

BERGQUIST, LABOR IN LATIN AMERICA: COMPARATIVE ESSAYS ON CHILE, ARGENTINA, VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA (1986); L. NORTH, BITTER
GROUNDS (1981) (in El Salvador, even if major massacres are excluded, the majority of

victims of political violence have been campesinos).

545.

In fact, Amnesty International uses letter writing and press coverage to make

governments aware that individual's fates are being monitored. See Amnesty International, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1294, 1295 (1987).
546. One court appears to have viewed prominence and risk as directly corelated,
noting that the Phillipine petitioner, who had attended lectures by Benito Aquino, who
was later assassinated, "has not... adduced evidence that he is a political leader of national notoriety, which might satisfy the clear probability standard by supporting a finding that [he] as an individual would be likely to be singled out for similar, even if less
drastic, persecution." Dolores v. INS, 772 F.2d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 1985).
547. See, e.g., Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[t]o prove
probable political persecution today [eight years after alleged arrest] [petitioner] would
have to provide some evidence that the Haitian government remembers him"). It is difficult to ascertain this without "reminding" the government.
543. See, e.g., Najaf-Ali v. Meese, 653 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (court
found that immigration judge had exaggerated amount of time petitioner spent in Afghanistan following her husband's abduction, and noted that during the time she remained, "the circle of persecution" was drawing closer and closer to her).
549. Stanley, supra note 379, at 142. For an example, see account of Salvadoran
actor in LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 355, at 43-44 ("I stayed in El Salvador after
the group had disbanded in order to get travel documents. During this time I stayed
hidden for about nine months.").
550. See, e.g., Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1985) (criticizing
this BIA theory because it would "lead to the absurd result of denying asylum to those
who have actually experienced persecution and were fortunate enough to survive arrest or
detention").
551. See, e.g., Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985) (fact that
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552
course, some governments are pleased when their enemies leave,
especially if they send money to their families.
Adjudicators often suggest that aliens can avoid danger by moving

within their own countries. 553 This may be impossible in planned

economies, where work and residence are assigned and difficult or
impossible to change. Even in capitalist countries, this may not be a
feasible road to safety where required identification papers indicate
place of origin, where settling in a new area effectively requires family connections, 554 or for people "blacklisted" by potential employers. 5 5 Sometimes the only domestic option is a refugee camp which
556
fails to offer personal security.
When immigration tribunals reject attempts by asylum applicants
to present information on "social groups" to which they belong, or
when they excessively discount such information, they are thrown
back on potentially misleading "common sense," and on materials
provided by the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
of the Department of State (BHRHA).55 7 By regulation, these repetitioner received exit permission cut against claim that persecution was likely). The
INS has often argued that people who can obtain and renew passports are not at risk,
although it also argues that illegal entrants lack credibility. P. Weiss Fagen, supra note
69, at 54. The INS recognizes that there are exceptions, and has directed field offices to
be aware of this possibility. See INS Clarifies Position on Asylum Seekers with Passports, 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 965 (1986).
552. Some courts have realized this. See, e.g., Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396,
1402 (9th Cir. 1987) ("persecutors may want to eliminate their political opposition and
to achieve that end will either persecute them or allow them to leave"); see also GarciaRamos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985) (passport obtained through bribe
had little or no relevance to risk).
553. See Quintanilla-Ticas v. INS, 783 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1986) ("deportation to El Salvador does not require petitioners to return to the area of the country where
they formerly lived").
554. See Kirmeyer, There's No 'Safe Haven' in El Salvador, Wash. Post, July 14,
1984, at A17, col. 2 ("While the western area of [El Salvador] is relatively less violent at
this time, persons without family ties to the west really have no means to become established in that area ..
").

555. Some observers believe that the Salvadoran government and business interests

maintain computerized "blacklists" which extend to low-level union activists. See Affidavit, Prepared for Asylum Case A27 677 033-New York City (Dec. 4, 1986) (author is a
member of the New York Committee for Democracy & Human Rights in El Salvador)
(on file with author); cf Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986) (petitioner
active in strike stated that participants were known by factory owners and felt
threatened, and that other workers who, like him, had pressed severance pay claims, were
killed by death squads).
556. See supra notes 441-42.
557. See generally Preston, Asylum Adjudications: Do State Department Advisory Opinions Violate Refugees' Rights and U.S. International Obligations?,45 MD. L.
REV. 91 (1986) (arguing that changes in way opinions are produced and presented, and
modifications in application procedures, could reduce frivolous claims and improve qual-
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ports were, until recently, a required part of the application process."' While these were supposed to reflect individualized examination of the petitioner's case, in practice the vast majority were
conclusory form letters. 559 They rarely discuss any particular "social
group" to which the petitioner belongs; they reflect, rather, the most
general kind of country-wide conclusions. Underlying evidence, if
any,5r 0 is revealed neither to the alien nor to the adjudicator; 561 Free-

dom of Information Act requests attempting to discover such materials are routinely ignored. 62
Decisions rarely if ever acknowledge reliance on advisory opinions.
In the wake of circuit court holdings disapproving of reliance on
State Department letters,56 3 immigration judges have taken to reciting that they have not relied on the reports.564 New regulations
abandon advisory opinions in routine cases. The BHRHA will no
longer provide the information available in State Department
"Country Conditions" Reports, but the BHRHA will still provide
information when it has specific insights concerning individual situations or situations of groups to which individuals belong which supplement materials in Country Reports. 65 The aspect of reports that
judges have found most persuasive-general country informaity of assessments).
558. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, 208.10 (1987). While the Reagan Administration at one
point proposed curtailing aliens' rights to present evidence and, in effect, greatly increasing the importance of State Department advisory opinions, see Helton, The Proposed
Asylum Rules: An Analysis, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1070 (1987), a subsequent proposal was published which would abandon advisory opinions altogether in "routine"
cases.
559. P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 55.
560. An empirical examination concludes that "[t]he [advisory] opinion, never
mandated by Congress, is the result of an ill-defined, haphazard, politicized process devoid of standards for assessing the validity of asylum claims." See Georgetown Univ.
Inst. for Public Representation, The State Department Advisory Opinion: A Due Process
Critique, GEO. U.L. CTR. IMMIGR. L. REP., Spring 1984, at 4, 43.
561. P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 10-11; R. STEEL, supra note 27, at 275.
Steel described the process:
The process of obtaining an opinion from the Bureau is essentially a closed one
in which neither the applicant nor his representative can become directly involved. The BHRHA makes its recommendation, based on information in the
particular case forwarded by the Immigration Service or Immigration Court
and its own background information. Its officers generally are not made available for depositions or examination.
Id. (citations omitted).
562. Cf. In re Exilus, 18 1. & N. Dec. 276 (BIA 1982) (refusal to allow asylum
applicant to submit interrogatories in connection with BHRHA opinion did not violate
due process).
563. See, e.g., Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 697 n.l (9th Cir. 1968); Zamora v.
INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1061-63 (2d Cir. 1976); Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d 824, 844 (6th Cir.
1970).
564. T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 705.
565. See INS Publishes Asylum Advisory Opinion Changes, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 159, app. VI (1988); BHRHA Cuts Down Advisory Opinions, 64 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1215 (1987).
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tion-will remain available, albeit not in the form of pseudo-individual opinions. Judges receive from State Department letters "cues" as
to the outcome the State Department prefers, 6 6 along with general
"country" information, which they take seriously even when skeptical about the basis for a particular recommendation. 67 Courts of
appeals sometimes accept State Department materials as highly probative, 568 despite criticisms of materials which purport to address individual cases but plainly do not. At least one immigration judge has
said in an interview that he would "never overrule" the State Department; knowledgeable observers consider this attitude typical.56 9
Keeping track of evolving human rights conditions around the world
is a difficult job and one for which most immigration judges are illprepared. Given the weakness of adversary testing and the tendency
to ignore petitioners' group-oriented evidence, judges are usually left
with little more than the State Department's position and applicants'
personal accounts on which to base their decisions. INS district directors depend even more on State Department
views in evaluating
5 70
claims of persons who apply affirmatively.
Thus, the government's "background" information and, when it
cares to be more specific, perspectives on particular social groups,
566. P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, summarized interviews with immigration
judges:
Several noted the presence of political factors and pressure in asylum cases,
especially with regard to the larger, more controversial groups, e.g.
Salvadorans, Haitians, and Poles. None would elaborate on the nature of these
political factors, and all asserted their independence of judgment, but some did
express the feeling that they were being obliged to make judicial decisions
which were more properly made in the political arena, and on political grounds.
For the immigration judges, as for the examinations officers, political judgements are seen as the domain of the Department of State.
Id. at 16.
567. Weiss Fagen found that "[]udges do not dispute State Department country
expertise, even if they may differ with advisory opinion letters on specific cases." Id.
568. See McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986) (permitting "official
notice" of certain information derived from department materials, and explaining that
"official notice" is broader than "judicial notice" because it allows consideration of a
wider range of accepted facts that are within agency expertise).
569. See Helton, The Refugee Act's Unfulfilled Promise, Project in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY: 1985 IN REVIEW 7 (1986) (quoting immigration judge: "I would never,
never overrule the State Department."); see also IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS: AN EVOLVING CONCEPT AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR

62 (June 1982) (quoting INS official
to this effect).
570. P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 12, 56 ("[iun New York the examinations
officers in the District Office acknowledge that they always follow the advisory opinions
if there is a positive or negative recommendation," and District Director Sava confirmed
this reliance on the State Department).
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

are already admitted. 'Both accounts by decisionmakers 5 1 and the
close correlation between outcomes and country of origin57 2 suggest
that this general information is extremely influential. Unlike most
industrial countries, in the United States human rights and refugee
organizations have no institutionalized role.573 Aliens' own efforts to
have group-oriented materials play an important role in decisions on
their cases are often rejected through explicit narrowing constructions of the "social group" criterion, or by a more amorphous requirement that petitioners provide "specific" evidence that they have
been "singled out" for persecution. Making reasonable inferences
about unfamiliar settings requires evidence transcending individual
experiences. Evidence about people similar to or close to the petitioner is the most probative. Though the extent to which group-level
evidence is probative will often be a difficult question, factfinding
would improve substantially if adjudicators welcomed such evidence
rather than ignoring anything that does not have the petitioner's
name on it.
C. BureaucraticConstraints and Evidentiary Reform
There are practical difficulties with the proposal for greater use of
group evidence. Some even apply, with less force, to denying adjudicators the shortcut of defining groups out of existence. If tribunals
deal so badly with current evidence and groups they do recognize,
increasing their responsibilities might exacerbate the problems. If
applicants often do not articulate their experiences persuasively,
leading adjudicators to expect evidence on similarly situated individuals may only accentuate their disadvantages.
However, these objections are weaker than they may at first appear. From the point of view of meeting the congressional goal of
571. Professor David Martin described his experiences at the State Department:
Many times I have heard INS officials speak as though the really important
decisions in every asylum case are made by the reviewing staff at the State
Department. This view is mistaken but understandable. . . . The Department's
acquaintance with conditions in foreign countries helps little in the actual adjudication. Knowing such conditions merely furnishes a rough guess about the
plausibility of the persecution risk that is claimed.
Asylum Adjudication: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee
Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprintedin
A. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 13, at 5-121, 5-122.
572. GAO REPORT, supra note 121 (Central Americans have a much lower approval rate than other applicants with similar claims; for those who described being tortured, four percent of Salvadorans, 15% of Nicaraguans, 64% of Iranians, and 80% of
Poles were granted asylum, and of the four countries examined, only Salvadorans were
actually deported).
573. P. Weiss Fagen, supra note 69, at 56. The role of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is also comparatively small in the United States. See Henkel, International Protection of Refugees, in 5 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 53 (L. Tomasi ed.
1983).
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bringing the United States practice into conformity with its international obligations, the changes proposed here can only improve matters. There are examples of careful and intelligent consideration of
".social group" claims, both here and abroad, and immigration adjudicators have sometimes proven capable of assimilating group evidence. Increasing numbers of immigration judges may become able
and willing to do so in the future. 57 4 Moreover, even given existing
time and financial constraints, increased use of group-level evidence
might make proceedings more genuinely adversarial. Whether or not
adversarial proceedings are the ideal way to handle asylum claims,5 75
they would be more revealing and fairer than bureaucratic processing and would require a less radical transition than alternatives. Introducing more group-level evidence might make judges more sophisticated triers of future claims; it holds more promise for this than
does hearing a much larger number of purely individual cases. Eliminating the option of defining "social group" claims out of existence
would remove a "path of least resistance" which causes the distribution of "error" to be lopsidedly against the .party with the greatest
stake in the proceedings. Finally, if existing institutions really require the shortcuts criticized here, courts should not pretend that the
process is functioning as Congress envisioned by ratifying the results.
These claims will now be discussed in more detail. Although some
immigration judges have an open approach to evidence and reach
unpredictable results, 576 asylum hearings rarely provide the individualized consideration Congress prescribed. This is most obvious for
national groups generating many applications, some of which must
have merit, but virtually none of which are granted. Even for nationalities receiving substantial grants, there is no assurance that those
protected are at greatest peril. The difference in quality of adjudication, as opposed to outcomes, appears small; the major difference is
that many Eastern Europeans have been granted asylum by INS district directors and thus avoided an adversary hearing altogether. 7 7
In any event, openness to group evidence could produce more feasible types of inquiry, thus improving hearings without substantially
574. See supra notes 488-93 and accompanying text.
575. For alternatives to the adversary system, see generally Aleinikoff, supra note
489; Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making: The Systems of Ten Countries, 19 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 235 (1983); Martin, supra note 265.
576. See supra notes 492-93 and accompanying text.
577. See GAO: Asylum Approval Rates, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 976 (1987)
(approval rates for Poles in Fiscal Year 1984 was ¢0% before district directors, but only

7.4% before immigration judges).

delaying adjudication and, where indicated, deportation. While the
INS is theoretically free to dispute the veracity and significance of
individualized accounts, 7 8 challenging group evidence is really more
feasible. The INS could seek experts to support its positions. It could
try to impeach petitioners' experts by exposing claims made on behalf of various asylum seekers which conflict with each other or with
academic writings subjected to peer criticism. The INS has belatedly
begun to establish internal procedures579for collecting information on
international human rights situations.
An obvious way to force the INS to deal with asylum seekers'
claims would be to require it to do so in order to win cases. Short of
such drastic reform, which may be inconsistent with substantial evidence review, 580 a more literal reading of "social group" and greater
openness to group evidence could lead adjudicators in some cases to
grant asylum based on group membership, on group evidence, or on
combinations of group and individual evidence. This might induce
the INS to contest such information, rather than waiting complacently for its almost inevitable "victory," and thus push asylum adju-

dications closer to an adversarial truthseeking process. Having to
take group evidence seriously could require both the INS and immigration judges to learn more about the countries of people whose
fates they determine. 81 .
Given the tremendous evidentiary difficulties asylum seekers already face, any proposal which might augment their burden deserves
skepticism. "Litigation imbalances" make expert and social science
evidence problematic: certain parties are vulnerable to expert testi-

578. See supra note 474.
579. See Attorney GeneralAnnounces New Asylum Policy Unit, 64 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 472, 473 (1987) (new unit will, inter alia, "[clompile and disseminate to INS
officers information concerning the persecution of persons in other countries on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion"); New Asylum Policy and Review Unit Created, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 439-40
(1987) (first director of new unit was former Director of Policy at State Department
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs).
580. See Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986) (proper standard of review is in between clear error and de novo review, and "to hold that once an
alien puts forth unrefuted and credible testimony he automatically satisfies his burden of
proof unless the INS comes forth with substantial evidence to rebut the testimony would
approximate de novo review"); Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259, 1265 n.4 (9th Cir.
1985) ("Congress allocated the burden of proving a clear probability of persecution to
the alien, and we cannot reallocate that burden under the guise of review.").
581. While in a "pure" adversary model, the less the arbiter knows the better,
asylum proceedings are not purely adversarial. Some petitioners are unrepresented, and
in those cases the judge is supposed to ensure that relevant evidence is brought out. It is
unrealistic to suppose that judges confronted with repeated petitions from members of
certain national groups could put aside all they had learned in other cases, and it would
not be desirable for them to do so. Most proposals for reform call for increasing, not
decreasing, adjudicators' levels of knowledge. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 489.
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mony which they lack the resources to refute.5 82 Reliance on individual testimony can benefit petitioners if adjudicators give credible accounts "the benefit of the doubt." In the asylum area, ironically,
refugees, many of whom are poor, seek to introduce expert evidence
and the government resists. In theory, use of social science and other
group-level evidence could favor the INS as the better endowed
party, but in practice increased openness to group-level evidence is
unlikely to prejudice asylum seekers. Specialized offices and pro
bono programs coordinate evidentiary research,58 3 and would likely
augment such efforts if this evidence became more important. University area studies and human rights programs generate considerable information about many countries; writings and live witnesses are
often available free of charge. In any event, the status quo is not that
supra-individual information is ignored in favor of individual circumstances, but that petitioner's attempts to influence the consideration
of broader factors are frustrated.
Group, as contrasted with individual, evidence involves economies
of scale for both sides in gathering information and potentially in
testing it as well. A "rule-making" approach--"listing" persecuted
"social groups"-would interfere with the right to present evidence.
Formal collective factfinding procedures could easily deteriorate: the
executive could "listen" to comments and then do whatever served
its own concerns. Nonetheless, with strong judicial or congressional
oversight, procedures might be developed which would permit both
asylum seekers and the government to marshal evidence more comprehensively and efficiently than in individual hearings and to test
that evidence carefully. For some countries or groups, eligibility may
be sufficiently widespread or individual factfinding sufficiently difficult that extended voluntary departure-a moratorium on deporta-

tions-makes more sense than individual hearings. Congress has allowed the executive to grant this status,5 8 and has considered doing
so itself for certain groups.58 5 In summary, increased openness to
group evidence might make hearings substantially more revealing
582. See Davis, supra note 298, at 1549-57, 1579-80, 1598-99 (contrasting success
of parents presenting expert testimony in custody cases with failure of poor parents to
invoke psychological parent theory to defend biological family from state intervention).
583.

See, e.g., A GUIDE TO AVAILABLE RESOURCES FOR GUATEMALAN ASYLUM

(K. Steinburg ed. 1986); Helton, supra note 522, at 21 (describing training programs and "master exhibits" developed by INS and Haitian Refugee Center). The
ACLU maintains a data base on assassinations in El Salvador.
CLAIMS

584. See supra note 103.
585. See supra note 116.

without greatly increasing the burden on petitioners, the INS, or the
adjudicative system.
Even if increased openness to "social group" evidence and "social
group" claims would overburden adjudication mechanisms, that is
no excuse for letting asylum seekers' procedural and substantive
rights be eviscerated. The entire immigration bureaucracy is understaffed relative to its tasks,586 and asylum may have particularly low
priority. 587 Although the recent amnesty is reducing INS and immigration court backlogs, the ratio of aliens to adjudicators may make
it impossible to consider petitions both quickly and adequately.,, 8 If
so, promptness should be sacrificed rather than adequacy of consideration: Congress has mandated substantive standards and procedural safeguards, not timetables. The tradeoff may be less sharp
than it superficially appears, in that judicial intervention prompted
by administrative abuses can itself disrupt immigration enforcement.589 To the extent that there is a tradeoff, some delays in expulsions should be tolerated in order to minimize the number of people
killed, tortured, and imprisoned. 90
586.

See generally M.

MORRIS,

supra note 136.

587. Helton, The Refugee Act's Unfilled Promise, in

WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY:

REVIEW 5 (1986).
588. As of August 1987, there were 69 immigration judges, plus four assistant
chief immigration judges. There were eight, with many responsibilities besides asylum, in
1985

IN

New York City. EOIR Updates List of Immigration Judges, 64

INTERPRETER RELEASES

922, 934 (1987). There are an estimated 100,000 undocumented Central Americans,
mostly Salvadorans, living in the New York City area. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1986, at Al
(quoting estimate of the Inter-Religious Task Force).
589. According to one commentator:
For through its use and misuse of "advisory opinions," and its systematic denial of due process to applicants from particular countries, the INS has not rid
itself of refugees, but has instead subjected itself to ever more vigilant, and
more critical, judicial scrutiny-scrutiny which has periodically brought exclusion and deportation machinery to a halt, and can be expected to do so again in
the future.
Scanlan, Who is a Refugee? Procedure and Burden of Proof Under the Refugee Act of
1980, in 5 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 23, 37 (L. Tomasi ed. 1983).
590. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Court prescribed a
test for "what process is due" in social security disability termination hearings which
examines:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. Further, as Justice Harlan explained elsewhere:
The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of these two types of
erroneous outcomes. . . . In a civil suit between twQ private parties for money
damages, for example, we view it as no more serious in general for there to be
an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous
verdict in the plaintiff's favor. . . . In a criminal case, on the other hand, we
do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to

Social Groups
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Like substantive standards, how many resources to devote to asylum adjudications and how to deploy them are ultimately decisions
for Congress. Congress has acted both to fulfill its sense of what our
history and values require, and to honor our international covenants.
The means it has chosen require complex case-by-case factfinding. If
more adjudicative or investigative resources are needed to implement
the Refugee Act properly, this is a problem for Congress. The execu5 91
tive has not requested more resources for asylum adjudications.
The executive and courts act improperly if they adopt shortcuts that
frustrate legislative intent, but proceed as though Congress's design
was being implemented.
CONCLUSION

I have argued that "social group" as used in the asylum eligibility
formula retains its ordinary, broad meaning. Recent conclusions that
surely Congress must have had in mind something narrower are both
factually incorrect and institutionally illegitimate. Administrative
and judicial tribunals should abandon the misguided and formidable
project of trying to determine whether "social groups" meet their
limiting definitions, and shift toward examining claims that certain
groups' members are targets for persecution. If they were to undertake that task seriously, group-level evidence would prove extremely

valuable not only in resolving newly cognizable "social group" claims
but in resolving evidentiary dilemmas which often arise in adjudicating other claims. The individualistic focus of current asylum
law-both theoretically, as reflected by attempts to narrow the "social group" criterion, and practically, as expressed by failure to take
advantage of group-based evidence-has helped to perpetuate the
exclusion from asylum eligibility of many persons whom Congress
mandated be protected in order to honor its recognized obligations
under international law.

the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
591. For a discussion of budget priorities, see Administration Budget Request
Shows Large Increasefor INS, Cuts for Refugee Programs, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES
29 (1987).
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